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The Rhetoric of the Fourth Amendment: 
Toward a More Persuasive Fourth 
Amendment 
Timothy C. MacDonnell 
Abstract 
In the last forty-five years, the United States Supreme Court’s 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has been under siege. As early as 
1971 one of the Court’s own members, Justice Harlan, stated there 
were “serious distortions and incongruities” in the Court’s Fourth 
Amendment case law. Since Justice Harlan’s criticism numerous 
scholars have echoed his dissatisfaction, calling the Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence “unstable and unconvincing,” a “tar-
baby,” and “a mass of contradiction and obscurity.” The Court itself 
seems as unconvinced by its own Fourth Amendment case law as 
the academic community. In 1967 the Court appeared to have 
placed the final nail in the trespass doctrine’s coffin, only to 
resurrect the theory in 2012. Between the 1980s and 2000s, the 
Court significantly altered the contours of the search incident to 
arrest doctrine with regard to automobiles. In 2006 the Randolph 
Court created the rule that one resident’s decision to permit police 
to search a home may not overrule another resident’s decision to 
prevent the search. Approximately eight years later, the Fernandez 
Court limited the applicability of the Randolph Court’s rule to such 
an extent as to make it virtually irrelevant.  
The focus of this Article is on why many Fourth Amendment 
opinions are unconvincing. To answer this question, I analyze 
various Fourth Amendment opinions by the Justices of the United 
States Supreme Court between 2005 and today. I examine and 
evaluate the persuasiveness of the Court’s Fourth Amendment 
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jurisprudence through the lens of classical rhetoric. Opinions are 
assessed based on three areas of persuasion: appeals to logic (logos); 
appeals to emotion (pathos); and appeals to credibility (ethos). By 
examining the Justices’ opinions in this fashion, patterns of 
unpersuasive opinion writing emerge. While a common source for 
all unpersuasive opinions is not available, common patterns of 
weak persuasion in particular appeals do exist. Weak appeals to 
ethos commonly stem from Justices failing to fully confront the 
doctrine of stare decisis. Weak pathos-based appeals often involve 
Justices engaging in misplaced emotive arguments, where a Justice 
seeks to persuade by appealing to emotions that are disconnected 
from the Fourth Amendment or the facts of the case. Logically weak 
arguments usually include one or more logical fallacies. Misplaced 
pathos appeals and weak logos appeals often leave readers with the 
sense that these flaws stem from poorly disguised outcome-directed 
opinions. Any opinion written in this fashion runs the risk of 
appearing like an elaborate rationalization and thereby being 
unconvincing. Additionally, I assert that apparent 
outcome-directed judicial opinions, particularly Supreme Court 
decisions, violate one of the core principles of classical and modern 
rhetoric— that persuasive speech should be modified to account for 
the expectations of an audience. 
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I. Introduction 
On June 25, 2014, the United States Supreme Court issued its 
decision in Riley v. California,1 in which it held that cell phones 
are safe from warrantless governmental searches incident to an 
arrest.2 In newspapers throughout the country, the decision was 
declared a great victory for privacy3 and, at least in this case, the 
                                                                                                     
 1. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
 2. See id. at 2495 (“Our answer to the question of what police must do before 
searching a cell phone seized incident to in arrest is accordingly simple—get a 
warrant.”). 
 3. See Supreme Court: Warrant Needed to Search Cellphones, TAMPA BAY 
TIMES (June 25, 2014), http://www.tbo.com/news/crime/supreme-court-warrant-
needed-to-search-cellphones-20140625/ (last visited on Dec. 15, 2016) (stating 
that the Court’s decision was “a strong defense of digital age privacy”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Adam Liptak, Justices, 9-0; Rule Cellphone 
Search Needs a Warrant, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/26/us/supreme-court-cellphones-search-privacy. 
html (last visited on Dec. 15, 2016) (calling the ruling “a sweeping victory for 
privacy rights”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); High Court 
Defends Personal Privacy, MERCURY NEWS (June 25, 2014), 
http://www.mercurynews.com/2014/06/25/high-court-defends-personal-privacy/ 
(last visited Dec. 10, 2016) (calling the decision an “emphatic defense”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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Justices of the Court were declared wise.4 While all true, there is 
more to be found in the Riley decision than just cell phone privacy.5  
Scholars and judges have observed that judicial opinions are 
“performative utterances . . . an expression that is not only 
articulated but also operative.”6 Senior Judge Ruggero J. Aldisert 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
observed that “a court’s public performance in reaching a 
conclusion is at least as important as the conclusion.”7 The 
Supreme Court has reached a similar conclusion, acknowledging 
that how the Court explains its decision is often as important as 
the ruling itself.8 When it comes to the Supreme Court, a pleasing 
result in a case is not, in and of itself, enough to declare it “a good 
opinion.”9 Nor is it enough that a concurrence or dissent supports 
the conclusion we may find prudent.  
                                                                                                     
 4. See Editorial, Court Wisely Protects Cellphones from Searches, BOS. 
GLOBE (June 27, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2014/06 
/26/court-wisely-protects-cellphones-from-searches/bo2HCPjgTz4PwUjUa1VI5M 
/story.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (approving of the Court’s decision) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Editorial, The Supreme Court Saves 
Cellphone Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/26/ 
opinion/the-supreme-court-saves-cellphone-privacy.html (last visited Dec. 15, 
2016) (expressing gratitude at the Court’s ruling) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 5. See, e.g., Adam M. Gershowitz, Google Glass While Driving, 47 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 755, 792–93 (2015) (noting that a search of a driver’s Google Glass would be 
impermissible under Riley’s search incident arrest doctrine); Laurie Buchan 
Serafino, Note, “I Know My Rights, So You Go’n Need a Warrant for That”: The 
Fourth Amendment, Riley’s Impact, and Warrantless Searches of Third-Party 
Clouds, 19 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 154, 205 (2014) (arguing that Riley’s standard 
should apply to data stored in clouds).  
 6. Dist. Council 47, Am. Fed. of State, County and Mun. Emp.’s v. Bradley, 
795 F.2d 310, 320 n.4 (3d Cir. 1986) (Aldisert, J. dissenting); see also Pintip 
Hompluem Dunn, Note, How Judges Overrule: Speech Act Theory and the 
Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 113 YALE L.J. 493, 499 (2003) (noting that judges’ speech 
must be performative in order to make law).  
 7. RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS: A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL 
THINKING 66 (3d ed. 1997). 
 8. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866 (1992) (“Thus, the 
Court’s legitimacy depends on making legally principled decisions under 
circumstances in which their principled character is sufficiently plausible to be 
accepted by the Nation.”). 
 9.  See infra Part III.A.2.a (noting that although the Supreme Court denied 
a warrantless search in Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2005), the opinion 
had limited practical effect). 
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A “good opinion” is expected to be many things. We expect it 
to be grounded in logic, to be clearly stated, and to credibly account 
for the impact of prior Court rulings.10 We also expect the opinion 
to demonstrate practical wisdom, thereby creating rules that will 
work in the “real world.”11 Additionally, the Court must be attuned 
to the intense emotions stirred by Fourth Amendment questions 
when balancing between privacy and security.12 In short, the 
decision must be persuasive. Persuasive opinions enhance the 
legitimacy of the Court in the eyes of the public, law enforcement, 
and lower courts.13 More importantly, persuasive opinions lay deep 
roots that grow over time, creating whole new subcategories of 
constitutional law.14 Over time, a particularly persuasive 
concurrence or dissent can outpace a majority opinion and become 
the new rule of law. Finally, persuasive opinions are more likely to 
be enforced broadly and consistently by lower courts, rather than 
being limited to the facts of the opinion or misinterpreted because 
                                                                                                     
 10. See S.I. Strong, Writing Reasoned Decisions and Opinions: A Guide For 
Novel, Experienced, and Foreign Judges, 2015 J. DISP. RESOL. 93, 102 (stating that 
courts must consider precedent and use precise language in creating binding 
authority). 
 11. See Melissa Murray, Real-Life Effects of Court Rulings Should Matter as 
Well as the Law, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/01/26/the-
supreme-court-meets-the-real-world/real-life-effects-of-court-rulings-should-matter-
as-well-as-the-law (last updated Mar. 18, 2016) (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) 
(arguing that courts should consider real-world consequences when reaching 
decisions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 12. See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting) (noting that many innocent people are subjected to unconstitutional 
searches). 
 13. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1659 (2015) (“Unlike the 
legislature or the executive, the judiciary ‘has no influence over either the sword 
or the purse’ . . . so its authority depends in large measure on the public’s 
willingness to respect and follow its decisions.” (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 
(Alexander Hamilton))); see also Earl M. Maltz, The Function of Supreme Court 
Opinions, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 1395, 1420 (2000) (“Without opinions, lower courts 
and other government officials would be faced with a set of holdings that, 
separately or together, could be taken to stand for any number of different legal 
rules.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Michael J. Turner, Comment, Fade to Black: The Formalization 
of Jackson’s Youngstown Taxonomy by Hamdan and Medellin, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 
665, 667 (2009) (noting that Justice Jackson’s classification of executive power 
into three parts “dominated subsequent separation of powers jurisprudence”). 
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the decision is illogical or just wrong.15 Riley v. California is a 
persuasive opinion.16  
It could be argued that the persuasiveness of Riley is a matter 
of no great significance. For one, the Justices of the Supreme Court 
possess some of the finest legal minds in the country.17 Further, at 
the heart of what it is to be a lawyer is the art and science of 
persuasion.18 Therefore, all Supreme Court decisions should be 
persuasive, and it should not come as a great surprise that Riley 
is. Of course, this is not the case with all Supreme Court opinions.19 
The Supreme Court’s post-Katz Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence has been vigorously criticized. It has been described 
as “arbitrary, unpredictable and often border[ing] on incoherent,”20 
“a vast jumble of judicial pronouncements that is not merely 
complex and contradictory, but often perverse,”21 and “a mass of 
                                                                                                     
 15.  See Kyle Nelson, Comment, Florida v. Jardines: A Shortsighted View of 
the Fourth Amendment, 49 GONZ. L. REV. 415, 426 (2013) (noting that Jardines 
“solidified an inadaptable standard, leaving the jurisprudence unsettled and 
ensuring that future cases will not be ‘easy’”).  
 16. See generally Adam M. Gershowitz, Symposium, Surprising Unanimity, 
Even More Surprising Clarity, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2014). But see generally 
Leslie A. Shoebotham, The Strife of Riley: The Search-Incident Consequences of 
Making an Easy Case Simple, 75 LA. L. REV. 29 (2014) (arguing that Riley stands 
for a dramatic shift in the Court’s search incident to arrest line of cases).  
 17. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., J.D.–Harvard Law School ’79; The 
Late Justice Antonin Scalia, LL.B.–Harvard Law School ’60; Justice Anthony 
Kennedy, LL.B.–Harvard Law School ’61; Justice Clarence Thomas, J.D.–Yale 
Law School ’74; Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, LL.B.–Columbia Law School ’59; 
Justice Steven Breyer, LL.B.–Harvard Law School ’64; Justice Samuel Alito, Jr., 
J.D.–Yale Law School ’75; Justice Sonia Sotomayor, J.D.–Yale Law School ’79; 
Justice Elena Kagan, J.D.–Harvard Law School ’86.  
 18. RONALD WAICUKAUSKI, PAUL M. SANDLER & JOANNE EPPS, THE 12 
SECRETS OF PERSUASIVE ARGUMENT, at v (2009) (“The essence that the great 
advocate adds to fact and law is an assessment of their implications for her client’s 
case, and an understanding of the way that the facts and law support her overall 
rationale.”).  
 19. See infra Part III.A.1.b (noting that Justice Scalia’s use of precedent in 
United States v. Jones “goes too far” and thus fails to persuade); see also infra 
Part III.A.1.c (asserting that Justice Stevens’s opinion in Illinois v. Caballes, 
unnecessarily reworked earlier precedent). 
 20. David E. Steinberg, Restoring the Fourth Amendment: The Original 
Understanding Revisited, 33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 47, 47 (2006). 
 21. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
757, 758 (1994). 
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contradictions and obscurities.”22 The Court has struggled to 
resolve fundamental Fourth Amendment questions including 
whether the Amendment contains a warrant presumption23 and 
the proper breadth of searches incident to arrest.24 Even recently, 
with the Court relying more and more consistently on the 
“reasonableness” doctrine,25 the Court has drawn criticism for 
favoring governmental interests over the privacy of individuals.26  
John G. Roberts became the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court in 2005.27 Since that time, the Supreme Court has written 
numerous Fourth Amendment opinions, with varying levels of 
persuasive power.28 Of the Fourth Amendment decisions issued 
between 2012 and 2015,29 seven have been deeply divided, 
                                                                                                     
 22. Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. 
REV. 1468, 1468 (1985). But see Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory 
of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 480 (2011) (offering a defense 
and explanation for the seeming inconsistency of the Supreme Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence). 
 23. See THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND 
INTERPRETATION 471–73 (2008) (discussing the Court’s various interpretations of 
the Fourth Amendment’s warrant clause); THOMAS N. MCINNIS, THE EVOLUTION 
OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 110–13 (2009) [hereinafter MCINNIS] (discussing the 
Court’s creation of exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement). 
 24. See Shoebotham, supra note 16, at 42 (discussing the debate surrounding 
the scope of the search incident to arrest doctrine). 
 25. Under this doctrine, the Court relies on the theory that “the ultimate 
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’” Brigham City v. 
Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). To determine whether a search or seizure is 
reasonable, the Court balances the intrusion the government commits against 
certain governmental interests, including law enforcement purposes and public 
safety. Id. 
 26. See Cynthia Lee, Reasonableness with Teeth: The Future of Fourth 
Amendment Reasonableness Analysis, 81 MISS. L.J. 1133, 1136 (2012) (noting that 
the Court’s reasonableness doctrine “tend[s] to be overly deferential to the 
government”); MCINNIS, supra note 23, at 282 (stating that the Court has 
“enlarged the power of the government”).  
 27. See Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, SUPREME 
COURT OF THE U.S. (Sept. 4, 2016), https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/ 
biographies.aspx (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (noting the date Chief Justice John 
Roberts assumed office) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 28. Infra Part III. 
 29. See generally City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015); City & 
Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015); Rodriguez v. United 
States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015); Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368 (2015); 
Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014); Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348 
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demonstrating that the Justices were unable to convince even one 
another.30 The Court’s majority opinion in cases like Maryland v. 
King31 and Navarette v. California,32 include questionable logic.33 
Even in a decision like United States v. Jones,34 where all the 
Justices agreed on the proper outcome of the case, they disagreed 
sharply about why.35 While this is not to say that disagreement 
among the Justices is to be condemned, the lack of optimal 
persuasiveness the disagreement evidences is to be avoided. When 
a Supreme Court opinion fails to persuade, the legitimacy of the 
decision is questioned.36 As stated above, because the Supreme 
Court is not elected, the Court’s legitimacy comes primarily from 
its power to persuade.37 Several of the Fourth Amendment 
                                                                                                     
(2014); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 
2012 (2014); Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014); Fernandez v. 
California, 134 S. Ct. 1126 (2014); Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013); 
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013); Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 
(2013); Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013); Bailey v. United States, 133 S. 
Ct. 1031 (2013); Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012); 
Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535 (2012); Ryburn v. Huff, 565 U.S. 469 
(2012); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 30. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015) (split 5 to 4 decision); 
Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015) (split 6 to 3 decision); 
Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014) (split 5 to 4 decision); Maryland v. 
King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (same); Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013) 
(same); Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013) (same); Florence v. Bd. of 
Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012) (same).  
 31. See 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1979–80 (2013) (authorizing the government to take 
an individual’s DNA when arrested for a serious felony). 
 32. See 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1690–92 (2014) (permitting a weakly substantiated 
anonymous tip to support a vehicle stop). 
 33. See infra Part III (discussing cases with questionable logic). 
 34. 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 35. See id. at 953, 957 (noting the Court’s disagreement on which legal 
standard should protect data collected from a GPS device).  
 36.  See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1659 (2015) (“Unlike the 
legislature or the executive, the judiciary ‘has no influence over either the sword 
or the purse’ . . . so its authority depends in large measure on the public’s 
willingness to respect and follow its decisions.”) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 
(Alexander Hamilton)). 
 37. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (“The Court’s 
power lies . . . in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows 
itself in people’s acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation’s 
law means and to declare what it demands.”); see also Henry M. Hart, Jr., 
Forward: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 99–101 (1959) 
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opinions issued by Justices on the Roberts Court are simply 
unpersuasive.38  
The purpose of this Article is to examine the persuasiveness of 
the Roberts Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. As part of 
that examination, the Article will analyze various Fourth 
Amendment opinions from the Court, including concurrences and 
dissents. The opinions will be examined applying primarily 
classical theories of rhetoric. The lens through which the opinions 
will be evaluated is Aristotelian (focusing on different Justices’ use 
of appeals to logic, emotion, and credibility). Upon evaluation of 
the Roberts Court’s Fourth Amendment opinions it becomes clear 
that, more than the modality of constitutional analysis, the use of 
effective rhetoric determines whether an opinion is a “good 
opinion.” Although restricting this Article to examining only the 
Fourth Amendment cases from 2005 forward is somewhat 
arbitrary, it has a purpose. By limiting the discussion in this 
fashion, the number of Fourth Amendment opinions is more 
manageable and more current.  
The Article is divided into three parts. Part II discusses 
classical rhetorical theory and how it will be used to evaluate the 
Roberts Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In this section 
I hope to convince readers that persuasion is a universal ideal. 
Although some of the measures of Aristotelian persuasion, like 
logos (logical reasoning), may seem to favor a formalist approach 
to constitutional theory, or like ethos (which includes the concept 
of practical wisdom), might appear to favor a pragmatic approach, 
Aristotle’s formula plays no favorites. I suggest that, regardless of 
the theoretical starting point, a Justice’s opinion must incorporate 
the core elements of effective rhetoric described by Aristotle and 
others to be fully persuasive. Part III of the Article applies these 
theories of rhetoric to several Fourth Amendment opinions issued 
by the Justices of the Roberts Court. This section examines 
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions, focusing on opinions 
                                                                                                     
(arguing that Supreme Court opinions can undermine the Court’s legitimacy 
because they are often poorly written and have an insufficient basis in law); 
Maltz, supra note 13, at 1397–400 (discussing arguments that well-crafted 
opinions increase the legitimacy of the Supreme Court and maintain its “ability 
to function effectively as a judicial institution”).  
 38. See supra note 33 (discussing Maryland v. King and Navarette v. 
California). 
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that demonstrate a weakness in a given area of evaluation. In Part 
IV, I suggest several root causes for the weak persuasion described 
in Part III.  
First, weaknesses in ethos are connected to the doctrine of 
stare decisis. In some decisions the weight of the doctrine seems to 
paralyze the Justices. Fearing an unwise precedent, the Justice 
opts for a decision that creates virtually no precedent at all. This 
approach results in a lack of clear precedent and violates the 
rhetorical principle of practical wisdom. Second, the constraining 
effect of stare decisis causes some Justices to overstate or 
understate precedent, claiming a case stands for a proposition that 
it simply does not. This undermines the ethos of an opinion by 
calling into question the author’s truthfulness or competence. 
Weak appeals to pathos and logos manifest very differently in 
opinions, but I suggest they often create the appearance that the 
opinion is an inadequately veiled outcome-based judicial opinion.39 
When a Justice has decided the outcome of an issue first and then 
seeks to fashion a reason to support the position, weaknesses in 
emotive- and logic-based arguments often occur. Such weaknesses 
can appear in pathos-based arguments that seek to stir anger or 
hate toward a criminal defendant instead of appealing to the 
emotional touchstones of the Fourth Amendment, privacy and 
security. Also, unveiled outcome-based judicial opinion writing 
often results in strained or fallacious logic. Opinions that appear 
outcome-directed are fundamentally less persuasive because they 
fail to comply with the expectations of the Court’s audience.  
II. Rhetoric: The Art and Science of Persuasion 
The attempt to distill persuasive communication into a system 
of analysis and application is thousands of years old.40 The search 
                                                                                                     
 39. It is important to note that this weakness is not intended as a negative 
judgment of judicial realism. The debate over judicial realism has been raging for 
decades and will no doubt continue for many more. This Article does not claim 
that the doctrine of legal formalism is better than legal realism. Rather, this 
Article asserts that the common expectation of the Court is that it is more 
formalist that realist. Thus, opinions that appear to be decided first and 
rationalized second are less persuasive.  
 40. See George A.Kennedy, Introduction to ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A 
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for this system (at least in western civilization) reached a high 
water mark between the fifth and third centuries B.C.E. in 
Greece.41 During this time teachers and philosophers debated the 
nature and purpose of rhetoric (persuasive communication).42 Out 
of this era of debate and critical thinking came one of the most 
important and comprehensive analyses of persuasive speech ever 
written, Aristotle’s The Rhetoric.43 The Rhetoric captured and 
organized the best of Greek teaching regarding persuasion, 
coupled with Aristotle’s own insights.44 
A. Classical Rhetorical Theory 
Before beginning an in-depth discussion of Aristotle’s theories 
on persuasion, it is valuable to briefly discuss the context in which 
these theories developed. Aristotle was born into an era of western 
civilization when rhetoric was the subject of intense debate and 
analysis.45 In the fifth century B.C.E., democracy began to take 
hold in Greece.46 As democracy grew so too did the need to 
influence audiences with persuasive arguments.47 Athenian 
                                                                                                     
THEORY OF CIVIL DISCOURSE 7 (George A. Kennedy trans., 2007) [hereinafter ON 
RHETORIC] (“The earliest known rhetorical handbook is The Instructions of 
Ptahhotep, composed by an Egyptian official sometime before 2000 B.C.E.”). 
Kennedy, one of the leading scholars on Aristotle, actually uses different titles 
when describing Aristotle’s treatise on rhetoric, calling it ON RHETORIC and 
RHETORIC interchangeably. Id. These alternative titles merely seem to reflect 
differences in translation. For the purposes of this Article, I will use The Rhetoric 
to refer to Aristotle’s writings on the subject. 
 41. See BRIAN VICKERS, IN DEFENCE OF RHETORIC 148–64 (1988) (discussing 
the development of rhetoric against rival classical Greek traditions). 
 42. See generally JAMES HERRICK, THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF RHETORIC: AN 
INTRODUCTION 32–69 (2001). The term rhetoric is first used by Plato in Gorgias. 
Id.  
 43. See id. at 87–88 (“[Aristotle’s] treatment of rhetoric remains one of the 
most complete and insightful ever penned.”). 
 44. See id. at 78 (noting Aristotle’s three divisions of rhetoric). 
 45. See id. at 77–78 (discussing Aristotle’s dispute with the sophists over 
rhetoric forms). 
 46. See id. at 32 (noting that Greek culture was shifting from an aristocracy 
to a democracy). 
 47. See id. (“[T]he key factor in personal success and public influence was no 
longer class but skill in persuasive speaking.”). 
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democracy included direct representation, entitling all citizens to 
vote.48 To be successful in this new style of government, persuasive 
oral communication was necessary.49 Additionally, there were no 
professional lawyers and enormous juries with hundreds of 
members resolved legal disputes.50 Thus, if a Greek citizen wanted 
to win a legal dispute, they often had to do it through their own 
skills of persuasion.51  
The importance of effective persuasion to Greek legal and 
political life gave rise to a group of teachers called sophists.52 The 
sophists generally were teachers from outside of the Greek city-
state where they taught.53 Sophists taught persuasive speech for 
money and some sophists claimed they could “persuade virtually 
anyone of anything.”54 Several opened schools in different Greek 
city-states to teach those who could pay.55 Several also wrote and 
published books on the subject of persuasive speech.56 
Suspicious of the sophists’ claims and hostile to their 
philosophy, Plato wrote the dialogue, Gorgias.57 In that dialogue, 
Plato asserted in effect that rhetoric was a tool of deception and 
those who practiced it were seeking their own ends rather than the 
                                                                                                     
 48. See id. (noting that “the new system guaranteed a broader distribution 
of power across different backgrounds, occupations, and economic statuses”). 
 49. See id. (noting that persuasive speaking was a key skill in Athenian 
society). 
 50. See JAMES D. WILLIAMS, AN INTRODUCTION TO CLASSICAL RHETORIC: 
ESSENTIAL READINGS 18 (2009) (“Athenian juries were large, ranging from several 
hundred to several thousand members . . . .”).  
 51. See E. W. Timberlake, Jr., Origin and Development of Advocacy as a 
Profession, 9 VA. L. REV. 25, 25 (1922) (“Among the ancient Greeks . . . . [t]he usual 
custom was for the client to lay his case before one of the great orators or writers 
of the day who would then prepare an oration which the client read or delivered 
at the trial.”). 
 52. See Edward M. Cope, Introduction to ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC WITH 
ANALYSIS NOTES AND APPENDICES 1–3 (1867) (discussing early developments of 
rhetoric taught by the sophists). 
 53. See HERRICK, supra note 42, at 37 (explaining that Athenians were 
skeptical of the sophists because they were foreigners).  
 54. Id. at 39. 
 55. See id. at 37 (noting Athenian skepticism of the sophists’ schools). 
 56. See id. at 42–45 (quoting from one prominent sophist’s writings). 
 57. See VICKERS, supra note 41, at 84 (noting that Plato wrote Gorgias 
attacking the sophists’ teaching of rhetoric). 
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truth.58 Gorgias was published in approximately 387 B.C.E., when 
Aristotle was three years old.59 Aristotle became Plato’s student 
and initially was a critic of the sophists.60 As time passed, however, 
his views on rhetoric diverged from Plato’s.61 Unlike Plato, 
Aristotle saw rhetoric as a valuable tool in the search for truth.62  
B. Aristotle’s The Rhetoric 
In The Rhetoric, Aristotle sought to provide a comprehensive 
analysis of persuasion.63 In doing so he defined rhetoric, described 
the different types and species of persuasion, the primary methods 
of persuasion present in all rhetoric, and the unique methods 
within specific species of persuasion.64 In the Introduction to his 
translation of The Rhetoric, George Kennedy, a scholar focusing on 
classical rhetoric, explains that Aristotle’s writings on rhetoric 
were never meant to be published.65 Rather, it is believed that 
much of the book is a compilation of lectures he gave to students 
in Athens.66 Further, Kennedy writes that The Rhetoric was not 
                                                                                                     
 58. See id. (“In the Gorgias, rhetoric is treated as subservient to politics.”).  
 59. See id. at 85 (explaining that the Gorgias was written around the time of 
Plato’s visit to Sicily in 389–87 B.C.E.); HERRICK, supra note 42, at 72 (noting that 
Aristotle was born in 384 B.C.E.). 
 60.  See HERRICK, supra note 42, at 73 (noting that Aristotle, “under the 
influence of Plato . . . was critical of rhetoric”) 
 61. See VICKERS, supra note 41, at 161 (defending rhetoric on grounds that 
it is misused by its speakers, rather than structurally flawed). 
 62. It could be argued that Plato did see a very limited specialized form of 
rhetoric that could be used to find truth. In another dialogue called The Phaedrus, 
Plato seems to imply that rhetoric can be a “true art” but to use it so would require 
the rhetor to be a philosopher. HERRICK, supra note 42, at 63.  
 63. See VICKERS, supra note 41, at 19 (“[Aristotle] will describe ‘the 
systematic principles of Rhetoric itself,’ and defines it as ‘the faculty of observing 
in any given case the available means of persuasion.’”) 
 64. See id. at 18–26 (presenting a comprehensive description of the forms of 
rhetoric). 
 65. See ON RHETORIC, supra note 40, at 17–18 (explaining that The Rhetoric 
was not published until three-hundred years after Aristotle’s death).  
 66. See id. at 18 (noting that Aristotle’s students were the intended audience 
of The Rhetoric). 
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the product of one or two years of study and writing, but was the 
product of decades of thinking, writing, and revising.67  
The Rhetoric begins with Aristotle’s explanation of what 
rhetoric is and why the study of rhetoric is important.68 He 
described rhetoric as “an ability, in each case, to see the available 
means of persuasion.”69 He explained that “persuasion occurs 
through the arguments when we show the truth or the apparent 
truth from whatever is persuasive in each case.”70 Although aware 
that rhetoric could be used to mislead,71 Aristotle nonetheless 
believed it was useful.72 He explained the primary value of 
studying rhetoric is to reach the truth and to convince others of the 
truth.73 Students of effective rhetoric should be able to argue both 
sides of an issue “in order that it may not escape [their] notice what 
the real state of the case is and that [they themselves] may be able 
to refute if another person uses speech unjustly.”74 Thus, “rhetoric 
is useful because the true and the just are by nature stronger than 
their opposites.”75 
After describing rhetoric, Aristotle divided the types of 
persuasive speech into three genres or species that are separated 
contextually and temporally.76 The first is deliberative speech.77 It 
is directed toward future events being resolved through the 
                                                                                                     
 67. See id. (discussing the various decades in which Aristotle developed The 
Rhetoric).  
 68. See id. at 30–37 (discussing Aristotle’s dissatisfaction with rhetorical 
practice and teaching).  
 69. Id. at 37. 
 70. Id. at 39. 
 71. See ON RHETORIC, supra note 40, at 31–32 (“[F]or it is wrong to warp the 
jury by leading them into anger or envy or pity: that is the same as if someone 
made a straight-edge ruler crooked before using it.”). 
 72. See id. at 35 (“[R]hetoric is useful, because the true and the just are by 
nature stronger than their opposites . . . .”). 
 73. See id. at 34 (“[I]t belongs to the same capacity both to see the true and 
what resembles the true . . . .”). 
 74. Id. at 35. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See id. at 46–50 (noting that for each species of rhetoric, there is a class 
to which the audience of the speeches belongs). 
 77. See id. at 48 (stating that deliberative advice is either exhortative or 
dissuasive). 
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political process.78 The second is judicial speech, which is 
sometimes called forensic speech.79 It is directed toward past 
events being resolved in a court of law.80 The final species is 
epideictic speech, which is concerned with evoking praise or 
condemnation in the context of a public address and is focused on 
producing a response in the present.81 Although each species of 
persuasion shares some common methods, The Rhetoric discussed 
the ways in which persuasion differs depending on the species.82  
Aristotle’s division of rhetoric into three species highlights one 
of the many challenges that Justices face when writing a Fourth 
Amendment opinion. The purpose of dividing rhetoric into three 
species is to optimize a rhetor’s persuasiveness by narrowing the 
objective of the rhetoric.83 Most Fourth Amendment opinions, 
however, will require a Justice to be persuasive in all three types 
of rhetoric. To be maximally persuasive, a Justice must convince 
her audience that she has been fair and just to the litigants in the 
case, established a wise and correct rule for the future, and 
properly praised or condemned the virtues and vices present in the 
case.84  
Next, Aristotle identified the three primary components of 
persuasion.85 This system has sometimes been described as a 
triangle to emphasize the unitary nature of Aristotle’s theory of 
                                                                                                     
 78. See id. (identifying future events to dissuade or exhort the audience). 
 79. See id. at 47 (urging against the term “forensic” speech, Kennedy denotes 
the confusion associated with the term). 
 80. See id. at 48 (prosecuting or defending concerns events of the past). 
 81. See id. at 47 (noting that in Aristotle’s time, epideictic speech was usually 
used at a funeral oration or a commemorative event). 
 82.  See id. (stating that there are three species of rhetoric due to the three 
classes to which hearers of speeches belong). 
 83. See id. (stating that the objective of the speech should relate to the 
audience). 
 84. See Brett G. Scharffs, The Character of Legal Reasoning, 61 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 733, 746–47 (2004) (arguing that judicial opinions must persuade 
other judges to join the opinion and later apply the opinion to other cases, and 
the parties to the case, who must feel they have been treated fairly and received 
due process). 
 85. See ON RHETORIC, supra note 40, at 111 (providing these components 
initially in Book I and further explaining them in Book II).  
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argumentation.86 Each of the three components of persuasion 
impacts the other, thus the theory is described as having three 
sides rather than three pillars.87 These components are ethos, 
logos, and pathos.88  
Ethos is “the character of the speaker”89 or said another way, 
“presenting the character of the speaker in a favorable light.”90 
Important to this component is that the audience’s belief in the 
character of the speaker “should result from the speech, not from 
a previous opinion that the speaker is a certain kind of person.”91 
Aristotle rejected the sophist belief that ethos was of little 
significance.92 He asserted “character is almost . . . the most 
authoritative form of persuasion.”93 The Rhetoric breaks ethos 
down further to include both “practical wisdom . . . [and] virtue.”94 
Thus, strong ethos appeals convince an audience that the 
presenter has good practical sense and so his or her position is the 
correct one and the presenter is competent and virtuous, and so 
can be trusted.95  
Within this Article, the ethos analysis will follow Aristotle’s 
suggestion closely. The first measure of analysis is the opinion’s 
virtue, or the competence and truthfulness of its author. This point 
of evaluation does not allege that any of the Supreme Court 
Justices have a bad character, but rather examines how various 
opinions deal with favorable and unfavorable precedent. The 
question is whether the author’s suggested account of prior Court 
                                                                                                     
 86. See, e.g., Aristotle’s Rhetorical Triangle, BLACK HILLS STATE UNIV., 
(2015), https://www.bhsu.edu/Portals/32/Rhetorical%20Appeals.pdf (depicting a 
triangle containing the three components of persuasion). 
 87. See Scharffs, supra note 84, at 756 (“Aristotle stressed that all three 
elements are essential and inexorably linked to successful persuasion.”). 
 88. See ON RHETORIC, supra note 40, at 38–39 (listing and characterizing 
each component). 
 89. Id. at 38. 
 90. Id. at 111. 
 91. Id. at 39. 
 92. See id. at 39 (disputing the notion that ethos did not contribute to 
persuasiveness).  
 93. Id. 
 94. ON RHETORIC, supra note 40, at 112. 
 95. See id. at 112–13 (stating that without practical sense the speaker will 
not form opinions correctly). 
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rulings hold together with the current ruling, or are we left to 
question whether the author of the opinion is correct or truly 
believes what he or she had written. Next, I will examine the 
practicality of the case opinion and the rule the opinion proposes. 
This point of evaluation will examine how clear and 
understandable the proposed rule is, and whether such a rule lends 
itself to application in real-world law enforcement.  
The next component of analysis is pathos. Aristotle explained 
that an audience can be persuaded “when they are led to feel 
emotion by the speech; for we do not give the same judgment when 
grieved and rejoicing or when being friendly and hostile.”96 
Aristotle devoted a fair amount of The Rhetoric to how emotion can 
be used as part of persuasion.97  
Although some might reject the idea that judges should 
incorporate appeals to emotion in their opinions, decisions 
involving the Fourth Amendment are often already emotionally 
charged.98 Failing to acknowledge the strong emotions stirred by 
Fourth Amendment decisions would be a mistake.99 In order for 
Justices to provide adequately persuasive opinions, they must 
either make allowances for these emotions or capitalize on them.  
The final method of persuasion Aristotle described is logos.100 
The Greek word logos literally means “what is said,” but in The 
                                                                                                     
 96. Id. 
 97. See id. at 38–39 (varying the discussion between emotions that the 
speaker wishes to elicit from the audience about herself, which is more in line 
with the concept of ethos, and those the speaker directs at a contrary opinion). 
In this section of the Article, pathos will be used to discuss emotions that the 
author seeks to elicit about an issue or individual involved in the case that is 
the subject of the judicial opinion. 
 98. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 23 (2003) (“The Fourth Amendment protects core 
interests essential to human flourishing; interests in privacy, property, and 
freedom of movement.”). 
 99. See Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First 
Century: Technology, Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
125, 129 (2002) (“To be sure, sometimes the Court’s cases unavoidably address 
the relevance of emotions involved in governmental searches, but this is done all 
too rarely, and when emotions are mentioned, the ones identified are usually 
rendered minimally important to the Court’s conclusions.”). 
 100. See ON RHETORIC, supra note 40, at 111 (identifying logos as the third 
component). 
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Rhetoric it seems clear that logos is the reason or logic that shows, 
or appears to show, something to be true.101 In this regard Aristotle 
explained that “there is on the one hand induction and on the other 
the syllogism and apparent syllogism.”102 Although the term 
syllogism has come to be associated with formal logic, Aristotle did 
not mean it to have so narrow a meaning.103 In The Rhetoric, he 
accepted that few premises that form the basis of syllogisms are 
necessarily true.104  
In this section of the Article, the logos analysis will evaluate 
the logic of various opinions. As part of this examination, the 
opinions will be distilled into syllogistic form and evaluated to 
determine whether the syllogism is sound on its face and then 
whether the foundation of the syllogism is strong or weak.  
III. Ethos, Pathos, and Logos as Applied 
As mentioned above, because of the interdependence of ethos, 
pathos, and logos, Aristotle’s formula is often described as a 
triangle.105 This metaphor is apt. If one, two, or all three sides of a 
triangle are out of proportion with one another, the shape’s 
stability is significantly lessened; so too with persuasion. The 
following section examines several Fourth Amendment opinions 
from Justices on the Roberts Court. These opinions have been 
selected because they illustrate weakness in the use of the 
individual components of persuasion.  
A. Ethos: The Foundation 
Aristotle’s vision of ethos is well summarized in the following 
passage: “[There is persuasion] through character whenever the 
                                                                                                     
 101. See id. at 39 (“Persuasion occurs through the arguments [logoi] when we 
show the truth or the apparent truth from whatever is persuasive in each case.”). 
 102. Id. at 40. 
 103. See id. (stating that it is always necessary to show something either by 
syllogizing or by inducing). 
 104. Id. at 40. 
 105. Supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
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speech is spoken in such a way as to make the speaker worthy of 
credence; for we believe fair-minded people to a greater extent and 
more quickly [than we do others], on all subjects.”106 As mentioned 
above, this section will discuss how ethos is affected through 
Justices’ use of precedent and their crafting of rules for real-world 
application. 
1. Credibility and Stare Decisis 
At points in The Rhetoric, Aristotle uses the terms ethos and 
character interchangeably and he treats both as synonymous with 
credibility.107 His point, which seems well made, is that an 
audience must first believe the advocate is correct and being 
truthful before they can believe the truth and accuracy of the 
advocate’s position.108 Thus, credibility has two components: 
competence and honesty.109 In the context of this discussion 
competence is demonstrated when the Justice’s opinion is 
comprehensive, showing that the Justice understands the relevant 
precedent impacting the case. Honesty means the judge is being 
truthful in his or her accounting of the law.  
Evaluating the credibility of a Justice’s opinion is a difficult 
matter. First, competence and honesty are not black and white 
determinations. Rather, both concepts move along a scale of more 
or less competent or honest. Further, it can be challenging to parse 
out what is an incredible opinion as opposed to an opinion with 
which a reader simply disagrees. Finally, it is important to note 
that what is being discussed in this Article is apparent competence 
and honesty. The Article does not assert that a particular Justice 
                                                                                                     
 106. ON RHETORIC, supra note 40, at 38. 
 107. See id. at 38–39 (claiming character is one of the most authoritative 
forms of persuasion). 
 108. But see Michael L. Wells, “Sociological Legitimacy” in Supreme Court 
Opinions, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1011, 1015–16 (2007) (arguing that Supreme 
Court opinions need not utilize valid arguments for the outcome to be in step 
with public expectations). 
 109. Cf. James C. McCroskey, Scales for the Measurement of Ethos, JAMES C. 
MCCROSKEY, http://www.jamescmccroskey.com/publications/22.htm (last 
updated Nov. 5, 2003) (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (identifying common 
components in the division of ethos comparable to the components suggested 
above) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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is, in fact, incompetent or dishonest. Rather, the Article asserts 
that certain common deficiencies in opinion writing results in 
opinions that appear less competent or less truthful.  
Below are three examples of opinions where I suggest Justices 
have offered opinions that suffer from weak credibility. In some 
opinions, the Justice has failed to fully account for language in 
earlier precedent that is contrary to their position. This failure can 
leave a reader wondering if the Justice either missed the contrary 
point or simply did not have a good answer and so chose not to 
address it. In two of the opinions below, the Justices appear to 
present a position that is different from an earlier opinion they 
wrote. Of course, a Justice may change his or her mind. In these 
opinions, however, the change in position is unexplained. Such a 
shift in position without an explanation can leave a reader with 
the sense of an untrustworthy position.  
a. Rodriguez v. United States 
The first opinion is Justice Thomas’s dissent in Rodriguez v. 
United States.110 The Rodriguez case was decided in 2015 and 
focused on the Court’s interpretation of Illinois v. Caballes.111 
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, claimed that the Court 
was “adher[ing] to the line drawn in [Caballes].”112 Justice Thomas 
in dissent claimed that the majority’s opinion could not “be 
reconciled with our decision in Caballes.”113  
In Rodriguez, a police officer pulled the defendant over for a 
traffic violation.114 The officer conducted all the business necessary 
to the traffic stop, issued Rodriquez a ticket, and then asked for 
permission to conduct a dog-sniff of Rodriquez’s vehicle.115 
                                                                                                     
 110. 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1617–24 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 111. 543 U.S. 405 (2005). Caballes was the Court’s 2005 decision where it held 
that a warrantless and suspicionless dog sniff of an automobile stopped for a 
traffic violation did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
 112. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1612. 
 113. Id. at 1617 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 114. See id. at 1612 (stating that the police officer pulled the defendant over 
for violating a Nebraska law which prohibited driving on a highway shoulder). 
 115. See id. at 1613 (“Although justification for the traffic stop was ‘out of the 
way,’ Struble asked for permission to walk his dog around Rodriguez’s vehicle.”). 
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Rodriguez refused.116 The officer next ordered Rodriguez to shut off 
his car and exit the vehicle.117 Approximately five minutes later 
another deputy arrived at the scene, and three minutes later the 
drug detection dog alerted.118 A search of the vehicle revealed a 
quantity of methamphetamine.119  
Before a Magistrate Judge, Rodriguez challenged the dog sniff 
as illegal because the officer prolonged the traffic stop without 
reasonable suspicion.120 The Magistrate Judge found that there 
was no reasonable suspicion for the officer to have prolonged the 
traffic stop once the citation was issued.121 He found, however, that 
the seven to eight minute additional detention amounted to a de 
minimis intrusion on Mr. Rodriguez’s rights and was thus 
permissible under the Fourth Amendment.122 The District Court 
adopted the Magistrate’s findings of fact and law, and the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.123 A majority of the Supreme 
Court reversed and remanded the case.124 
Justice Thomas dissented from the majority and was joined by 
Justices Alito and Kennedy.125 In his dissent, Justice Thomas 
                                                                                                     
 116. Id. 
 117. See id. (“Struble then instructed Rodriguez to turn off the ignition, exit 
the vehicle, and stand in front of the patrol car to wait for the second officer. 
Rodriguez complied.”). 
 118. See id. at 1612 (“The dog alerted to the presence of drugs halfway 
through Struble’s second pass. All told, seven or eight minutes had elapsed from 
the time Struble issued the written warning until the dog indicated the presence 
of drugs.”). 
 119. See id. (“A search of the vehicle revealed a large bag of 
methamphetamine.”). 
 120. See id. (“He moved to suppress the evidence seized from his car on the 
ground, among others, that Struble had prolonged the traffic stop without 
reasonable suspicion in order to conduct the dog sniff.”). 
 121. See id. (“The Magistrate Judge found no probable cause to search the 
vehicle independent of the dog alert.”). 
 122. Id. at 1613. 
 123. See id. at 1613–14 (“The court noted that, in the Eighth Circuit, ‘dog 
sniffs that occur within a short time following the completion of a traffic stop are 
not constitutionally prohibited if they constitute only de minimis intrusions.’” 
(quoting United States v. Alexander, 448 F.3d 1014, 1016 (8th Cir. 2006))). 
 124. See id. at 1617 (remanding to the Eighth Circuit to determine whether 
reasonable suspicion warranted expanding the time required for the drug stop). 
 125. Id. 
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repeatedly asserted that the majority’s opinion was contrary to 
Caballes.126 As part of that claim Justice Thomas stated, “[a]s 
Caballes makes clear, the fact that Officer Struble waited until 
after he gave Rodriguez the warning to conduct the dog sniff does 
not alter this analysis.”127 He also declared, “Caballes expressly 
anticipated that a traffic stop could be reasonably prolonged for 
officers to engage in a dog sniff.”128  
Justice Thomas’s statements regarding the Caballes decision 
are forceful and definitive, but the opinion does not support them. 
There are at least three errors in Justice Thomas’s 
characterization of Caballes. First, the Caballes Court was not 
required to resolve whether a traffic stop could be extended for the 
purpose of conducting a dog sniff.129 Second, the dicta of Caballes 
strongly supports a conclusion contrary to Justice Thomas’s 
position.130 Third, the Caballes Court offered an example of what 
would constitute an improper detention that strongly resembles 
the facts in Rodriguez.131 Each of these errors has the effect of 
weakening Justice Thomas’s opinion by suggesting a less than 
fully competent accounting of the Caballes case. 
The first problem with Justice Thomas’s claims regarding the 
controlling power of the Caballes decision is that Caballes did not 
reach the same issue as the Rodriquez decision. The question 
presented in Caballes was “[w]hether the Fourth Amendment 
requires reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drug-
                                                                                                     
 126. See id. at 1617–19, 1622 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s holding 
to the contrary cannot be reconciled with our decision in Caballes or a number of 
common police practices.”). 
 127. Id. at 1618. 
 128. Id. at 1619. 
 129. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005) (“The question on which 
we granted certiorari is narrow: ‘Whether the Fourth Amendment requires 
reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drug-detection dog to sniff a 
vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop.’” (citing Pet. for Cert. i.)). 
 130. See id. (“A seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a 
warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the 
time reasonably required to complete that mission.”). 
 131. See id. at 407–08 (“In an earlier case involving a dog sniff that occurred 
during an unreasonably prolonged traffic stop, the Illinois Supreme Court held 
that use of the dog and the subsequent discovery of contraband were the product 
of an unconstitutional seizure.”). 
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detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop.”132 
The majority in Caballes answered no.133 The essence of the 
majority opinion was that dog sniffs do not infringe on any 
legitimate privacy interest, so using a canine sniff during an 
otherwise lawful traffic stop raises no additional Fourth 
Amendment issue.134 An important part of the Caballes case was 
that the officer who stopped the defendant had not completed the 
traffic related components of the stop before the canine unit 
conducted its sweep of the vehicle.135 Given that the Caballes Court 
did not have to resolve the issue in Rodriguez,136 Justice Thomas’s 
claim that the majority opinion in Rodriguez was contrary to 
Caballes is an unsupported stretch.  
Second, although the Caballes Court never specifically 
reached the question raised in Rodriguez, the majority gave strong 
indications that if it had, its conclusion would have been contrary 
to Justice Thomas’s Rodriguez dissent. The majority in Caballes 
observed that the initial stop of Caballes was lawful but, “a seizure 
that is lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth Amendment if 
its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected 
by the Constitution.”137 The Court went on to explain that “[a] 
seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning 
ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond 
the time reasonably required to complete that mission.”138 This 
                                                                                                     
 132. Id. at 407. 
 133. See id. at 409 (“Moreover, respondent does not suggest that an erroneous 
alert, in and of itself, reveals any legitimate private information, and, in this case, 
the trial judge found that the dog sniff was sufficiently reliable to establish 
probable cause to conduct a full-blown search of the trunk.”). 
 134. See id. at 408 (finding that conduct merely revealing the possession of 
contraband does not compromise a legitimate privacy interest). 
 135. See id. at 406 (“While Gillette was in the process of writing a warning 
ticket, Graham walked his dog around respondent’s car.”). 
 136. Compare id. at 407 (stating that the issue was whether the Fourth 
Amendment requires reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a 
drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop), with 
Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015) (stating that the issue 
was whether police routinely may extend an otherwise-completed traffic stop, 
absent reasonable suspicion, in order to conduct a dog sniff).  
 137. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). 
 138. Id. 
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statement, although arguably dicta is, nonetheless, fairly explicit 
dicta.  
Justice Thomas tried to diffuse this language by claiming that: 
The dividing line [in Caballes] was whether the overall duration 
of the stop exceeded “the time reasonably required to complete 
th[e] mission,” not, as the majority suggests, whether the 
duration of the stop “in fact” exceeded the time necessary to 
complete the traffic-related inquiries.139 
There are at least two problems with Justice Thomas’s 
attempt to explain away this language. First, Justice Thomas 
placed emphasis on the Caballes Court’s decision to use the word 
“mission,” implying there is a difference between an officer’s 
“mission” when conducting a traffic stop and the officer’s “traffic 
related inquiries.”140 The context with which the Caballes Court 
used the term mission, however, does not support this 
construction. The Caballes Court explicitly links the word mission 
to the steps necessary to issuing a driver a ticket.141 Second, Justice 
Thomas suggested that the majority meant to draw a distinction 
between the time it actually takes to conduct a traffic stop and the 
time it reasonably should take to conduct a traffic stop.142 This 
distinction suggests that if the time it actually takes to complete a 
traffic stop is less than what might be viewed as reasonable, the 
officer can bank the saved time. Under this theory, if a police officer 
completed a traffic stop and issued a ticket in seven minutes, but 
the stop could have reasonably taken thirty minutes, the officer 
can detain the motorist for an additional twenty-three minutes of 
questioning. The Rodriguez majority commented on this idea, 
                                                                                                     
 139. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1619 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 140. See id. at 1616 (“If an officer can complete traffic-based inquiries 
expeditiously, then that is the amount of ‘time reasonably required to complete 
[the stop’s] mission.’” (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005))). 
 141. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005) (“A seizure that is 
justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become 
unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that 
mission.” (emphasis added)). 
 142. See Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1619–20 (2015) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the “dividing line” is what is reasonably 
required “not, as the majority suggests, whether the duration of the stop ‘in fact’ 
exceeded the time necessary”). 
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suggesting that Justice Thomas believes police “can earn bonus 
time to pursue an unrelated criminal investigation.”143  
Justice Thomas attempted to use this 
actual-versus-reasonable distinction to claim the majority in 
Caballes, “expressly anticipated that a traffic stop could be 
reasonably prolonged for officers to engage in a dog sniff.”144 This 
statement has no support in the Caballes decision. Moreover, it is 
contrary to one of the examples the majority in Caballes provided.  
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in Caballes, 
explained:  
In an earlier case involving a dog sniff that occurred during an 
unreasonably prolonged traffic stop, the Illinois Supreme Court 
held that use of the dog and the subsequent discovery of 
contraband were the product of an unconstitutional seizure. 
People v. Cox, 202 Ill.2d 462, 782 N.E.2d 275 (2002). We may 
assume that a similar result would be warranted in this case if 
the dog sniff had been conducted while respondent was being 
unlawfully detained.145 
Thus, had Caballes been factually the same as Cox, then the dog 
sniff in Caballes would have been illegal. In Cox, the officer 
conducted a lawful traffic stop because the defendant’s rear 
registration light was out.146 Immediately after stopping the 
defendant, the officer called for a canine unit.147 The dog arrived 
approximately fifteen minutes after the initial stop and before the 
officer had issued a ticket.148 In Cox, the Illinois Supreme Court 
found fifteen minutes was too long of a detention for the traffic 
                                                                                                     
 143. Id. at 1616 (majority opinion). 
 144. Id. at 1619 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 145. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407–08. 
 146. See People v. Cox, 782 N.E.2d 275, 277 (Ill. 2002) (“On July 18, 1998, at 
approximately 2:21 a.m., Officer Matt McCormick of the Fairfield police 
department stopped defendant’s vehicle because it did not have a rear 
registration light.”), overruled by People v. Brew, 866 N.E.2d 1002, 1007 (Ill. 2008) 
(“After the Caballes decisions, it is clear that a suspicionless dog sniff at a routine 
traffic stop is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment . . . While the specific and 
articulable facts prong of Cox is overruled, the duration prong still survives.”). 
 147. See Cox, 782 N.E.2d at 277 (“At the time of the stop, Officer McCormick 
called Deputy Dave Zola and asked him to bring his canine, Tango, to the scene.”). 
 148. See id. (arriving at the scene fifteen minutes after the call, Deputy Zola 
walked the dog around the defendant’s vehicle). 
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stop, and implied the officer stalled during the traffic stop in order 
for the canine unit to arrive.149 It is also noteworthy that in 
Caballes, from the start of the traffic stop to when the dog alerted 
to the presence of drugs, a total of ten minutes had passed.150 In 
Rodriguez, it took the officer twenty-one to twenty-two minutes to 
issue a ticket, five more minutes for the canine unit to arrive, and 
another two to three minutes before the dog alerted to the presence 
of drugs.151  
The Caballes case does not support Justice Thomas’s strong 
and definitive statements. In fact, Caballes is much more 
supportive of the majority’s position in Rodriguez than Justice 
Thomas’s. Additionally, claiming support from Caballes was 
unnecessary, as Justice Thomas’s arguments against the majority 
opinion did not require Caballes for resolution of the issue. The 
essence of Justice Thomas’s dissent was that the majority had 
strayed from the Fourth Amendment’s touchstone of 
reasonableness, and in doing so unnecessarily tied law 
enforcement’s hands during traffic stops.152 These claims could be 
valid whether or not he cited to Caballes. Further, Justice 
Thomas’s arguably strongest point in the dissent—that the 
majority has missed the distinction between a traffic stop based on 
reasonable suspicion and one based on probable cause153—did not 
rely on Caballes for its validity. The valuable points in Justice 
Thomas’s dissent are lost in his claims about Caballes.  
                                                                                                     
 149. See id. at 280 (“We have examined the record and find that it is devoid 
of circumstances which would justify the length of the detention. Rather, the 
record leads us to conclude this was a routine traffic stop, which should have 
resulted in a correspondingly abbreviated detention.”). 
 150. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 406 (2005) (“The entire incident 
lasted less than 10 minutes.”). 
 151. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1613 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
 152. See id. at 1617 (“The only question here is whether an officer executed a 
stop in a reasonable manner . . . . Because the stop was reasonably executed, no 
Fourth Amendment violation occurred.”). 
 153. See id. at 1620 (“On a more fundamental level, the majority’s inquiry 
elides the distinction between traffic stops based on probable cause and those 
based on reasonable suspicion.”).  
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b. United States v. Jones 
The next Fourth Amendment case from the Roberts Court 
discussed under the heading of ethos is Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion in United States v. Jones.154 Jones is one of the most 
significant Fourth Amendment decisions to come down from the 
Robert’s Court.155 In Jones, a majority of the Justices revised the 
test for determining whether the Fourth Amendment applies in a 
given situation.156 Before Jones, the Court applied the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test from Katz v. United States.157 The Katz 
test asks two questions to determine whether a Fourth 
Amendment interest is at stake: (1) did the defendant have an 
actual, subjective expectation of privacy; and (2) was it an 
expectation society is willing to recognize as legitimate.158 After 
Jones, the Court asks whether the Government has engaged in a 
warrantless physical trespass for the purpose of obtaining 
information and, if the answer is no, then the Court applies the 
Katz test.159  
In addition to being a transformative Fourth Amendment 
case, Jones is the culmination of Justice Scalia’s decades-long 
effort to close potential privacy gaps created when the Court 
adopted the Katz test.160 Although Justice Scalia achieved his 
                                                                                                     
 154. 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 155. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, United States v. Jones and the Future of 
Privacy Law: The Potential Far-Reaching Implications of the GPS Surveillance 
Case, BNA (Feb. 8, 2012), http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/dsolove/files/BNA-
Jones-FINAL.pdf (discussing Jones and noting that it is “a profound decision in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as well as in privacy law more generally”). 
 156. See id. (“Writing for the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia bases the 
Fourth Amendment analysis on a property rationale that had not been used much 
after the reasonable expectation of privacy test became the approach to 
determining whether there was a Fourth Amendment search.”). 
 157. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 158. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that, for example, a 
person’s home has an expectation of privacy, but an open area does not because 
society would be unwilling to recognize it as reasonable). 
 159. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 406 (“But we need not address the Government's 
contentions, because Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the 
Katz formulation.”).  
 160. See Timothy C. MacDonnell, Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment: Text, 
Context, Clarity, and Occasional Faint-Hearted Originalism, 3 VA. J. CRIM. L. 175, 
232 (2015) (“Jones is the culmination of Justice Scalia’s twenty-six-year long fight 
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objective, it was by a narrow margin. In Jones, all the Justices 
agreed on the outcome of the decision, but only four joined Justice 
Scalia’s opinion.161 Central to the disagreement was what role, if 
any, a trespass analysis should play in the Court’s opinion. Four 
Justices believed a trespass/property-based test was unnecessary 
and inappropriate to a modern analysis of the Fourth 
Amendment.162 Justice Scalia explained his approach by asserting 
that the Katz test did not replace the trespass doctrine, but merely 
supplemented it.163 It is this assertion that is the subject of the 
discussion below. 
The facts in Jones are fairly simple. Police suspected Jones of 
being involved in drug trafficking.164 As part of their investigation, 
they obtained a warrant authorizing them to place an electronic 
global positioning satellite tracking device on Jones’s vehicle.165 
The warrant had a time and location limitation.166 Police violated 
the warrant’s limitations and subsequently tracked the movement 
of Jones’s vehicle for over twenty days.167 The information derived 
from the GPS, along with other evidence, was used to convict Jones 
of possession and trafficking in illegal narcotics.168 Jones brought 
                                                                                                     
to alter the Court’s test for determining whether a Fourth Amendment interest is 
present in a given case.”).  
 161. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 401 (2012). 
 162. See id. at 401, 418–19 (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that utilizing 
outdated tort law concepts is “unwise”).  
 163. See id. at 409 (majority opinion) (“But as we have discussed, the Katz 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the 
common-law trespassory test.”). 
 164. See id. at 402 (“Jones, owner and operator of a nightclub in the District 
of Columbia, came under suspicion of trafficking in narcotics and was made the 
target of an investigation by a joint FBI and Metropolitan Police Department task 
force.”). 
 165. Id. at 402–03. 
 166. See id. (explaining that the warrant authorized installation of the GPS 
device in the District of Columbia within ten days). 
 167. See id. at 403 (describing how the agents violated the warrant by 
installing a GPS tracking device “[o]n the 11th day, and not in the District of 
Columbia but in Maryland” and then followed the movement of Jones’s vehicle 
“[o]ver the next 28 days”). 
 168. See id. at 403–04 (“The Government introduced at trial . . . GPS-derived 
locational data . . . which connected Jones to the alleged conspirators’ stash 
house . . . . The jury returned a guilty verdict.”). 
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a motion to suppress all evidence secured through and because of 
the government’s use of the GPS device.169 The question before the 
Supreme Court was whether the placement and subsequent use of 
the GPS device to track Jones’s movements were a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.170 The Court ruled these actions were.171 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, focused on the 
government’s physical intrusion on the defendant’s property.172 He 
stated, “It is important to be clear about what occurred in this case: 
The Government physically occupied private property for the 
purpose of obtaining information.”173 He went on to say that “[w]e 
have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been 
considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment when it was adopted.”174 Based on these facts, and the 
absence of a warrant, Justice Scalia found the Fourth Amendment 
had been violated.175 In responding to the government’s argument 
that the Katz test had not been violated, Justice Scalia wrote, 
“Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz 
formulation.”176 He then went on to claim that “the Katz 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not 
substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”177 Much of 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion is spent defending this claim.  
                                                                                                     
 169. See id. at 403 (“Jones filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained 
through the GPS device. The District Court granted the motion only in part, 
suppressing the data obtained while the vehicle was parked in the garage 
adjoining Jones’s residence . . . . It held the remaining data admissible.”). 
 170. See id. at 402 (“[D]ecid[ing] whether the attachment of a 
Global-Positioning-System (GPS) tracking device to an individual’s vehicle, and 
subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements on public 
streets, constitutes a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.”). 
 171. See id. at 404 (“We hold that the Government’s installation of a GPS 
device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s 
movements, constitutes a ‘search.’”). 
 172. See id. at 404–05 (explaining that “a vehicle is an ‘effect’” and that the 
Government physically occupied Jones’s vehicle to obtain information). 
 173. Id. at 404. 
 174. Id. at 404–05.  
 175. See id. at 404, 412 (finding that the admission of evidence obtained by 
warrantless physical intrusion was “an unconstitutional invasion of privacy”). 
 176. Id. at 400. 
 177. Id. at 409. 
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Justice Scalia’s assertion is bold. He claims, in effect, that the 
trespass test has been alive for the last fifty years and the Court 
simply has not expressly discussed or applied it.178 To support his 
position, he relies primarily on the traditional connection between 
the Fourth Amendment and property, portions of the Katz 
decision, and two post-Katz decisions.179 Although Justice Scalia’s 
argument is not without support, it simply goes too far, leaving 
readers to question whether Justice Scalia really believes his own 
argument.  
At least three pieces of substantial evidence stand against 
Justice Scalia’s assertion. First, the Katz opinion strongly signaled 
the Court’s decision to drop the trespass test from the status of a 
primary test to, at most, a subordinate sub-test.180 Second, the 
weight of time and subsequent decisions argue against Justice 
Scalia. In the last forty-five years, the United States Supreme 
Court has never relied on “the trespass test or doctrine” to resolve 
a Fourth Amendment issue.181 To be sure, the cases from the last 
fifty years establish that there is a relationship between property 
and the Fourth Amendment.182 They however, do not establish 
that the Court has been merely biding its time, waiting for the 
right case to fully reassert the trespass doctrine. Finally, Justice 
                                                                                                     
 178. See id. at 407 (“Katz did not erode the principle ‘that, when the 
Government does engage in physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area 
in order to obtain information, that intrusion may constitute a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.’” (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 
(1983))). 
 179. Id. at 407–08.  
 180. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (“We conclude that 
the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by our 
subsequent decisions that the ‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated can no longer 
be regarded as controlling.”). 
 181. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (“Our later cases 
have applied the analysis of Justice Harlan’s concurrence in [Katz], which said 
that a violation occurs when government officers violate a person’s ‘reasonable 
expectation of privacy.’” (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 360)). 
 182. See id. at 405 (describing the evolution of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence and its close connection to property (citing Kyllo v. United States, 
533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001))); see also id. at 407 (“Katz, the Court explained, established 
that ‘property rights are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations,’ 
but did not ‘snuf[f] out the previously recognized protection for property.’” (citing 
Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 64 (1992))). 
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Scalia’s own opinions have asserted conclusions contrary to the 
claim that the trespass test has merely been lying dormant.183  
Katz v. United States was the Jones decision of its day.184 In 
Katz, the Court brought to a close a chapter in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence that began with Justice Brandeis’s dissent in 
Olmstead v. United States.185 In Olmstead, Chief Justice Taft, 
writing for a majority of the Court, created the trespass doctrine.186 
                                                                                                     
 183. See generally Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); Minnesota v. 
Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring). See also cases cited infra note 
212 (citing Justice Scalia). 
 184. See Tom McInnis, The Changing Definition of Search or Seizure, 11.2 
A.B.A. INSIGHTS ON L. & SOC’Y 10, 12 (2011) (“Katz’s change in approach had the 
potential to enlarge the protections of the Fourth Amendment beyond those 
things specifically mentioned or directly implied in the amendment to include a 
wide variety of other human activities.”). 
 185. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead advocated 
that the Court apply a Fourth Amendment interpretation that was not limited to 
the trespass theory. Id. at 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). He noted that 
wire-tapping, whether through trespass or not, worked “[a]s a means of 
espionage, writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny instruments of 
tyranny and oppression when compared with wire tapping.” Id. at 476. 
 186. See id. at 466 (majority opinion). Chief Justice Taft writes that no 
violation of the Fourth Amendment can be found “unless there has been an official 
search and seizure of [the defendant], or such a seizure of his papers or his 
tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion of his house ‘or curtilage’ 
for the purpose of making a seizure.” Id. It is noteworthy that other Justices and 
scholars have asserted that the Olmstead decision did not rest on the trespass 
doctrine, but rather on the broad statement that the Fourth Amendment did not 
apply to the spoken word. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 n.* 
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]oday’s decision must be recognized as 
overruling Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, which essentially rested on 
the ground that conversations were not subject to the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment.”); see also id. at 369 (Black, J., dissenting) (“[M]y reading of the 
Olmstead and Goldman cases convinces me that they were decided on the basis 
of the inapplicability of the wording of the Fourth Amendment to eavesdropping, 
and not on any trespass basis.”). But see id. at 353 (majority opinion) (“It is true 
that the absence of [physical] penetration was at one time thought to foreclose 
further Fourth Amendment inquiry.”); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 633 
(1991) (discussing how Olmstead relied on trespass (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 353–
54)); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 138 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(citing Olmstead and Katz to note the trespass doctrine was overruled); United 
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 748 (1971) (noting that Olmstead was decided on 
trespass); William S. Doenges, Search and Seizure: The Physical Trespass 
Doctrine and the Adaption of the Fourth Amendment to Modern Technology, 2 
TULSA L.J. 180, 181 (1965) (discussing how Olmstead placed emphasis on the lack 
of “physical trespass” and found that “[i]n essence, a physical entry into the 
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In that same decision Justice Brandeis wrote a dissent where he 
argued, in effect, that physical intrusion into a constitutionally 
protected area was immaterial to whether a Fourth Amendment 
violation occurred.187 Justice Brandeis’s position ultimately won 
out.188 In Katz, the Court changed its test for determining whether 
a Fourth Amendment interest existed from the Olmstead trespass 
doctrine to the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test.189 
Under the old rule, a physical trespass into a constitutionally 
protected area was necessary in order for the Fourth Amendment 
to be violated.190 Under the Katz “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” test, a physical trespass was no longer necessary to 
conclude the Fourth Amendment was violated.191 Of course, this 
does not resolve the question in Jones.  
The fact that a trespass is no longer necessary to determine 
that a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred is not the same 
as saying that when a trespass has occurred, it is not necessarily a 
Fourth Amendment violation. The simple fact is that the Katz 
decision never truly resolved this issue.192 The focus of the majority 
                                                                                                     
victim’s premises was necessary before he could complain that his rights were 
violated”). 
 187. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473–79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(“Applying to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments the established rule of 
construction . . . . It is, of course, immaterial where the physical 
connection . . . into the defendants’ premises was made.”). 
 188. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (“[O]nce it is recognized that the Fourth 
Amendment protects people—and not simply ‘areas’—against unreasonable 
searches and seizures it becomes clear that the reach of the Fourth Amendment 
cannot turn upon . . . a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.”). 
 189. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“My understanding of the rule 
that has emerged . . . is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person 
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the 
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”). 
 190. See id. at 349 (majority opinion) (explaining that prior to this case the 
rule for determining violations of the Fourth Amendment was based on “physical 
entrance” (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457, 464, 466 (1928))). 
 191. See id. at 353 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment protects both 
people and areas against unreasonable searches and seizures regardless of a 
trespass). 
 192. See id. at 350 (“[T]he correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is 
not necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase ‘constitutionally protected 
area’ . . . . [T]he Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general 
constitutional ‘right to privacy.’”); see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 
406–07 (2012) (discussing how Katz “did not repudiate [the] understanding” that 
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opinion and Justice Harlan’s concurrence was on expanding the 
limits of the Fourth Amendment’s reach, not on limiting it.193 That 
much favors Justice Scalia’s position.194 The opinions of the 
majority and Justice Harlan, however, strongly suggest that the 
Court intended the trespass doctrine to be, at most, a component 
of the new “reasonable expectation of privacy” test.195  
The majority opinion in Katz, written by Justice Stewart, 
appears to remove property from the Fourth Amendment 
equation.196 Justice Stewart noted that “the premise that property 
interests control the right of the Government to search and seize 
has been discredited.”197 He also noted that “whether or not a given 
                                                                                                     
the Fourth Amendment was concerned about government intrusion, it simply 
established a different test without deciding how trespass fit into the test). 
 193. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (explaining that the 
Fourth Amendment “protects individual privacy against certain kinds of 
governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have nothing to 
do with privacy at all”); id. at 361–62 (Harlan, J., concurrence) (describing how 
previous precedent was a “limitation on Fourth Amendment protection” that is 
“bad physics as well as bad law, for reasonable expectations of privacy may be 
defeated by electronic as well as physical invasion”). 
 194. See Jones, 500 U.S. at 405–06 (explaining how Katz expanded the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 195. See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (“Thus, although a closely divided Court 
supposed in Olmstead that surveillance without any trespass and without the 
seizure of any material object fell outside the ambit of the Constitution, we have 
since departed from the narrow view on which that decision rested.”); id. at 361 
(Harlan, J., concurring) 
As the Court’s opinion states, “the Fourth Amendment protects people, 
not places.” The question, however, is what protection it affords to 
those people. Generally, as here, the answer to that question requires 
reference to a “place.” My understanding of the rule that has emerged 
from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a 
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, 
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize 
as “reasonable.” Thus a man’s home is, for most purposes, a place 
where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he 
exposes to the “plain view” of outsiders are not “protected” because no 
intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited. On the other 
hand, conversations in the open would not be protected against being 
overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the circumstances 
would be unreasonable.  
 196. See id. at 347–60 (analyzing what is protected by the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 197. Id. at 353 (quoting Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 
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‘area,’ viewed in the abstract, is ‘constitutionally protected’ deflects 
attention from the problem presented in this case. For the Fourth 
Amendment protects people not places.”198 Justice Stewart goes on 
to state, “[O]nce it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment 
protects people—and not simply ‘areas’—against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of that 
Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a 
physical intrusion into any given enclosure.”199  
Justice Harlan’s concurrence, from which the “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” test derives, includes property as one of the 
considerations in determining whether the two-part Katz test has 
been satisfied.200 He explained: 
As the Court’s opinion states, “the Fourth Amendment protects 
people, not places.” The question, however, is what protection it 
affords to those people. Generally, as here, the answer to that 
question requires reference to a “place.” My understanding of 
the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a 
twofold requirement.201  
Justice Harlan then went on to describe the two-part 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test.202 Justice Harlan noted 
that the old test’s “limitation on Fourth Amendment protection is, 
in the present day, bad physics as well as bad law, for reasonable 
expectations of privacy may be defeated by electronic as well as 
physical invasion.”203 
It appears that the two relevant Katz opinions do not support 
Justice Scalia’s formulation in Jones. The Katz majority was 
unclear on how they thought property or trespass should play in 
their new formulation.204 Justice Harlan is clearer and perhaps 
that is why his formulation gained primacy. That clarity, however, 
                                                                                                     
304 (1967)). 
 198. Id. at 351. 
 199. Id. at 353. 
 200. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (describing the two-part 
requirement). 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id.  
 203. Id. at 362.  
 204. See id. at 353 (majority opinion) (explaining that the trespass doctrine is 
no longer the controlling test for Fourth Amendment violations). 
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squarely places property and trespass under the Katz test and not 
alongside it, or—according to Justice Scalia’s design—before it.205  
Justice Scalia also cites two post-Katz majority opinions and a 
concurring opinion to assert that the trespass doctrine was meant 
to endure independent of the Katz test.206 Although the cases 
support the general argument that the Katz test was not meant to 
roll back Fourth Amendment protection, they only partially 
support the more controversial claim that the trespass test has 
endured all these many years.207 Despite the support Justice Scalia 
                                                                                                     
 205. Compare id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining that the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test applies to “people, not places. The question, 
however, is what protection it affords to those people. Generally, as here, the 
answer to that question requires reference to a place”), with United States v. 
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 407 (2012) (“[W]e [do not] believe that Katz, by holding that 
the Fourth Amendment protects persons and their private conversations, was 
intended to withdraw any of the protection which the Amendment extends to the 
home [or property].” (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 189 
(1969))). 
 206. Justice Scalia cites the majority opinions in Alderman v. United States, 
394 U.S. 165 (1969), and Soldal v. Cook Cty., 506 U.S. 56 (1992), and Justice 
Brennan’s concurring opinion in United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983). 
Jones, 565 U.S. at 407.  
 207. Of these two cases, Alderman is more supportive of Justice Scalia’s claim. 
Alderman resolves the unique question of whether a defendant had standing to 
challenge the government’s use of evidence secured through a warrantless 
listening device in a defendant’s home when the evidence did not include the 
defendant’s conversations. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969). A 
majority of the Court ruled no. Id. at 171–76. Justice White, writing for the 
majority, stated:  
Because the Court has now decided that the Fourth Amendment 
protects a person’s private conversations as well as his private 
premises . . . [citing to Katz], the dissent would discard the concept 
that private conversations overheard through an illegal entry into a 
private place must be excluded as the fruits of a Fourth Amendment 
violation.  
Id. at 178. He goes on to state:  
Nor do we believe that Katz, by holding that the Fourth Amendment 
protects persons and their private conversations, was intended to 
withdraw any of the protection which the Amendment extends to the 
home or to overrule the existing doctrine, recognized at least since 
Silverman, that conversations as well as property are excludable from 
the criminal trial when they are found to be the fruits of an illegal 
invasion of the home 
Id. at 180. Justice Harlan dissented in part, arguing that “conversational privacy 
is a personal right, not a property right.” Id. at 194 (Harlan, J., concurring in part 
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cites, two majority opinions and one concurr208ence seem a paltry 
quantum of evidence when compared to numerous opinions that 
have cited and used the Katz test.208 For example, cases like United 
States v. Jacobsen,209 where the Court approved of law 
enforcement’s warrantless penetration of a defendant’s property to 
test its contents for drugs, would seem clearly in error.210 
Additionally, the case most commonly associated with the trespass 
test, Olmstead, is simply never cited except to note that the Katz 
decision overruled it.211  
Finally, Justice Scalia’s own words in two prior decisions 
undercut his assertions regarding the trespass doctrine.212 In 
                                                                                                     
and dissenting in part). Thus, according to Justice Harlan, the defendant did not 
have standing to object to a violation of other people’s Fourth Amendment rights. 
Id.  
 208. A Westlaw search revealed that Katz has been cited in 150 Supreme 
Court opinions. Search results for “389 U.S. 347,” WESTLAW, www.westlaw.com 
(sign in; then enter “389 U.S. 347” in search box; then follow “Citation References” 
hyperlink; then filter to cases; then filter to Supreme Court cases). See, e.g., 
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (applying the Katz reasonableness 
test); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280–81 (1983) (same); Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979) (“In determining whether a particular form 
of government-initiated electronic surveillance is a ‘search’ within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment, our lodestar is Katz . . . .”); JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. 
MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, VOLUME ONE 71 (6th ed. 2013) 
(“In 2012, however, the Supreme Court surprised those who accepted the 
conventional wisdom (including four sitting members of the Court) by announcing 
that Katz did not displace the prior property-rights approach.”). 
 209. 466 U.S. 109 (1984). 
 210. See id. at 125 (“[W]e conclude that . . . the field test was reasonable. The 
law enforcement interests justifying the procedure were substantial.”). 
 211. See, e.g., City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010) (citing 
Olmstead solely for the purpose of noting that it was overruled by Katz); 
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 632–33 (1991) (noting that Olmstead was 
overruled by Katz); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 138 (1984) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting) (same); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (“[I]n 
Katz . . . the Court overruled Olmstead saying the Fourth Amendment reach 
cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given 
enclosure.” (citation omitted)); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 748 (1971) 
(discussing how Katz overruled previous doctrines related to wiretapping such as 
the one articulated in Olmstead);  DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 210, at 69 
(6th ed. 2013) (discussing how Olmstead was overruled by Katz). 
 212. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001) (“We have since 
decoupled violation of a person’s Fourth Amendment rights from trespassory 
violation of his property.”); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 92, 97 (1998) (Scalia, 
J., concurring) (arguing that the Katz test is “notoriously unhelpful” and 
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Jones, Justice Scalia restates a version of a comment he made in 
other opinions: “Consistent with this understanding, our Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass, at 
least until the latter half of the 20th century.”213 He also states, 
“Our later cases, of course, have deviated from that exclusively 
property-based approach.”214 These comments in Jones are 
generally consistent with prior statements made by Justice Scalia, 
but his earlier statements were more forceful. In a concurring 
opinion in Minnesota v. Carter,215 and a majority opinion in Kyllo 
v. United States,216 Justice Scalia appeared far less convinced that 
the trespass doctrine was standing quietly on the sidelines, 
waiting to be sent into the game. In Carter, Justice Scalia rails 
against the Katz test, at least as a method of determining whether 
the Fourth Amendment applies in a given situation.217 He never 
asserts, however, that the trespass doctrine is still in play.218 In 
Kyllo, he seems to find a middle ground where, although not happy 
with the Katz test, he still applies it.219 Kyllo provides some of the 
strongest indications that, at least at the time of the decision, 
Justice Scalia had accepted the fact that an independent trespass 
doctrine no longer existed.  
In Carter, Justice Scalia concurred with the majority, which 
applied the Katz test to the case, but wrote separately.220 His 
stated reason in writing a separate opinion was to express his view 
that the parties to the case had given “short shrift” to the text of 
                                                                                                     
reviewing the history and language of the Fourth Amendment without discussing 
trespass as a doctrine that should be applied). 
 213. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 404–05 (paraphrasing his comments from Kyllo, 
533 U.S. at 32–35 and Carter, 525 U.S. at 91–99).  
 214. Id. at 405. 
 215. 525 U.S. 83 (1998). 
 216. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 217. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 97–98 (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing Katz as 
“the notoriously unhelpful test adopted in a ‘benchmark’ decision”). 
 218. See id. (criticizing the Katz standard for determining Fourth Amendment 
violations without expressly mentioning the trespass doctrine).  
 219. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (relying on the Katz test for determining “the 
minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be 
reasonable”). 
 220. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 91 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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the Constitution.221 Justice Scalia believed the parties had done so 
by leaping “to apply the fuzzy standard of ‘legitimate expectation 
of privacy’—a consideration that is often relevant to whether a 
search or seizure covered by the Fourth Amendment is 
‘unreasonable’—to the threshold question whether a search or 
seizure covered by the Fourth Amendment has occurred.”222  
Although Justice Scalia concurred with the majority in the 
outcome of the case, it was for a very different reason.223 In fact, 
Justice Scalia’s criticism of the “parties” in the case appears to also 
be leveled at the majority.224 The majority repeatedly tied its 
conclusions to the Katz formulation.225 Chief Justice Rehnquist 
uses the phrase “legitimate expectation of privacy” six times in his 
three pages of analysis of the case.226 In the analysis, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist emphasized the connection between property and the 
Fourth Amendment, not as a separate test, but as a component of 
the Katz “legitimate expectation of privacy” test.227  
Later in his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia criticized the 
dissent for arguing that the majority opinion failed to properly 
apply the Katz test.228 As part of that criticism, Justice Scalia 
                                                                                                     
 221. Id. at 91. 
 222. Id. at 91–92. 
 223. Id. at 92–97. Justice Scalia’s argument in favor of the outcome in the case 
is based on an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation. He argues 
that the text of the Constitution provides a ready answer for whether the Fourth 
Amendment applies to the situation in Carter. Id. Since the search in the case did 
not involve the home of the defendants, they had no textual basis for claiming a 
Fourth Amendment violation. Id. 
 224. See id. at 111 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (determining Scalia’s purpose for 
writing separately was partly to critique the majority’s application and 
understanding of the text of the Fourth Amendment). 
 225. See id. at 85–92 (majority opinion) citing the Katz expectation of privacy). 
 226. Id. at 87–91. 
 227. See id. at 90 (“Property used for commercial purposes is treated 
differently for Fourth Amendment purposes from residential property. ‘An 
expectation of privacy in commercial premises, however, is different from, and 
indeed less than, a similar expectation in an individual’s home.’”). 
 228. See id. at 97–98 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The dissent believes that ‘our 
obligation to produce coherent results’ requires that we ignore [the Fourth 
Amendment], and apply instead [Katz].”). 
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expressed his view that the Katz test was “notoriously unhelpful” 
and “self-indulgent.”229 He goes on to write:  
[T]he only thing the past three decades have established about 
the Katz test (which has come to mean the test enunciated by 
Justice Harlan’s separate concurrence in Katz . . . ) is that, 
unsurprisingly, those “actual (subjective) expectations of 
privacy” “that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable,’” . . . bear an uncanny resemblance to those 
expectations of privacy that this Court considers reasonable.230  
Despite this apparently damning critique of the Katz test, 
Justice Scalia claimed in a footnote to agree with Justice Harlan’s 
opinion at least in some respects.231 In particular, Justice Scalia 
appears to agree with Justice Harlan’s statement in Katz that the 
protections provided by the Fourth Amendment to people, 
“requires reference to a ‘place.’”232  
Justice Scalia’s concurrence is best understood as an advocacy 
piece against the Katz test. He asserts the test is inconsistent with 
the text of the Fourth Amendment, unhelpful and self-indulgent.233 
Although he claims in footnote three to be in some respects in 
harmony with the Katz test, that harmony is limited. Despite the 
focus of his concurrence, Justice Scalia never asserts that the 
trespass test is still viable and should be applied.234  
                                                                                                     
 229. Id. at 97. 
 230. Id. 
 231. See id. at 98 n.3 (“I am entirely in harmony with [Justice Harlan’s 
concurring] opinion.”). 
 232. Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)). 
 233. See id. at 97 (criticizing Katz as a “notoriously unhelpful . . . self-
indulgent test”). 
 234. It could be argued that Justice Scalia did not raise the trespass test in 
this case because it would not have resolved the issues at hand. To apply the 
trespass test would only produce the obvious answer that visiting someone else’s 
home did not make it your ‘property’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. The Carter case would clearly turn on whether Katz was satisfied or 
not. However, that is not what Justice Scalia suggested. Instead he argued that 
the Fourth Amendment did not apply in the Carter case because to do so would 
stretch the language of the Fourth Amendment to the breaking point. Id. at 92. 
He argues that Katz should only apply when determining whether a search or 
seizure was reasonable, not when determining whether a search or seizure 
occurred. Id.  
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Next, Justice Scalia discussed the Katz formulation in Kyllo v. 
United States.235 In that opinion, despite continuing to criticize the 
test, he nonetheless applied it.236 The Kyllo decision is an 
important Fourth Amendment case for a number of reasons, but 
for the purposes of this discussion, it is important because it 
appears to include statements counter to the Jones case.237 Of 
particular significance is Justice Scalia’s statement stating that 
“[w]e have since decoupled violation of a person’s Fourth 
Amendment rights from trespassory violation of his property.”238  
The most compelling aspect of Justice Scalia’s criticism of Katz 
is his observation that the Katz test could be used to reduce privacy 
in places that were formerly protected under the trespass 
doctrine.239 Correcting this potential flaw in the Katz test, 
however, does not require the trespass doctrine to exist 
independent of the Katz formulation. Rather than declaring the 
existence of a “dormant trespass doctrine,”240 at least two better 
alternatives were present. First, Justice Scalia could have argued 
that the protections contained in the trespass doctrine were 
incorporated, or intended to be incorporated, as part of the Katz 
test. This line of argument would seem entirely consistent with 
Justice Harlan’s opinion in Katz.241 Further, the opinions that 
Justice Scalia cites in Jones would fit much more clearly as 
supportive of this theory rather than the one Justice Scalia 
                                                                                                     
 235. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 236. See id. at 33 (explaining how “a Fourth Amendment search occurs when 
the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes 
as reasonable” (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361(1967))). 
 237. Compare id. at 32 (“We have since decoupled violation of a person’s 
Fourth Amendment rights from trespassory violation of his property.”), with 
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 407 (2012) (supposing that Katz added to 
the breadth of possible Fourth Amendment violations). 
 238. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32. 
 239. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 411 (noting that using Katz exclusively “eliminates 
rights that previously existed”). 
 240. See id. at 405 (“[T]he Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has 
been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test); see also 
cases cited supra note 182 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia’s 
statements regarding trespass in Jones). 
 241. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (questioning “what 
protection [the Fourth Amendment] affords to . . . people. Generally, as here, the 
answer to that question requires reference to a ‘place’”).  
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describes in Jones. Second, he could have accepted that Katz 
overturned the trespass doctrine, but argued that was an error. 
Either way, it was unnecessary for Justice Scalia to assert that the 
trespass doctrine was merely an unused theory that could now be 
put into the Court’s Fourth Amendment line-up.  
c. Illinois v. Caballes 
The final example of a non-credible use of stare decisis in a 
recent Fourth Amendment opinion is presented in Justice 
Stevens’s majority opinion in Illinois v. Caballes.242 Caballes, 
briefly discussed supra, dealt with the use of a dog sniff during a 
traffic stop.243 Among the issues Justice Stevens discussed in 
Caballes was the impact of the Kyllo decision on the Court’s 
opinion.244 The Respondent in Caballes argued that Kyllo stood for 
the idea that the government could not use “non-intrusive” 
investigative techniques if such actions would reveal information 
that was contained in a private location.245 Justice Stevens, who 
dissented in Kyllo, took the opportunity presented in writing the 
majority opinion in Caballes to, in effect, rewrite Kyllo.246 
The Kyllo decision is one of several Fourth Amendment 
decisions by the Supreme Court that sought to confront the 
challenge created by technology’s capacity to infringe on 
traditionally private places.247 In Kyllo, law enforcement used a 
thermal imaging device to observe the relative heat escaping from 
                                                                                                     
 242. 543 U.S. 405 (2005). 
 243. Supra notes 129–138 and accompanying text. 
 244. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409 (concluding that the decision is “entirely 
consistent” with Kyllo). 
 245. Brief for Respondent at 14, 15, 18, Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 
(2005) (No. 03-923), 2004 WL 2097415. 
 246. See Timothy C. MacDonnell, Orwellian Ramifications: The Contraband 
Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 299, 316–17 (2010) 
[hereinafter MacDonnell, Orwellian] (“[Justice Stevens’s] claim that the Kyllo 
case turned on the fact that the device in question could pick up lawful or intimate 
details as well as unlawful activity in the home is not supported by the opinion.”). 
 247. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (“We think that obtaining by . . . technology any 
information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been 
obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected 
area,’ . . . constitutes a search.”). 
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Kyllo’s home and garage as compared to his neighbors.248 This 
exam revealed that there was more heat escaping from Kyllo’s 
home than that of his neighbors.249 The government used this 
along with other information to secure a search warrant.250 The 
search revealed that Kyllo had approximately 100 marijuana 
plants in his home.251 The question before the Court was whether 
the use of the thermal-imaging device on Kyllo’s home violated the 
Fourth Amendment.252 The Court found that it did.253 
The majority opinion was written by Justice Scalia and has 
been discussed previously.254 However, one aspect of Justice 
Scalia’s opinion not addressed was his discussion of intrusiveness. 
The government in Kyllo argued that the thermal imaging device 
“did not detect private activities occurring in private areas,”255 and 
thus did not reveal “intimate details” of the home.256 In response 
to this argument, Justice Scalia wrote: 
The Fourth Amendment’s protection of the home has never been 
tied to measurement of the quality or quantity of information 
obtained. In Silverman, for example, we made clear that any 
physical invasion of the structure of the home, “by even a 
fraction of an inch,” was too much, . . . 365 U. S. at 512, and 
there is certainly no exception to the warrant requirement for 
the officer who barely cracks open the front door and sees 
nothing but the nonintimate rug on the vestibule floor. In the 
                                                                                                     
 248. Id. at 29. 
 249. Id. at 30.  
 250. See id. (“Based on tips from informants, utility bills, and the thermal 
imaging, a Federal Magistrate Judge issued a warrant authorizing a search of 
petitioner’s home.”). 
 251. Id.  
 252. Id. at 29. 
 253. See id. at 40 (“Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not 
in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have 
been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is 
presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”). 
 254. Supra notes 216–219, 235–238 and accompanying text. 
 255. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 256. Id. 
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home, our cases show, all details are intimate details, because 
the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.257 
Justice Scalia then went on to explain, “Limiting the 
prohibition of thermal imaging to ‘intimate details’ would not only 
be wrong in principle; it would be impractical in application.”258 So, 
Justice Scalia identified two reasons that the “intimate detail” 
argument fails. First, all details of the home are considered 
intimate details.259 Second, any effort to create an “intimate 
details” test would be virtually impossible to administer.260  
Justice Stevens dissented in Kyllo.261 Among his several 
arguments against the majority, Justice Stevens argued against 
Justice Scalia’s intimate details discussion.262 In his attack, Justice 
Stevens claimed that the device used provided no details about the 
inside of the home, but only information about the exterior of the 
home.263 In this section of his dissent, Justice Stevens seems to 
understand Justice Scalia’s argument regarding the asserted 
“intimate details” test.264 Justice Stevens wrote:  
the Court argues that the permissibility of “through-the-wall 
surveillance” cannot depend on a distinction between observing 
“intimate details” such as “the lady of the house [taking] her 
daily sauna and bath,” and noticing only “the non-intimate rug 
on the vestibule floor” or “objects no smaller than 36 by 36 
inches.”265  
In Justice Stevens’s majority opinion from Caballes he recast 
the Kyllo decision.266 Justice Stevens wrote: “Critical to [Kyllo] was 
                                                                                                     
 257. Id. (citation omitted).  
 258. Id. at 38. 
 259. See id. at 37 (“In the home . . . all details are intimate details.”). 
 260. See id. at 38–39 (describing the would-be difficulties in applying such a 
rule). 
 261. Id. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 262. See id. at 49–52 (criticizing Justice Scalia’s argument). 
 263. See id. at 50 (describing that the thermal images show the outside of the 
house).  
 264. See generally id. at 49–52. 
 265. Id. at 50. 
 266. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (“This conclusion is 
entirely consistent with our recent decision that the use of a thermal-imaging 
device to detect the growth of marijuana in a home constituted an unlawful 
1912 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1869 (2016) 
the fact that the device was capable of detecting lawful activity—
in that case, intimate details in a home, such as ‘at what hour each 
night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath.’”267 
There are several components of the above quote that are 
noteworthy. First, the question of whether the thermal imaging 
device in Kyllo could detect lawful or unlawful activity was simply 
not a matter of significance.268 Second, although the Court 
discussed the concept of intimate details, Justice Scalia made clear 
that all details of the home are intimate.269 Third, the example 
Justice Stevens provided implied that the decision turned on the 
distinction between an intimate and non-intimate detail when it 
did not.270 Given Justice Stevens’s apparent commitment to this 
issue in Kyllo and Caballes,271 his account of Kyllo appears weakly 
trustworthy. 
In Caballes, Justice Stevens seems to be trying to achieve 
what he could not in his dissent from Kyllo. The question of 
whether law enforcement can use a “binary” search method to 
detect contraband in a traditionally protected area was clearly part 
                                                                                                     
search.”). 
 267. Id. at 409–10. 
 268. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38–40 (2001) (noting that a 
limitation on only intimate details would be both wrong and “impractical” and 
there is a “firm line at the entrance to the house” regardless of the intimacy of the 
details discovered). 
 269. See id. at 37 (“In the home, our cases show, all details are intimate 
details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.” 
(emphasis in original)). 
 270. See id. at 50 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the imager was only 
able to identify heat emanating from the house and not able to “identify either 
the lady of the house [in her bath], the rug on the floor, or anything else inside 
the house” and therefore did not qualify as a Fourth Amendment violation). 
 271. See id. (stating that the majority assumes that the thermal imager 
could observe intimate details of the home); see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 
405, 409–10 (2005) (“Critical to [the Kyllo] decision was the fact that the 
[thermal-imaging] device was capable of detecting lawful activity—in that case 
intimate details in a home, such as ‘at what hour each night the lady of the 
house takes her daily sauna and bath.’”). 
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of Justice Stevens’s objective in Caballes.272 In his dissent in Kyllo, 
Justice Stevens argued that the majority decision was too broad: 
It is clear, however, that the category of “sense-enhancing 
technology” covered by the new rule, ibid., is far too broad. It 
would, for example, embrace potential mechanical substitutes 
for dogs trained to react when they sniff narcotics. But in United 
States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696, 707 (1983), we held that a dog 
sniff that “discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics” 
does “not constitute a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment,” and it must follow that sense-enhancing 
equipment that identifies nothing but illegal activity is not a 
search either. Nevertheless, the use of such a device would be 
unconstitutional under the Court’s rule . . . .273 
The rewriting of Kyllo through Caballes would arguably 
permit sense-enhancing technology so long as it only revealed the 
presence or absence of a thing that was illegal to possess.274 Under 
Justice Stevens’s new formulation, which would distinguish 
between legal intimate detail activity and illegal non-intimate 
details, dog sniffs or their equivalent would be permissible.275 
Consistent with the other cases discussed in this section, 
Justice Stevens’s rewrite of the Kyllo decision was unnecessary, at 
least to achieve the outcome in the case. Justice Stevens could have 
easily argued that the dog sniff was permissible based on the lesser 
degree of privacy present in automobiles. This argument, coupled 
with the Court’s line of cases applying the binary search doctrine 
or contraband exception,276 would have provided an adequate basis 
                                                                                                     
 272. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409 (concluding that “the use of a well-trained 
narcotics-detection dog . . . during a lawful traffic stop generally does not 
implicate legitimate privacy interests”). 
 273. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47–48 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 274. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005) (explaining that “any 
interest in possessing contraband cannot be deemed ‘legitimate,’ and thus, 
governmental conduct that only reveals the possession of contraband 
‘compromises no legitimate privacy interest’”). 
 275.  See id. at 410 (concluding that dog sniffs “conducted during a concededly 
lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than the location of a 
substance that no individual has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment”). But see Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1413 (2013) 
(addressing the use of a drug detection dog on the home). 
 276. See, e.g., Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000) (concluding that 
a roadblock checkpoint program was an improper search and detention but 
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to permit the dog sniff without reference to Kyllo or the need to 
rejigger the decision. 
Each of the above cases demonstrates Justices reducing the 
persuasiveness of their opinions, whether majority or dissent, by 
asserting claims regarding precedent that are weakly credible or 
simply untenable. Not only were each of the three positions 
discussed above unsupportable, but they were also unnecessary. In 
each of the three cases the Justices’ characterizations of precedent 
were unnecessary to the argument in favor of the outcome the 
Justice was advocating. Ultimately, the mischaracterization of the 
precedent only served to weaken the persuasiveness of the 
Justices’ opinions. 
2. Practical Wisdom 
Despite describing ethos as “almost . . . the most authoritative 
form of persuasion,”277 Aristotle’s discussion of practical wisdom in 
The Rhetoric is barely a few lines.278 Fortunately, he elaborated on 
the concept in another work, the Nicomachean Ethics.279 In that 
work, Aristotle explained “[a]gain, the work of man is achieved 
only in accordance with practical wisdom as well as moral virtue; 
                                                                                                     
stating that a general canine sniff was not); Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 566 
(1999) (concluding that the Fourth Amendment did not require a warrant to seize 
a vehicle where the police had probable cause to believe the vehicle itself was 
contraband); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (“The police may 
search an automobile and the containers within it [without a warrant] where they 
have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained.”); United 
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 121 (1984) (“[I]t is well-settled that it is 
constitutionally reasonable for law enforcement officials to seize ‘effects’ that 
cannot support a justifiable expectation of privacy without a warrant, based on 
probable cause to believe they contain contraband.”); United States v. Place, 462 
U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (“[T]he [police dog] sniff discloses only the presence or 
absence of narcotics, a contraband item. Thus, despite the fact that the sniff tells 
the authorities something about the contents of the luggage, the information 
obtained is limited.”). See generally MacDonnell, Orwellian, supra note 237. 
 277. ON RHETORIC, supra note 40, at 39. 
 278. See id. at 69 (translating phronēsis as practical wisdom). 
 279. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. VI, at 168 (J.M. Mitchell ed., 
Rev. D.P. Chase trans., George Routledge & Sons, Limited 3rd ed.1910) (c. 384 
B.C.E.) (“As for Practical Wisdom, we shall ascertain its nature by examining to 
what kind of persons we in common language ascribe it.”). 
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for virtue makes us aim at the right mark, and practical wisdom 
makes us take the right means.”280 Scholars in the field of rhetoric 
have characterized Aristotle’s view on practical wisdom as 
including “practical intelligence”281 or “prudence.”282 In this 
Article, practical wisdom in the Fourth Amendment context means 
opinions that can be applied in a practical way on the streets and 
in the courtrooms of the United States. 
This section will discuss two majority opinions and one 
concurrence. The first opinion is Justice Souter’s majority opinion 
in Georgia v. Randolph.283 Randolph deals with whether police 
may enter a home without a warrant when one resident of a home 
consents and another does not.284 The second opinion is Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion in City of Ontario v. Quon.285 Quon 
dealt with an employee’s privacy in electronic communication 
when the Government issued the device being searched.286 The 
third opinion is Justice Alito’s concurrence in United States v. 
Jones.287 In each of the above opinions there is a serious question 
of how these cases will or would be applied either, by the police or 
the courts. 
                                                                                                     
 280. Id. at bk. VI., at chpt. 12, 13, p. 1144a. 
 281. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RHETORIC 634 (Thomas O. Sloan et. al. eds., 2001) 
(explaining “rhetoric is an exercise of the practical intellect”). 
 282. Id. It is important to acknowledge that Aristotle’s discussion of practical 
wisdom in Nicomachean Ethics goes far beyond the use of rhetoric. Aristotle’s 
discussion of practical wisdom is part of a broader work on what it is to lead a 
fruitful life. It is also important to note that Aristotle’s discussion of practical 
wisdom is not as clearly separated from virtue as this Article approaches the 
subject.  
 283. 547 U.S. 103 (2006). 
 284. See id. at 106 (“The question here is whether such an evidentiary seizure 
is likewise lawful with the permission of one occupant when the other . . . is 
present at the scene and expressly refuses to consent.”). 
 285. 560 U.S. 746 (2010). 
 286. See id. at 750 (“This case involves the assertion by a government 
employer of the right . . . to read text messages sent and received on a pager the 
employer owned and issued to an employee.”). 
 287. 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
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a. Georgia v. Randolph 
Georgia v. Randolph was the first time the Supreme Court 
sought to resolve the circumstance where one resident gives police 
permission to search a home but another denies police entry.288 In 
Randolph, the defendant’s wife contacted police after a domestic 
dispute with her husband.289 Police arrived and Mrs. Randolph 
informed them that the defendant was a drug user and there were 
drugs in the home.290 The defendant denied being a drug user.291 
Police asked Mr. Randolph for permission to search the home, 
which he refused.292 Police asked Mrs. Randolph for permission, 
which she granted.293 The search revealed evidence of drug use in 
the room alleged to be Mr. Randolph’s.294 Mr. Randolph, who was 
indicted for possession of cocaine, challenged the search on Fourth 
Amendment grounds.295 The trial court denied Mr. Randolph’s 
motion, but that ruling was overturned on appeal.296 The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari and upheld the Supreme Court of 
Georgia’s ruling that the search violated the Fourth 
Amendment.297  
Justice Souter, writing for the majority, concluded that the 
police could not conduct a warrantless search of a home based on 
the consent of one of the tenants if another tenant was present and 
refusing consent.298 The practicality of the opinion can be 
                                                                                                     
 288. The Supreme Court had already resolved several cases, including United 
States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974), that confirmed that the co-resident of a 
home could consent to a warrantless search of the residence he or she shared with 
another and evidence seized was admissible against the non-consenting resident. 
Id. at 174–76. 
 289. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 107 (2006). 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. at 107–08. 
 297. Id. at 123. 
 298. See id. at 123 (stating that “[Mr.] Randolph’s refusal is clear, and nothing 
in the record justifies the search on grounds independent of [Mrs.] Randolph’s 
consent”). 
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challenged both by how police would interpret and execute it and 
as precedent for future cases. 
Justice Souter began his opinion by reemphasizing the 
importance of the home to the Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.299 He pointed out that the warrantless search of a 
home is per se unreasonable and any exceptions to this rule are 
“jealously and carefully drawn.”300 One such exception he 
discussed at length was the consent of a co-occupant.301 He 
explained that although a co-occupant may grant consent, that 
consent cannot overcome the refusal of another physically present 
co-occupant.302 The argument seems reasonable up to this point. 
Rather than basing his opinion on the foundation that one person’s 
right to permit a search cannot trump another’s right to refuse it, 
Justice Souter instead arrives at his conclusion based on “widely 
shared social expectations.”303 Further, Justice Souter insists on 
adding another wrinkle to the opinion. In order to avoid disturbing 
other Supreme Court precedent and in an attempt to connect the 
ruling more closely to the social expectation line of reasoning, 
Justice Souter requires that the resident refusing consent to a 
police search be present.304  
The practicality of Justice Souter’s opinion can be evaluated 
in at least three ways. First, is the decision clear and easily 
applied? Second, is it fashioned in such a way that it fulfills its 
purpose in light of human behavior? Third, is it built upon a line 
of reasoning that permits lower courts to apply the decision to 
future circumstances? Justice Souter’s opinion misses the mark on 
two of these three objectives.  
                                                                                                     
 299. Id. at 109. 
 300. Id. (quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958)). 
 301. See id. at 109 (explaining that the exception might include “the 
householder against whom evidence is sought, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 
U.S. 218, 222 (1973), or a fellow occupant who shares common authority over 
property, when the suspect is absent”). 
 302. Id. at 121. 
 303. Id. at 111. 
 304. See id. at 121–22 (stating that “there is practical value in the simple 
clarity of complementary rules, one recognizing the co-tenant’s permission when 
there is no fellow occupant on hand, the other according dispositive weight to the 
fellow occupant’s contrary indication when he expresses it”). 
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Randolph’s greatest strength is its immediate clarity. The 
opinion lays down a bright—albeit narrow—rule for police to 
follow: In the circumstance where two residents are present and 
one gives permission to search a home and the other refuses, the 
police may not search without a warrant.305  
Despite Justice Souter’s reemphasis of the Court’s precedent 
that warrantless searches of homes are usually per se 
unreasonable and that the exceptions to this rule are few and 
narrow,306 his opinion does little to practically protect Fourth 
Amendment rights. By requiring that the defendant be physically 
present at the exact moment police are seeking entry based on 
another resident’s consent,307 there is little protection to the 
Fourth Amendment rights Justice Souter extoled. In addition to 
requiring an unlikely confluence of events to occur for a defendant 
to protect his or her Fourth Amendment rights, it limits the 
protection to a specific moment in time. Unless a defendant can 
remain home and always vigilant, police may simply return when 
the defendant is not home. Further, by requiring the defendant to, 
in effect, stand in the door and deny police entry, the Randolph 
opinion provides the perverse incentive to simply remove the 
defendant from the equation—which is exactly what occurred in 
Fernandez v. California.308 Despite declaring that “[d]isputed 
permission is thus no match for this central value of the Fourth 
                                                                                                     
 305. See id. at 122–23 (“A physically present inhabitant’s express refusal of 
consent to a police search is dispositive as to him, regardless of the consent of a 
fellow occupant.”). 
 306. Id. at 109. 
 307. Id. at 122–23. 
 308. 134 S. Ct. 1126 (2014). In Fernandez, the defendant told police they could 
not enter the home. Id. at 1130. Because law enforcement suspected Fernandez 
of committing domestic violence and other offenses against his wife, they arrested 
him. Id. An hour after the arrest, police asked Mrs. Fernandez for permission to 
search the home and she granted them permission. Id. Justice Alito, writing for 
the majority, took Justice Souter at his word and limited the Randolph case to 
exactly the circumstance where the non-consenting resident stands in the door 
preventing police from entering the home. Id. at 1137. But see Georgia v. 
Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 121 (2006) (“So long as there is no evidence that the 
police have removed the potentially objecting tenant from the entrance for the 
sake of avoiding a possible objection, there is practical value in . . . 
complementary rules, one recognizing the co-tenant’s permission . . . [one] 
according dispositive weight to the fellow occupant’s contrary indication . . . .”). 
THE RHETORIC OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 1919 
Amendment,”309 Justice Souter’s opinion does little to actually 
protect those Fourth Amendment values.  
At the conclusion of his opinion, Justice Souter explained that, 
to preserve the Court’s precedent in other consent cases, his 
opinion had to be constrained to circumstances where two 
residents are physically present.310 Justice Souter appears, 
however, to overstate the demands of the Court’s precedent. The 
two cases Justice Souter cites are Matlock v. United States311 and 
Illinois v. Rodriguez.312 Each case dealt with a non-defendant 
apparent resident giving consent to police to conduct a warrantless 
search of the residence they shared with the defendant.313 In 
Matlock, police detained the defendant in a police car outside the 
residence, but never asked for his permission to conduct a 
search.314 In Rodriguez, the defendant was asleep in the residence 
when police entered.315 What is noteworthy about both cases is that 
neither defendant had refused the police request for consent to 
search.316 Thus, neither decision dictated that a defendant’s 
refusal to grant consent must be limited to standing at the door to 
block police entry. Justice Souter’s majority opinion resolves but a 
moment in time and encourages law enforcement to be minimally 
inventive to ensure a suspect is not able to literally stand in their 
way. 
In addition to having a limited practical effect when applied 
by law enforcement, Justice Souter’s majority opinion is also 
practically limited as precedent. This practical limitation stems 
from Justice Souter’s reliance on “widely shared social 
                                                                                                     
 309. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 115. 
 310. See id. at 120–22 (“If those cases are not to be undercut . . . we have to 
admit that we are drawing a fine line; if a potential defendant with self-interest 
in objecting is in fact at the door and objects . . . .”). 
 311. 415 U.S. 164 (1974). 
 312. 497 U.S. 177 (1990). 
 313. Id. at 179; Matlock, 415 U.S. at 166.  
 314. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 166. 
 315. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 179. 
 316. See id. (explaining that Rodriguez was asleep in the apartment when the 
police were given consent to search and access to the apartment); see also Matlock, 
415 U.S. at 166 (noting that police arrested Matlock in front of his home, but 
never asked him for his consent to search it—another occupant gave the consent 
to search). 
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expectations”317 rather than the long line of cases that focus on 
privacy in the home.  
In Randolph, the only question in play was whether one 
resident could, through their consent, veto the nonconsenting 
resident’s refusal.318 Justice Souter declared they could not.319 By 
tying his opinion to the “widely held social expectation”320 that a 
person would not enter a home when given conflicting directions 
from residents of the home, lower courts have an answer to one 
question and nothing more. Additionally, there are multiple 
“widely held social expectations.” Why limit the question to the 
social expectation of a confrontation at the front door? Is it any less 
a social expectation that people should not enter a home where 
they are not welcome? Or why not focus on the social expectation 
that when we tell the police they do not have consent to search our 
homes without a warrant, our home will not be searched without a 
warrant? Additionally, the Randolph opinion is a precedent built 
upon the shifting sands of “social expectations.”321 If the 
circumstances in Randolph were different regarding the two 
residents, would the Fourth Amendment rights of the 
nonconsenting resident change? In his dissent, Chief Justice 
Roberts points this out, stating “[t]he fact is that a wide variety of 
differing social situations can readily be imagined, giving rise to 
quite different social expectations.”322  
Because of these weaknesses, Justice Souter’s opinion in 
Randolph has been strictly limited to the facts of the case. In 
Fernandez v. California, Justice Alito, writing for the majority, 
found that the Court’s decision in Randolph only prevents police 
                                                                                                     
 317. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006). 
 318. Id. at 106. This question can of course, be turned on its head to ask 
whether the refusing resident vetoes the consenting resident’s action. Chief 
Justice Roberts turned the question around this way in his dissent. Id. at 129 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 319. See id. at 142 (stating “that a physically present inhabitant’s express 
refusal of consent to a police search is dispositive as to him, regardless of the 
consent of a fellow occupant”). 
 320. Id. at 111. 
 321. See id. at 121 (providing the question in the case to be “whether 
customary social understanding accords the consenting tenant authority powerful 
enough to prevail over the co-tenant's objection”). 
 322. Id. at 129 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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from entering a home when the defendant is present and objecting 
to the warrantless search.323 Further, in Fernandez the Court’s 
decision made it entirely permissible for police to remove a 
nonconsenting resident and then proceed with a consent search.324 
b. The City of Ontario v. Quon 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in City of Ontario v. Quon 
presents a question of practical wisdom with regard to the 
precedential value of the opinion. In addition to resolving the case 
at hand, an appellate court—especially the United States Supreme 
Court—is expected to create clear precedent that lower courts can 
easily follow. Central to this activity is describing a rule and any 
limiting principles the Supreme Court expects lower courts to 
follow. In Quon, Justice Kennedy refused to choose between two 
different rules and thus left lower courts continuing to guess as to 
what the proper rule is.325  
In Quon, a police officer brought a section 1983 action326 
against the City of Ontario, California, for violating his Fourth 
Amendment rights.327 Officer Quon and other members of the 
police force were issued electronic pagers that allowed the officers 
to send text messages.328 Officers were told the pagers were for 
work use only and were limited in how many text messages they 
                                                                                                     
 323. See 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1136 (2014) (“If Randolph is taken at its word—that 
it applies only when the objector is standing in the door saying ‘stay out’ when 
officers propose to make a consent search—all of these problems [of how officers 
should treat objections] disappear.”). 
 324. See id. at 1134 (“The Randolph dictum is best understood not to require 
an inquiry into the subjective intent of officers who detain or arrest a potential 
objector but instead refer to situations in which the removal of the potential 
objector is not objectively reasonable.”). 
 325. See 560 U.S. 746, 757 (2010) (explaining that the two different 
approaches outlined in the plurality and Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in 
O’Connor v. Ortega lead to the same result in this case—without choosing one 
approach over the other). 
 326. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (allowing civil actions for deprivation of 
constitutional and federal statutory rights by persons acting “under color of law”). 
 327. Quon, 560 U.S. at 753. 
 328. Id. at 751. 
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could send per week.329 Officer Quon repeatedly exceeded his use 
of the pager and had to pay the overage fees several times.330 
Although Officer Quon’s supervisor warned him about running 
over the text limit, he also told Officer Quon that he did not intend 
to audit the text messages to insure they were work related.331 
Eventually, Officer Quon’s supervisor did audit the text messages 
and discovered abuses.332 Based on that discovery Officer Quon 
was disciplined.333 Officer Quon brought a section 1983 action 
against the City for a violation of the Fourth Amendment.334 
The Quon case required the Court to resolve the question of 
what level of privacy the Fourth Amendment requires in the work 
place when the government is the employer.335 The leading case in 
this area was O’Connor v. Ortega.336 Justice Kennedy noted that 
the Court in O’Connor did not agree on the “analytical framework 
for Fourth Amendment claims against government employers.”337 
He then went on to discuss at length the proposed framework 
provided by the plurality and Justice Scalia’s concurrence in 
O’Connor.338  
The O’Connor plurality declared that “[s]earches and seizures 
by government employers or supervisors of the private property of 
their employees . . . are subject to the restraints of the Fourth 
Amendment.”339 The plurality stated, however, that given the 
operational realities of some government offices, employees may 
                                                                                                     
 329. Id. at 751–52.  
 330. Id. at 752. 
 331. Id.  
 332. See id. at 752–53 (discovering “that many of the messages sent and 
received on Quon’s pager were not work related, and some were sexually 
explicit”). 
 333. Id. at 753  
 334. Id.  
 335. See id. at 750 (“This case involves the assertion by a government 
employer of the right . . . to read text messages sent and received on a pager the 
employer owned and issued to an employee.”). 
 336. 480 U.S. 709 (1987). 
 337. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 756 (2010). 
 338. See id. at 756–57 (stating that the “four-Justice plurality concluded that 
the correct analysis has two steps” and “Justice Scalia, concurring in the 
judgment, outlined a different approach”). 
 339. O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 715. 
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have no reasonable expectation of privacy.340 Further, based on the 
wide variety of possible work environments such cases had to be 
resolved on a case-by-case basis.341 The plurality also found that 
there are “special needs” present when the government is also an 
employer.342 The “special needs” render the normal probable cause 
and warrant requirements impracticable when the government is 
engaged in “legitimate work-related, non-investigatory intrusions 
as well as investigations of work-related misconduct.”343 The 
plurality substituted the usual requirement of probable cause with 
a standard of “reasonableness under all the circumstances.”344  
In O’Connor, Justice Scalia wrote a concurrence where he 
challenged the method the plurality proposed.345 Justice Scalia’s 
dissatisfaction with the plurality was two-fold. First, he rejected 
the value of a case-by-case approach as too vague and difficult for 
lower courts and law enforcement to follow.346 Second, Justice 
Scalia asserted that whatever standard the plurality suggested 
would be the wrong one if it resulted in a conclusion that the 
Fourth Amendment did not generally apply to a government 
employee’s office.347  
The plurality and Justice Scalia offer different methods of 
addressing searches by the government of the workplace. The 
plurality created a test that was highly fact dependent, both with 
                                                                                                     
 340. Id. at 717. 
 341. Id. at 718. 
 342. Id. at 725. 
 343. Id.  
 344. Id. at 726. According to the plurality, this test is comprised of two steps: 
“first, one must consider ‘whether the . . . action was justified at its 
inception . . . second, one must determine whether the search as actually 
conducted ‘was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified 
the interference in the first place.’” Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 
(1968), and New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985)). 
 345. See id. at 729 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I disagree with the reason for the 
reversal given by the plurality opinion, and with the standard it prescribes for the 
Fourth Amendment inquiry.”). 
 346. See id. at 730 (“I would object to the formulation of a standard so devoid 
of content that it produces rather than eliminates uncertainty in this field.”). 
 347. Id. at 730–32. Justice Scalia did not suggest an iron-clad rule regarding 
government employee offices—he suggested that there may be some offices so 
“exposed to the public” that they would “not be subject to the Fourth Amendment.” 
Id. at 731. 
1924 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1869 (2016) 
regard to whether the Fourth Amendment would apply and 
whether the search was reasonable.348 Justice Scalia clearly 
rejected the case-by-case approach, at least with regard to the 
question of whether the Fourth Amendment applied to government 
employee offices.349 He ultimately concluded that when the 
government is an employer the special need doctrine should apply, 
so long as the search is work-related.350 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Quon manifests a 
timidity that calls into question the decision to grant certiorari in 
the first place. After describing the plurality in O’Connor and 
Justice Scalia’s concurrence, Justice Kennedy explains that under 
either test the search in this case would be reasonable.351 Using 
phrases like “were we to assume that inquiry into ‘operational 
realities’ were called for,”352 “[e]ven if the Court were certain that 
the O’Connor plurality approach were the right one,”353 and “with 
boundaries that we need not here explore,”354 Justice Kennedy 
writes much but says little. In fact, Justice Kennedy wrote a 
two-page explanation of why the Court “must proceed with care 
when considering the whole concept of privacy expectations in 
communications made on electronic equipment owned by a 
government employer.”355 He continued with the statement that 
“[t]he judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth 
Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in 
society has become clear.”356  
                                                                                                     
 348. See id. at 725–26 (“We hold . . . that public employer intrusions on the 
constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees . . . should 
be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances.”) 
 349. Id. at 731 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 350. See id. at 732 (“I would hold that government searches to retrieve 
work-related materials or to investigate violations of workplace rules . . . do not 
violate the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 351. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 764–65 (2010) (stating “the 
search was reasonable under the approach of the O’Connor plurality” and “would 
satisfy the approach of Justice Scalia’s concurrence”). 
 352. Id. at 758. 
 353. Id. at 759. 
 354. Id. at 762. 
 355. Id. at 759. Justice Kennedy’s explanation begins on 759 and ends on 
761. 
 356. Id. 
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The Quon decision was published in 2010. It would be an 
overstatement to declare that pagers, even those capable of 
transmitting text messages, were an emerging technology in 2010. 
Justice Kennedy, however, while noting that in Katz the Court was 
able to rely on its own knowledge and experience to arrive at its 
conclusions, found that in the current case “[i]t is not so clear that 
courts at present are on so sure a ground.”357 It is very likely that 
the Justices of the Katz Court were more comfortable with deciding 
a case involving a public telephone than the Justices of the Quon 
Court were when resolving an issue regarding a pager. But it is 
likely that the Justices in Katz knew no more about how a phone 
transmits messages than the Quon Court knew about how text 
pagers work. Further, since it seems likely that the average citizen 
(and certainly Officer Quon) knows no more about how text 
messages arrive at their proper destination than they understand 
how telephones work, the entire issue is beside the point. Finally, 
even if text pagers were a new technology and it mattered how the 
information was transmitted, we still expect the Supreme Court to 
resolve the issues. 
c. Justice Alito in United States v. Jones 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Jones has already been 
discussed above.358 As previously mentioned, the Court divided 
sharply on the question of what role the Katz test should play in 
resolving whether the government’s warrantless use of a GPS 
tracking device violated the Fourth Amendment.359 Justice Alito 
wrote a concurring opinion arguing against the resurrection of the 
trespass test, claiming instead that the Katz test was the proper 
measure of whether and how the Fourth Amendment should be 
applied in the present and future.360 The focus of this discussion of 
                                                                                                     
 357. Id. 
 358. See generally supra Part III.A.1.b.  
 359. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012). 
 360. See id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring) (reasoning that “Katz v. United 
States . . . finally did away with the old approach, holding that a trespass was not 
required for a Fourth Amendment violation”). 
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Justice Alito’s concurrence is on his description and explanation of 
how the Katz test should be applied.  
The core of Justice Alito’s challenge to the majority opinion in 
Jones was his claim that tying the Court’s Fourth Amendment 
analysis to “18th-century tort law . . . was unwise.”361 Instead, 
Justice Alito and the three Justices that joined in his concurrence 
argued the Katz test was the better method.362 As part of his 
argument, Justice Alito agreed with the majority that “we must 
‘assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against government 
that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted’. . . . But it 
is almost impossible to think of late-18th-century situations that 
are analogous to what took place in this case.”363 To illustrate this 
point Justice Alito wrote in a footnote, “The Court suggests that 
something like this [referring to the facts in Jones] might have 
occurred in 1791, but this would have required either a gigantic 
coach, a very tiny constable, or both—not to mention a constable 
with incredible fortitude and patience.”364 
Although Justice Alito was critical of the majority’s method of 
resolving Jones, he agreed with the outcome.365 He arrived at that 
conclusion by finding the government’s actions violated Jones’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy.366 In his fourteen-page 
concurrence, Justice Alito devotes approximately a page to 
explaining how the Katz test should be applied to the facts in 
Jones, seeming to say that some warrantless GPS monitoring is 
                                                                                                     
 361. Id. at 418–19. 
 362. See id. at 430 (arguing that the Court should apply “existing Fourth 
Amendment doctrine” of the Katz test, and “ask whether the use of GPS tracking 
in a particular case involved a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would 
not have anticipated”). 
 363. Id. at 420 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 
27, 34 (2001)). 
 364. Id. at 420 n.3. 
 365. See id. at 431 (“For these reasons, I conclude that the lengthy monitoring 
that occurred in this case constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. I 
therefore agree with the majority that the decision of the Court of Appeals must 
be affirmed.”). 
 366. See id. at 419 (“I would analyze the question presented in this case by 
asking whether respondent’s reasonable expectations of privacy were violated by 
the long-term monitoring of the movements of the vehicle he drove.”). 
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acceptable while others is not.367 He wrote “[u]nder this approach 
[referring to the use of a GPS tracking device], relatively 
short-term monitoring of a person’s movements on public streets 
accords with expectations of privacy that our society has 
recognized as reasonable.”368 He then explained, “[b]ut the use of 
longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses 
impinges on expectations of privacy.”369 Then, anticipating the 
obvious questions the above sentence begs, he wrote: “We need not 
identify with precision the point at which the tracking of this 
vehicle became a search, for the line was surely crossed before the 
4-week mark”370 and “[w]e also need not consider whether 
prolonged GPS monitoring in the context of investigations 
involving extraordinary offenses would similarly intrude on a 
constitutionally protected sphere of privacy.”371 
The practical application of Justice Alito’s formulation leaves 
significant gaps both for police and lower courts. Under his 
approach, warrantless GPS tracking of vehicles would be 
permissible, but only for a short-term.372 But how short is 
short-term? Justice Alito stated it is unnecessary for the Court to 
answer that question.373 Further, he suggests the nature of the 
offense will impact on the use of warrantless GPS tracking, but he 
offers no explanation of what offenses fall into his category of “most 
offenses”374 and what offenses are “extraordinary.”375 Justice Alito 
suggests a sliding scale of Fourth Amendment protection based on 
the offense being investigated, but he offers no precedent to 
                                                                                                     
 367. See id. at 429–30 (discussing the perceived reasonableness of different 
types of monitoring). 
 368. Id. at 430. 
 369. Id. 
 370. Id. 
 371. Id. at 431.  
 372. See id. at 430 (“[R]elatively short-term monitoring of a person’s 
movements on public streets accords with expectations of privacy that our society 
has recognized as reasonable.”). 
 373. See id. (“We need not identify with precision the point at which the 
tracking of this vehicle became a search, for the line was surely crossed before the 
4–week mark.”). 
 374. Id. 
 375. Id. at 431.  
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support this proposed method.376 Further, under this sliding scale 
approach, would there be offenses that were so minor that no 
degree of warrantless GPS monitoring would be appropriate?  
In his book, The Nature of the Judicial Process,377 Justice 
Cardozo wrote, “[t]here can be no wisdom in the choice of a path 
unless we know where it will lead.”378 Later in the same book he 
explained “the common law is at bottom the philosophy of 
pragmatism”379 and “[t]he rule that functions well produces a title 
deed to recognition.”380 Both the Randolph and Quon majority 
opinions miss these core components of an effective judicial 
decision. In Randolph, Justice Souter’s opinion is impractical—it 
claims to protect the Fourth Amendment privacy rights of 
non-consenting residents against warrantless searches by police, 
but only if they are literally present at the moment of entry.381 
Implicit in the quote from Justice Cardozo is that a necessary step 
to a wise choice is making a choice. Justice Kennedy not only fails 
to make a choice, but he actually muddies the water. Of course, a 
definitive rule that is wrong is worse than an ambiguous rule, but 
if the Court cannot decide if a new rule is in order, it is better to 
leave well enough alone. Finally, Justice Alito’s formulation of how 
the Fourth Amendment should apply when law enforcement uses 
GPS devices382 is so vague it would leave police and courts lost in 
the undecided margins of his opinion. 
                                                                                                     
 376. See generally id. at 430–31. 
 377. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). 
 378. Id. at 102. 
 379. Id.  
 380. Id. at 102–03. 
 381. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006) (“We hold that, in the 
circumstances here at issue, a physically present co-occupant’s stated refusal to 
permit entry prevails, rendering the warrantless search unreasonable and invalid 
as to him.”). 
 382. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J., 
concurring) (“[R]elatively short-term monitoring of a person’s movements on 
public streets accords with expectations of privacy that our society has recognized 
as reasonable. . . . But the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of 
most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.” (citation omitted)). 
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B. Pathos 
In The Rhetoric, Aristotle acknowledges the importance of 
appeals to emotion in persuasion but does so grudgingly.383 Some 
of this discomfort in the use of pathos-based persuasion 
undoubtedly comes from his teacher, Plato. Much of Plato’s attack 
on rhetoric as a means to the truth centered on the heavy emphasis 
teachers of rhetoric often placed on manipulating an audience’s 
emotions.384 Despite Aristotle’s discomfort, a significant portion of 
The Rhetoric is devoted to analyzing emotions and suggesting how 
appeals to emotions could be used in argument.385  
Throughout the history of the study of rhetoric, emotional 
appeals have been unhappily recognized as effective.386 The 
concern over persuasion through emotion has always been that 
emotion will overcome reason.387 This concern seems especially 
relevant when considering the opinions of Supreme Court 
Justices.388 The essence of judicial decision making includes a 
dispassionate weighing of the evidence in a case. The visual 
depiction of justice on the steps of the Supreme Court building 
includes an individual, blindfolded and carrying a set of scales.389 
                                                                                                     
 383. See generally ON RHETORIC, supra note 40, at 32. 
 384. See HERRICK, supra note 42, at 53 (“Plato so successfully anticipates the 
major issues that attend rhetoric throughout its long history—issues like power, 
the potential for manipulation . . . .”). 
 385. See generally ON RHETORIC, supra note 40, at 113 (discussing 
“Propositions About the Emotions Useful to a Speaker in All Species of Rhetoric” 
in Chapters 2–11).  
 386. See Jamal Greene, Pathetic Argument in Constitutional Law, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 1389, 1389 (2013) (“Pathetic argument is one of the acceptable 
modes of persuasion . . . .”). 
 387. See id. at 1412 (“[I]t is portrayed as crucially important to narrowly 
delineate that finite list and those proper roles, so that emotion doesn’t encroach 
on the true preserve of law: which is reason.” (quoting SUSAN A. BANDES, THE 
PASSIONS OF LAW 2 (1999))). 
 388. See Scharffs, supra note 84, at 754 (“Emotions such as anger, pity, fear, 
hate, and love affect the reasoning abilities and legal decisions of a judge or 
jury.”). 
 389. Images of Justice depicted as a woman with scales appears several times 
within the Supreme Court building as well as outside. At least one image of 
Justice depicted in the Supreme Court building is without a blindfold and without 
scales. This is the image of Justice standing guard against evil. In this depiction, 
Justice also has a sword. OFF. CURATOR, SUPREME CT. U.S., FIGURES OF JUSTICE 
1930 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1869 (2016) 
The tradition of depicting “lady justice” with scales incorporates 
the expectation that legal decisions will be issued impartially after 
weighing both sides of a controversy.  
Of course a fair and impartial opinion need not be 
emotionless.390 Emotions influence Justices and they should use 
appeals to emotion in their opinions. To remove emotion from 
questions involving the Fourth Amendment would be to cut the 
Amendment away from its fundamental roots.391 John Adams’s 
famous description of the impact of James Otis’s legal arguments 
against general warrants conveys the powerful emotions inherent 
in the Fourth Amendment.392 So, Justices are called upon to walk 
a thin line when advocating their position. There is an expectation 
that any judge, and especially Supreme Court Justices, will be 
temperate in their opinions. I suggest that in the Fourth 
Amendment context, appeals to emotion are most legitimate when 
directed to the emotions that enliven the Amendment. These 
emotions include privacy, security,393 and practicality. The Fourth 
Amendment protects deeply personal freedoms, but it qualifies 
that protection with the critical descriptive of reasonableness.394 
                                                                                                     
(2009), https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/FiguresofJustice-9-11-2009-
approved.pdf. 
 390. See Greene, supra note 386, at 1395 (“There are several reasons to 
believe, however, that pathetic argument is at least sometimes an appropriate 
mode of persuasion in constitutional law.”). 
 391. See id. at 1400 (“Our assessment of the gravity of particular offenses and 
our sentencing practices reflect moral judgments that may be inseparable from 
the emotions those judgments both validate and produce.”). 
 392. See Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and 
the Fourth Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 1005 (2011) [hereinafter Clancy, 
Framers’ Intent] 
Every man of a crowded audience appeared to me to go away, as I did, 
ready to take arms against writs of assistance. Then and there was the 
first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great 
Britain. Then and there the child Independence was born. 
(quoting JOHN ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES VOLUME 10 247–48 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1851)). 
 393. See CLANCY, supra note 23, at 77–83 (asserting that security, rather than 
privacy, is the central protection the Fourth Amendment was directed toward 
preserving). 
 394. See Clancy, Framers’ Intent, supra note 392, at 977 (“The first clause of 
the Fourth Amendment requires that a search or seizure not be ‘unreasonable.’ 
This is the ‘fundamental command’ of the Amendment . . . .” (quoting New Jersey 
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So, citizens are not protected against all governmental searches 
and seizures, only those that are unreasonable.395 This becomes an 
important qualifier on emotional appeals, especially those based 
on individual privacy and security.  
Below is a discussion of three recent Supreme Court opinions 
where Justices engaged in pathos-based arguments that seem 
wide of the mark. The first opinion discussed below is Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Maryland v. King,396 which 
addressed a state statute that permitted taking DNA samples of 
individuals arrested for felonies. The second opinion is Justice 
Thomas’s opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part Safford 
Unified School District v. Redding,397 which addressed the 
permissibility of a warrantless “strip search” of a public school 
child.398 The third opinion is Justice Stevens’s dissent in Samson 
v. California,399 in which he argued against the permissibility of 
blanket search authorizations for parolees.400 
1. Maryland v. King 
Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion for the Court in 
Maryland v. King. In King, the Court took up the issue of whether 
a state statute authorizing the taking of a DNA swab of all 
defendants arrested for certain felonies violated the Fourth 
                                                                                                     
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985))). 
 395. See id. (“Reasonableness is the measure of both the permissibility of the 
initial decision to search and seize and the permissible scope of those 
intrusions.”). 
 396. 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013). 
 397. 557 U.S. 364 (2009). 
 398. See id. at 368 (“The issue here is whether a 13–year–old student’s Fourth 
Amendment right was violated when she was subjected to a search of her bra and 
underpants by school officials acting on reasonable suspicion that she had 
brought forbidden prescription and over-the-counter drugs to school.”). 
 399. 547 U.S. 843 (2006). 
 400. See id. at 857 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“But neither Knights nor Griffin 
supports a regime of suspicionless searches, conducted pursuant to a blanket 
grant of discretion untethered by any procedural safe-guards, by law enforcement 
personnel who have no special interest in the welfare of the parolee or 
probationer.”). 
1932 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1869 (2016) 
Amendment.401 The defendant in King was convicted of rape based 
primarily on DNA evidence secured as a result of a DNA swab 
taken after he had been arrested for an unrelated crime.402 Justice 
Kennedy, and four other Justices, determined that the statute did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment.403 Aspects of Kennedy’s 
majority opinion demonstrates a heavy emphasis on a 
pathos-based argument, however, the emotional appeal seems 
more directed at making the audience angry or outraged at the 
actions of the defendant, rather than stirring emotions related to 
the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, when Justice Kennedy does 
discuss the Fourth Amendment interests at stake in the taking of 
King’s DNA, he describes the intrusion as minimal because the 
DNA was taken by use of a cheek swab.404 This superficial 
discussion of intrusiveness seems to miss the emotive point of a 
DNA-based intrusion. In this way Justice Kennedy’s pathos 
argument endangers his persuasiveness as much, if not more, than 
aids it. 
Justice Kennedy opened his opinion in the following way:  
In 2003 a man concealing his face and armed with a gun broke 
into a woman’s home in Salisbury, Maryland. He raped her. The 
police were unable to identify or apprehend the assailant based 
                                                                                                     
 401. See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1965 (“The Court of Appeals of Maryland, on 
review of King’s rape conviction, ruled that the DNA taken when King was booked 
for the 2009 charge was an unlawful seizure because obtaining and using the 
cheek swab was an unreasonable search of the person.”). 
 402. See id. (“Additional DNA samples were taken from him and used in the 
rape trial, but there seems to be no doubt that it was the DNA from the cheek 
sample taken at the time he was booked in 2009 that led to his first having been 
linked to the rape and charged with its commission.”). 
 403. See id. at 1980 
When officers make an arrest supported by probable cause to hold for 
a serious offense and they bring the suspect to the station to be 
detained in custody, taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the 
arrestee’s DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate 
police booking procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
 404. See id. at 1977 (“By comparison to this substantial government interest 
and the unique effectiveness of DNA identification, the intrusion of a cheek swab 
to obtain a DNA sample is a minimal one.”). 
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on any detailed description or other evidence they had, but they 
did obtain from the victim a sample of the perpetrator’s DNA.405  
Next, he wrote, “In 2009 Alonzo King was arrested in 
Wicomico County, Maryland, and charged with first- and 
second-degree assault for menacing a group of people with a 
shotgun.”406 As a reader, it is difficult to not imagine the plight of 
the victims in the case. Also, it is equally difficult to not feel 
outrage toward the defendant, who had committed the crimes of 
rape and menacing, both crimes committed with weapons.  
After his powerfully emotive opening, Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion rambles through an explanation of the Maryland law that 
authorized the taking of the DNA swab, the history of DNA and 
the national DNA database (CODIS), before coming to the question 
of whether taking the swab involved Fourth Amendment 
interests.407 The objective of this discussion seems to be to lend 
credibility to the DNA database system. The effect of this 
discussion, however, is somewhat disorienting.  
Ultimately Justice Kennedy relies upon the minimal physical 
intrusion of the DNA test coupled with the reduced privacy interest 
of individuals held in custody to justify the DNA program.408 Since 
law enforcement investigatory needs are not a generally proper 
basis for conducting warrantless searches, Justice Kennedy 
asserts that the primary governmental need at play in King is for 
correctional personnel and the courts to be able to properly identify 
the defendant.409 In his discussion of the importance of 
identification, Justice Kennedy writes, “[i]t is a common 
occurrence that ‘people detained for minor offenses can turn out to 
be the most devious and dangerous criminals.’”410 He then goes on 
to point out that police had stopped Timothy McVeigh, serial killer 
                                                                                                     
 405. Id. at 1965. 
 406. Id. 
 407. Id. at 1966–68. 
 408. See id. at 1977–80 (discussing the government interest in identification, 
the reduced privacy of prisoners, and the minimal intrusion of the swab). 
 409. See id. at 1970 (“The legitimate government interest served by the 
Maryland DNA Collection Act is one that is well established: the need for law 
enforcement officers in a safe and accurate way to process and identify the 
persons and possessions they must take into custody.”). 
 410. Id. at 1971. 
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Joel Rifkin, and one of the 9/11 hijackers for traffic violations.411 
Here again, Justice Kennedy seems to draw on the audience’s 
emotive responses. It would be hard to conjure three more reviled 
individuals in the collective awareness of citizens of the United 
States than Timothy McVeigh—the Oklahoma City Bomber, a 9/11 
hijacker, and Joel Rifkin—a serial killer responsible for the deaths 
of at least seventeen women.412 Although these examples are 
offered to support the claim that the police simply cannot know 
how dangerous the people they detain are, there appears to be the 
implication that these traffic stops were missed opportunities to 
stop heinous crimes, had police but known. Like Justice Kennedy’s 
opening, this reference elicits strong emotions; but they are 
emotions that seem beside the Fourth Amendment point at 
hand.413  
In addressing the Fourth Amendment privacy interest, Justice 
Kennedy begins by acknowledging that “[i]t can be agreed that 
using a buccal swab on the inner tissues of a person’s cheek in 
order to obtain DNA samples is a search.”414 From this point 
Justice Kennedy compares the buccal swab to other bodily search 
methods including a blood draw, taking of fingernail scrapings, 
and conducting a breathalyzer test.415 Based on these points of 
comparison he concludes, “the intrusion of a cheek swab to obtain 
a DNA sample is a minimal one.”416 Comparing the taking of blood, 
breath, and fingernail scrapings to an individual’s DNA arguably 
                                                                                                     
 411. Id. (quoting Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cnty. of Burlington, 
132 S. Ct. 1510, 1520 (2012)). 
 412. See generally John T. McQuiston, Rifkin, at a Sentencing, Apologizes for 
17 Murders, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/26/ 
nyregion/rifkin-at-a-sentencing-apologizes-for-17-murders.html?_r=0 (last 
visited Dec. 15, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 413. It could be argued that Justice Kennedy is employing a technique 
Aristotle described in The Rhetoric. Under this technique, in instances where an 
advocate’s argument is weak, the advocate inflames the audience’s emotions on a 
tangential issue from the outset. See ON RHETORIC, supra note 40, at 241 (“If you 
do not have a reason to give, say not that you are not unaware that what you say 
may seem incredible but [that] you are naturally this sort of [virtuous] person and 
[that] people never do believe [that] anyone willingly does anything except for 
some advantage.”). 
 414. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1968–69 (2013). 
 415. Id. at 1969. 
 416. Id. at 1977. 
THE RHETORIC OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 1935 
misses an important emotive component of the issue at hand. It is 
well understood today that an individual’s DNA is, in essence, 
their blueprint.417 Justice Kennedy misses a powerful emotive 
point by focusing on the intrusion caused by the buccal swab rather 
than the intrusion caused by the government’s seizure and 
retention of an individual’s unique genetic sequence. Justice 
Kennedy does tangentially address this issue when explaining that 
the statute involved only allows DNA to be retained for 
identification purposes.418  
2. Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding 
The second opinion discussed in this section is Justice 
Thomas’s dissent in Safford v. Redding. The Redding case dealt 
with a lawsuit brought against the Safford School and several 
employees for violating a student’s Fourth Amendment rights.419 
Although a majority of the Court ruled that a Fourth Amendment 
violation had occurred, Justice Thomas argued one did not.420 The 
focus of this discussion is on Justice Thomas’s failure to confront 
the powerful emotive roots of the Fourth Amendment that run 
counter to his position. Justice Thomas argued at length that 
public schools should be declared in loco parentis and thus be freed 
of the constraints of the Fourth Amendment.421 In this argument 
                                                                                                     
 417. See Brief for the Respondent at 45, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 
(2013) (No. 12-207), 2013 WL 315233 (“Our DNA is our blueprint: an individual’s 
DNA contains . . . information about the subject’s medical history and genetic 
conditions . . . [and] physical and behavioral characteristics, ranging from the 
subject's age, ethnicity, and intelligence to the subject's propensity for violence 
and addiction.”). 
 418. See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1967 (“The Act also limits the information added 
to a DNA database and how it may be used. . . . No purpose other than 
identification is permissible[.]”). 
 419. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 368 (2009) 
(“The issue here is whether a 13-year-old student’s Fourth Amendment right was 
violated when she was subjected to a search of her bra and underpants by school 
officials acting on reasonable suspicion that she had brought forbidden 
prescription and over-the-counter drugs to school.”). 
 420. See id. at 382 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“Unlike the majority, however, I would hold that the search of Savana Redding 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 421. Id. at 389. 
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he fails to adequately confront the facts of the case at hand and he 
fails to explain why the traditionally permissive and discretionary 
doctrine of in loco parentis should now be compulsory. 
 The majority, written by Justice Souter, described the issue 
in the case in the following way: “[W]hether a 13-year-old student’s 
Fourth Amendment right was violated when she was subjected to 
a search of her bra and underpants by school officials acting on 
reasonable suspicion that she had brought forbidden prescription 
and over-the-counter drugs to school.”422 The prescription and 
over-the-counter drugs in this case were ibuprofen and naproxen, 
both of which are anti-inflammatory medications.423  
The context of the search in Redding was as follows. School 
officials had received reports from students and at least one set of 
parents that some students were bringing weapons and 
prescription medication into school.424 After receiving the report, a 
student went to school officials with a white pill he had gotten from 
another student, Marissa Glines.425 The school nurse identified the 
pill as a prescription-strength ibuprofen.426 A school official called 
Ms. Glines out of class.427 At the same time, school officials 
confiscated a daily-planner notebook on Ms. Glines’ desk.428 A 
search of the planner revealed several knives, a lighter, and a 
cigarette.429 Ms. Glines told school officials that the daily planner 
belonged to Ms. Savana Redding, a thirteen-year-old student at the 
school.430 Ms. Redding was called to the principal’s office and asked 
if the daily planner was hers.431 She said it was, but she had lent 
                                                                                                     
 422. Id. at 368 (majority opinion). 
 423. See id. (“Wilson then showed Savana four white prescription-strength 
ibuprofen 400-mg pills, and one over-the-counter blue naproxen 200-mg pill, all 
used for pain and inflammation . . . .”). 
 424. Id. at 373. 
 425. See id. at 372 (“On the morning of October 8, the same boy handed Wilson 
a white pill that he said Marissa Glines had given him.”). 
 426. See id. (“Wilson learned from Peggy Schwallier, the school nurse, that 
the pill was Ibuprofen 400 mg, available only by prescription.”). 
 427. Id.  
 428. Id. 
 429. Id. 
 430. Id. 
 431. Id. at 368. 
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it to a friend and she had no knowledge of the knives, lighter, or 
cigarette.432 Ms. Redding’s backpack was searched but nothing was 
found.433 Next, she was taken to the school nurse’s office where she 
was required to remove her clothes down to her underwear.434 Her 
clothes (coat, shirt, pants, and socks) were searched and nothing 
was found.435 Next, Ms. Redding was required to “pull her bra out 
and to the side and shake it, and to pull the elastic on her 
underpants, thus exposing her breasts and pelvic area to some 
degree. No pills were found.”436 
Ms. Redding’s parents brought suit against the school for a 
violation of their daughter’s Fourth Amendment rights.437 At the 
trial the school and named defendants brought a summary 
judgement motion.438 The District Court granted the motion and 
found there had been no Fourth Amendment violation.439 The 
ruling was appealed and the Ninth Circuit held the strip search 
did violate the Fourth Amendment, but found qualified immunity 
should apply to all the named defendants except the assistant 
principal of the school who had order the searches be executed.440 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and found there had been a 
Fourth Amendment violation but qualified immunity was proper 
for several defendants.441 Justice Thomas dissented in part.442 
At the heart of Justice Thomas’s dissent is the argument that 
public schools should be declared in loco parentis, or in the place of 
parents, and thus be unconstrained in their ability to conduct 
                                                                                                     
 432. Id. 
 433. Id. 
 434. Id. at 369. 
 435. Id. 
 436. Id. 
 437. Id. 
 438. Id. 
 439. Id. 
 440. See id. at 369–70 (“The upshot was reversal of summary judgment as to 
Wilson, while affirming the judgments in favor of Schwallier, the school nurse, 
and Romero, the administrative assistant, since they had not acted as 
independent decisionmakers.”). 
 441. Id. at 379. 
 442. See generally id. at 382–403 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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searches.443 Justice Thomas, quoting an earlier opinion, explains 
that under this doctrine parents delegate authority to schools to 
“command obedience, to control stubbornness, to quicken 
diligence, and to reform bad habits . . . . So empowered, 
schoolteachers and administrators had almost complete discretion 
to establish and enforce the rules they believed were necessary to 
maintain control over the classrooms.”444 At first, this quote seems 
like one of those that are common to historical recitations of a 
doctrine, but this is not so. Instead Justice Thomas advocates for 
“the complete restoration of the common-law doctrine of in loco 
parentis.”445 In the context of the Redding case he argues “[t]here 
can be no doubt that a parent would have had the authority to 
conduct the search at issue in this case”446 and if this approach 
were adopted “the search of Redding would stand.”447 
To support his argument Justice Thomas attempts to paint 
two pictures. First, of the case at hand, claiming that school 
officials in Redding acted in an “eminently reasonable” way.448 
Second, he paints a picture of the public schools in the United 
States as out of control.449 The images are meant to establish first 
that the school officials in Redding acted reasonably, and second, 
that a return to in loco parentis is necessary. 
In discussing the facts of the Redding case, Justice Thomas 
paints a grim picture of the middle school Ms. Redding attended 
and of Ms. Redding herself.450 He notes that school officials were 
aware that “a few years ago” a student had obtained a prescription 
                                                                                                     
 443. See id. at 383 (“This deep intrusion into the administration of public 
schools exemplifies why the Court should return to the common-law doctrine of 
in loco parentis . . . .”). 
 444. Id. at 398 (citations omitted). 
 445. Id.  
 446. Id. at 399. 
 447. Id.  
 448. Id. at 389. 
 449. See id. at 383 (“For nearly 25 years this Court has understood that 
‘[m]aintaining order in the classroom has never been easy, but in more recent 
years, school disorder has often taken particularly ugly forms: drug use and 
violent crime in the schools have become major social problems.’” (quoting New 
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985))). 
 450. Id. at 386. 
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drug from a classmate and become seriously ill.451 As a result the 
school had created a strict policy regarding “drugs” in school.452 
According to Justice Thomas, this incident “a few years ago” 
created a “history of problems with students using and distributing 
prohibited and illegal substances on campus.”453 Justice Thomas 
also discussed that school officials had found alcohol and cigarettes 
in the girl’s bathroom, thus establishing “[t]he school’s substance 
abuse problems had not abated by the 2003–2004 school year, 
which is when the challenged search of Redding took place.”454 
Turning next to Ms. Redding, Justice Thomas noted that school 
officials had “smelled alcohol” on her in the past, that she was 
alleged to have hosted a party where alcohol was served, and that 
she was suspected of being among a group of students “planning 
on taking the pills after lunch.”455 In his discussion of the ibuprofen 
in this case Justice Thomas refers to it as “pills,” “drugs,” and 
“prescription pills.”456  
Although it seems this portrayal is meant to conjure a fearful 
image, because of its heavy-handedness, it comes across more 
comic than dire. At one point, Justice Thomas attempts to confront 
the obvious question of the triviality of the drugs in question. He 
concedes “[a]dmittedly, the Ibuprofen and Naproxen at issue in 
this case are not the prescription painkillers at the forefront of the 
prescription-drug-abuse problem.”457 However, from there he notes 
that it is possible to overdose on anti-inflammatory pills and people 
have been known to have allergic reactions to such medicines.458 
Rather than confronting the central question, whether school 
officials overreacted in conducting the search, Justice Thomas 
seems to argue that it was not an overreaction because ibuprofen 
                                                                                                     
 451. Id. at 385. 
 452. Id. 
 453. Id.  
 454. Id. at 386. 
 455. Id.  
 456. Id. 
 457. Id. at 396. 
 458. See id. at 396–97 (“As nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs), 
they pose a risk of death from overdose . . . . Moreover, the side-effects caused by 
the use of NSAIDs can be magnified if they are taken in combination with other 
drugs.”). 
1940 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1869 (2016) 
can kill.459 Again, the emotive effect of this discussion is not to 
create concern or empathy for school officials, but to make Justice 
Thomas seem out of touch.  
Justice Thomas concludes his discussion on the specifics of the 
Redding case with the statement:  
In determining whether the search’s scope was reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment, it is therefore irrelevant 
whether the officials suspected Redding of possessing 
prescription-strength Ibuprofen, nonprescription-strength 
Naproxen, or some harder street drug . . . . Reasonable 
suspicion that Redding was in possession of drugs in violation 
of [school] . . . policies, therefore, justified a search extending to 
any area where small pills could be concealed.460  
This conclusion begs many questions. First, the categorical claim 
that the item a student possesses that is against school policy plays 
no part in a reasonableness analysis seems, well, unreasonable. 
Second, Justice Thomas seems to authorize a more invasive search 
than the one conducted in the case. After all, small pills can be 
hidden in body cavities. 
The image Justice Thomas paints of public schools in the 
United States compared to the days of old is also noteworthy. 
Citing numerous earlier Supreme Court decisions, Justice Thomas 
continues the Court’s tradition of declaring public schools out of 
control. Citing Court cases from 1975 and 1996, Justice Thomas 
writes “[f]or nearly 25 years this Court has understood, 
‘maintaining order in the classroom has never been easy, but in 
more recent years, school disorder has often taken particularly 
ugly forms: drug use and violent crime in the schools have become 
major social problems.”461 He goes on to quote studies that 
“[t]eenage abuse of over-the-counter and prescription drugs poses 
                                                                                                     
 459. See id. at 397 
If a student with a previously unknown intolerance to Ibuprofen or 
Naproxen were to take either drug and become ill, the public outrage 
would likely be directed toward the school for failing to take steps to 
prevent the unmonitored use of the drug. In light of the risks involved, 
a school’s decision to establish and enforce a school prohibition on the 
possession of any unauthorized drug is thus a reasonable judgment. 
 460. Id. at 397–98. 
 461. Id. at 383. 
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an increasingly alarming national crisis”462 and “44 percent of 
teens sa[id] drugs are used, kept or sold on grounds of their 
school.”463 Justice Thomas goes on, stating “[t]eenagers are 
nevertheless apt to ‘believe the myth that these [prescription] 
drugs provide a medically safe high’”464 and that “prescription 
drugs have become ‘gateway drugs to other substances of 
abuse.’”465  
Although it cannot be denied that the public schools in the 
United States face a drug problem, once again Justice Thomas is 
too heavy-handed in his emotional appeal; especially given the 
drugs that were the subject of the case and the fact that the school 
was a middle school.466 The image Justice Thomas paints plays out 
like a combination of the Black Board Jungle467 and Stand and 
Deliver.468 A reader is left to imagine drug deals being conducted 
in hallways, classrooms, and bathrooms. Further, no effort was 
made to distinguish between the problems of the nation’s high 
schools and middle schools. Based on Justice Thomas’s broad 
descriptions it would appear drug use is rampant from K–12. 
Justice Thomas finishes this discussion with a final, misaimed 
emotional appeal, “[b]y declaring the search unreasonable in this 
case, the majority has ‘surrender[ed] control of the American 
public school system to public school students.’”469  
As mentioned above, Justice Thomas’s solution to this problem 
is to have “the complete restoration of the common-law doctrine of 
                                                                                                     
 462. Id. at 395. 
 463. Id.  
 464. Id. (quoting OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, TEENS AND 
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT TRENDS ON THE EMERGING DRUG 
THREAT 3 (2007), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED495769.pdf).  
 465. Id. at 396 (quoting THE NATIONAL CENTER ON ADDICTION AND SUBSTANCE 
ABUSE AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, UNDER THE COUNTER: THE DIVERSION AND ABUSE 
OF CONTROLLED PRESCRIPTION DRUGS IN THE U.S. 4 (2005), 
https://www.centeronaddiction.org/sites/default/files/Under-the-counter-the-diversion- 
and-abuse-of-controlled-prescription-drugs-in-the-us_0.pdf). 
 466. See id. at 385 (“In this instance, the suspicion of drug possession arose 
at a middle school . . . .”). 
  467. BLACKBOARD JUNGLE (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1955). 
 468.  STAND AND DELIVER (Warner Bros. 1988). 
 469. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 398 (2009) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
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in loco parentis.”470 According to Justice Thomas, such authority 
would permit school officials to “command obedience, to control 
stubbornness, to quicken diligence, and to reform bad habits.”471 
Despite seeming to place far too rosy an outlook on the results of a 
return to in loco parentis, Justice Thomas’s view of how the 
doctrine would be employed is not entirely clear. In loco parentis 
was a permissive doctrine, which is to say the doctrine “assumes a 
voluntary delegation of parental authority.”472 Thus, the doctrine 
was not fashioned for a system of “compulsory education.”473 
Further, as some of the sources Justice Thomas cites note, under 
the doctrine a parent “may also delegate part of his parental 
authority.”474 This seems to say that each parent in a school could 
choose a different level of delegation—one parent might say you 
can search my child’s belongings but not her clothes, while another 
would say you can search as you please. But this is clearly not what 
Justice Thomas has in mind. Based on his opinion, Justice Thomas 
envisions the rule applying to all students unless parents, through 
their local school board, change the policy.475 Quoting an earlier 
concurrence of his own, Justice Thomas writes, “[i]f parents do not 
like the rules imposed by those schools, they can seek redress in 
school boards or legislatures; they can send their children to 
private schools or home school them; or they can simply move.”476 
Emotively, this statement reads quite poorly. It has the ring of 
someone who does not care or someone who does not understand. 
Thus, Justice Thomas appears like Dickens’ Ebenezer Scrooge 
turning away gentlemen collecting for charities, “are there no work 
houses, are there no prisons?”477 Or like Marie Antoinette 
                                                                                                     
 470. Id. 
 471. Id.  
 472. Susan Stewart, In Loco Parentis in the Public Schools: Abused, Confused, 
and in Need of Change, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 969, 971 (2010). 
 473. Id. at 991. 
 474. Redding, 557 U.S. at 399 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (internal citation omitted). 
 475. Id. at 400.  
 476. Id. (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 419 (2009) (Thomas, J., 
concurring)). 
 477. CHARLES DICKENS, A CHRISTMAS CAROL 12 (1843). When the men point 
out to Scrooge that most poor people would rather die than go to a workhouse or 
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suggesting that if the peasants of France had no bread the crown 
should “let them eat cake.”478 Beyond the immediate emotive 
problem with the statement, it would have the practical effect of 
granting greater Fourth Amendment protection to those who can 
send their children to private school or homeschool than those who 
cannot. 
Although Justice Thomas’s concern for limiting the options 
available for schools to combat drugs and indiscipline in the 
classroom is a long recognized concern of the Supreme Court,479 the 
Redding case was a poor vehicle for his argument. Justice Thomas 
appears to have missed the powerful emotions directly connected 
with the Fourth Amendment that are active in this case. In broad 
strokes, middle school officials conducted a strip search of a 
thirteen-year-old girl to find anti-inflammatory medication.480 
Justice Thomas’s efforts to justify these actions at once seemed out 
of touch with the essence of the Fourth Amendment while also 
seeming out of touch with the limited options many parents have 
with regard to their children’s education.  
3. Samson v. California 
The third opinion dealing with pathos is Justice Stevens’s 
dissent in Samson v. California.481 The Samson case dealt with the 
warrantless and suspicionless search of a parolee under California 
law.482 The majority in Samson found that “a condition of release 
can so diminish or eliminate a released prisoner’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy that a suspicionless search by a law 
enforcement officer would not offend the Fourth Amendment.”483 
                                                                                                     
prison, Scrooge states “then let them do so and decrease the surplus population.” 
 478. See RESPECTFULLY QUOTED: A DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS REQUESTED 
FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 253 (Suzy Platt ed., 1989) (stating 
that the author of the exact quote is unknown, but it is commonly attributed to 
Marie Antoinette). 
 479. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 385–87 (2009) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 480. Id. at 374 (majority opinion). 
 481. 547 U.S. 843 (2006). 
 482. Id. at 846–47. 
 483. Id. at 847. 
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Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, dissented.484 
Justice Stevens’s dissent is strongly emotive, drawing from a wide 
range of Fourth Amendment cases,485 but failing to confront the 
core legal and emotive question posed by the facts of the case. 
In Samson, the defendant was on parole from a conviction for 
being a felon in possession of a firearm.486 On September 6, 2002, 
an officer recognized Mr. Samson and knew he was on parole.487 
The officer suspected that Mr. Samson was in violation of his 
parole.488 He stopped Mr. Samson and asked him if he was current 
with his parole officer.489 Mr. Samson said he was, and the officer 
verified that Mr. Samson was telling the truth.490 At this point the 
officer conducted a search of Mr. Samson and found a small 
quantity of methamphetamine.491 Mr. Samson brought a motion to 
suppress the evidence based on a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.492 The government countered that the search was 
permissible under California law, which required a parolee to 
agree in writing to submit to a search anytime and anywhere as a 
condition of release.493 The motion was denied and Mr. Samson was 
convicted.494 The California Court of Appeals affirmed the 
conviction and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the 
case.495 A majority of the Court affirmed the California court’s 
conclusion that the Fourth Amendment had not been violated.496 
Justice Stevens’s dissent claimed that the majority opinion 
“sanctions . . . an unprecedented curtailment of liberty.”497 At the 
                                                                                                     
 484. Id. at 857. 
 485. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (concluding that 
suspicionless searches are the very evil the Fourth Amendment prevents). 
 486. Samson, 547 U.S. at 846. 
 487. Id. 
 488. Id. 
 489. Id. 
 490. Id. 
 491. Id. at 847. 
 492. Id. 
 493. Id. at 846. 
 494. Id. at 847. 
 495. Id. at 846. 
 496. Id. 
 497. Id. at 857 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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heart of his opinion is the belief that the majority opinion is 
opening the door to arbitrary suspicionless searches and that “is 
the very evil the Fourth Amendment was intended to stamp 
out.”498 Justice Stevens argues at length that the Court’s precedent 
dealing with parolees and the Fourth Amendment has never 
sanctioned suspicionless searches.499 In describing the majority’s 
decision, he repeatedly calls it “unprecedented” and accuses the 
majority of engaging in reasoning that is “entirely circular.”500 
Justice Stevens concludes with the statement that “[t]he 
requirement of individualized suspicion, in all its iterations, is the 
shield the Framers selected to guard against the evils of arbitrary 
action, caprice, and harassment. To say that those evils may be 
averted without that shield is, . . . to pay lip service to the end 
while withdrawing the means.”501 
Justice Stevens argues effectively and passionately against 
the majority opinion, but fails to address the strongest emotive 
component against his position. The California penal code section 
at issue in the case requires, as a condition of parole, parolees to 
“agree in writing to be subject to search or seizure by a parole 
officer or other peace officer at any time of the day or 
night, . . . with or without a search warrant and with or without 
cause.”502 Thus, an inmate is faced with a choice: Agree to 
suspicionless searches anytime, anywhere, or stay in jail.  
Justice Stevens gives this issue a glancing blow when he 
claims that the State of California cannot reduce a parolee’s 
legitimate expectations of privacy simply by announcing that 
parolees have no legitimate expectation of privacy.503 Justice 
Stevens claims that this would be as if “the Government were 
suddenly to announce on nationwide television that all homes 
henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry.”504 But is it 
really the same? Or put more specifically: Is it emotively the same? 
                                                                                                     
 498. Id. at 858. 
 499. Id. at 857. 
 500. Id. at 857, 863. 
 501. Id. at 866. 
 502. Id. at 843 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 3067(a) (West 2000)). 
 503. Id. at 861. 
 504. Id. at 863 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1979)). 
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Mr. Samson was in jail for a crime involving a handgun.505 He was 
given a choice regarding his confinement.506 He could serve the 
remainder of his prison term in confinement or he could accept 
parole with the caveat that he would have to submit to searches 
without limitations.507 This scenario is quite distinct from the 
government announcing that homes are no longer private. 
One of the challenges for the dissent in Samson was that the 
majority did not rely on the consent doctrine to uphold the 
search.508 Thus, the emotively strongest argument in favor of the 
search was not exactly in play. This fact seems to have made it 
more difficult for Justice Stevens to confront the emotively weak 
element of his position. Nonetheless, confronting that weakness 
was necessary to give the other aspects of his dissent traction. 
In his dissent, Justice Stevens draws on many of the powerful 
pathos-based components of the Fourth Amendment. He discussed 
the Amendment’s primary purpose of preventing the arbitrary 
execution of government powers through general warrants, the 
specter of the government shrinking privacy through 
declaration.509 However, in order for these emotional themes to 
gain momentum, the strongest emotional argument in favor of the 
government’s position must be confronted, even if not relied upon 
by the majority. 
C. Logos 
From the classical era to modern times, rhetoricians have 
argued that logos, or appeals to reason and logic, are likely the 
most important of the modes of persuasion.510 In the influential 
                                                                                                     
 505. Id. at 846 (majority opinion). 
 506. Id. at 851. 
 507. Id. 
 508. See id. at 852 n.3 (“Because we find that the search at issue here is 
reasonable under our general Fourth Amendment approach, we need not reach 
the issue whether ‘acceptance of the search condition constituted consent . . . .’”). 
 509. See id. at 862 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In any event, the notion that a 
parolee legitimately expects only so much privacy as a prisoner is utterly without 
foundation.”). 
 510. See generally Edward M. Cope, Introduction to ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC 
WITH ANALYSIS NOTES AND APPENDICES 99 (1867); HERRICK, supra note 42, at 21; 
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modern work on rhetoric by Ch. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-
Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, the authors noted the “prestige of logical 
thought”511 and how such arguments can give the advocate the 
appearance of “rigorous thought.”512 Logic-based arguments are 
particularly appropriate to our common perception of “justice” in 
the United States. As discussed above, our symbols of justice, 
scales, blindfolded figures and grave unemotional judges dressed 
in black, convey the common image of judicial decision making as 
an objective, logically intensive event.513 The arguments contained 
in the opinions of Supreme Court Justices are replete with 
references to logic and syllogism.514  
                                                                                                     
CH. PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC 193–95 (1st ed. 1969) 
(discussing the power of quasi-logical arguments as distinguished from 
formal/mathematical argumentation).  
 511. PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 510, at 194. 
 512. Id. 
 513. Supra note 389 and accompanying text. 
 514. Listed below are three examples from Fourth Amendment cases where 
Justices made express use of syllogisms in arguing their positions. The frequency 
with which Justices more broadly reference “logic” is much greater than the more 
technical term “syllogism.” The first is Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 678 (1961) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting).  
At the heart of the majority’s opinion in this case is the following 
syllogism: (1) the rule excluding in federal criminal trials evidence 
which is the product of an illegal search and seizure is “part and parcel” 
of the Fourth Amendment; (2) Wolf held that the “privacy” assured 
against federal action by the Fourth Amendment is also protected 
against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) it is 
therefore “logically and constitutionally necessary” that the Weeks 
exclusionary rule should also be enforced against the States. 
The second is Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 77 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting). 
On this premise of the changed command of the amendment, the Court’s task in 
passing on the use of eavesdropping evidence becomes a simple one. Its syllogism 
is this:  
The Fourth Amendment forbids invasion of privacy and excludes 
evidence such invasion obtains; To listen secretly to a man's 
conversations or to tap his telephone conversations invades his 
privacy; Therefore, the Fourth Amendment bars use of evidence 
eavesdropping or by tapping telephone wires. 
The foregoing syllogism is faulty for at least two reasons: (1) the Fourth 
Amendment itself contains no provision that implies a purpose to bar 
evidence or anything else an “unreasonable search or seizure” secures; 
(2) the Fourth Amendment's language, fairly construed, refers 
specifically to “unreasonable searches and seizures” and not to a broad 
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Although the importance of logical reasoning is at once 
obvious, it is also controversial. Much of the legal realism 
movement can be seen as a challenge to the primacy of logic as a 
way of judicial decision making.515 Despite the tension between 
logical analysis and the practicalities/realities of human decision 
making, at least the appearance of logic is critical. In this section, 
I seek to discuss opinions where the internal logic of the Justice’s 
opinion seems weak. This is distinct from when a Justice has relied 
on a precedent that does not support or weakly supports their 
position. 
Below I discuss three opinions where the Justice’s opinion 
demonstrates internally weak logic. The opinions contain a variety 
of potential informal logical fallacies. These fallacies include: the 
hasty generalization;516 arguing from consequences,517 the fallacy 
                                                                                                     
undefined right to “privacy” in general.  
The third is Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 861 (2006) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). The Court is able to make this unprecedented move only by making 
another.  
Coupling the dubious holding of Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 
S. Ct. 3194 (1984), with the bald statement that parolees have fewer 
expectations of privacy than probationers, the Court two-steps its way 
through a faulty syllogism and, thus, avoids the application of Fourth 
Amendment principles altogether. The logic, apparently, is this: 
Prisoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy; parolees are like 
prisoners; therefore, parolees have no legitimate expectation of 
privacy. 
 515. See Daniel Z. Epstein, Rationality, Legitimacy, and the Law, 7 WASH. U. 
JURIS. REV. 1, 2 (2014) (discussing the foundational challenge posed by the 
American legal realism movement). 
 516. See ALDISERT, supra note 7, at 195 (explaining the fallacy of the hasty 
generalization is “[a]lso called the fallacy of selected instances, it results from 
enumerating instances without obtaining a representative number to establish 
an inductive generalization”).  
 517. DOUGLAS WALTON, INFORMAL LOGIC: A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 27 (2008). 
Walton notes that arguing from consequences may be valid in some 
circumstances, if the consequences are not relevant to the issue being discussed 
it is fallacious. Id. For example, an attorney who argues that you cannot find a 
defendant not guilty because it will cause wide spread rioting is arguing from 
consequences. 
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of composition;518 and the fallacy of the non sequitur.519 The first is 
Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent in Missouri v. McNeely.520 The 
McNeely case dealt with the exigent circumstances surrounding 
the taking of a blood sample from a suspected drunk driver.521 The 
second is Justice Thomas’s majority opinion in Navarette v. 
California.522 Navarette addressed the minimum requirements 
necessary to conduct a reasonable suspicion detention based on an 
anonymous tip.523 The third opinion is Justice Breyer’s dissent in 
Arizona v. Gant.524 The Gant case addressed a search incident to 
an arrest that occurs in an automobile.525 
1. Missouri v. McNeely 
In Missouri v. McNeely,526 the Court was asked to resolve 
“whether the natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream 
presents a per se exigency that justifies an exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood 
testing in all drunk-driving cases.”527 In McNeely, a police officer 
observed the defendant driving erratically and speeding.528 After 
McNeely was stopped, the officer noticed McNeely’s eyes were 
bloodshot, his speech was slurred, and he smelled of alcohol.529 
McNeely admitted to drinking alcohol that night and after failing 
                                                                                                     
 518. See id. at 221 (“The fallacy of composition consists of reasoning 
improperly from a property of a member of a group to a property of the group 
itself.” (quoting JOSEPH GERARD BRENNAN, A HANJDBOOK OF LOGIC 190 (1957))). 
 519. See id. at 203 (noting the non sequitur “is an argument that contains a 
conclusion that does not necessarily follow from the premises or any antecedent 
statement”).  
 520. 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013).  
 521. Id. at 1556. 
 522. 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014). 
 523. Id. at 1687. 
 524. 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
 525. Id. at 332. 
 526. 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013). 
 527. Id. at 1556. 
 528. Id. 
 529. Id. 
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a field sobriety test, he refused a breathalyzer test.530 The officer 
then took McNeely to the hospital and asked if he would submit to 
a blood test, which McNeely refused.531 The officer had a blood test 
done nonetheless.532 The blood test determined that the 
Defendant’s blood alcohol level was .154, far above Missouri’s .08 
legal limit.533 The officer charged McNeely with drunk driving and 
at trial, McNeely moved to suppress the blood test.534  
The trial court suppressed the blood test results and the 
government appealed the decision.535 The case was directed to the 
Missouri Supreme Court, which affirmed the trial court’s holding, 
stating this was “unquestionably a routine DWI case”536 that did 
not merit the application of the exigent circumstances exception to 
the warrant requirement.537 The case was appealed to the United 
States Supreme Court, which affirmed the lower court.538 
Justice Sotomayor, writing for a majority of the Court, only 
answered the question presented of whether in drunk driving cases 
a per se rule on warrantless blood testing was justified.539 In 
rejecting the proposed per se rule, Justice Sotomayor explained 
that despite the fact that in DUI cases, evidence of the crime, in 
the form of alcohol in the blood stream, is being destroyed as it is 
metabolized, the usual requirement of a totality of the 
circumstances analysis to determine exigencies would still be 
required.540 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote an opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting in part and Justice Thomas wrote a dissent.541 Justice 
                                                                                                     
 530. Id. at 1557. 
 531. Id. 
 532. Id. 
 533. Id. 
 534. Id. 
 535. Id. 
 536. Id. 
 537. Id. at 1556. 
 538. Id. at 1558. 
 539. Id. at 1556. 
 540. Id. at 1568. 
 541. Chief Justice Roberts wrote an opinion that Justices Breyer and Alito 
joined. Id. at 1569 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
Justice Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion that was not joined by anyone. Id. at 
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Thomas suggested that the proposed per se rule in DUI cases 
should be adopted.542 Chief Justice Roberts suggested a rule that 
in effect split the difference between the majority’s rule and Justice 
Thomas’s opinion.543 
Chief Justice Roberts began his dissent with a definitive 
statement that “[a] police officer reading this Court’s opinion would 
have no idea—no idea—what the Fourth Amendment requires of 
him, once he decides to obtain a blood sample from a drunk driving 
suspect who has refused a breathalyzer test.”544 He then proceeded 
to argue that the proper method of solving the controversy in the 
case would be to create what Justice Sotomayor described as “a 
modified per se rule.”545 Under this modified rule an officer would 
be required to seek a warrant if there is “time to secure a warrant 
before blood can be drawn.”546 If not, “the exigent circumstances 
exception applies by its terms, and the blood may be drawn without 
a warrant.”547 Thus, under the Chief Justice’s proposed rule, police 
would be expected to pursue a warrant during the time it takes 
them to get a suspect from a traffic stop to a hospital. After that, 
the per se rule would apply and the blood could be drawn without 
a warrant.548 
Contained in Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent are at least two 
logically questionable positions. First, that police officers will have 
“no idea—no idea—what the Fourth Amendment requires of 
him”549 based on the majority opinion. Second, that based on the 
body’s natural metabolism of alcohol in the blood, exigent 
circumstances should be presumed in all DUI cases.550 
                                                                                                     
1574 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 542. Id. at 1579 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 543. Id. at 1569 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 544. Id.  
 545. Id. at 1563 (majority opinion). 
 546. Id. at 1569 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 547. Id.  
 548. See id. at 1563 (majority opinion) (arguing that Chief Justice Roberts’s 
opinion would create a per se rule “under which a warrantless blood draw is 
permissible if the officer could not secure a warrant . . . in the time it takes to 
transport the suspect to a hospital or similar facility”). 
 549. Id. at 1569 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 550. Id. 
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Chief Justice Roberts’s opening line to his dissent is clearly 
intended to make a powerful emotive point. This is manifested in 
its directness and in the deliberate choice to repeat the words “no 
idea”.551 It is more than simply a pathos-based argument, it is, in 
effect, the conclusion to the syllogism of his argument. If we were 
to put the argument into syllogistic form (or more accurately in 
enthymeme form) it might look like this: Officers confronted with 
a DUI suspect who refuses a breathalyzer require clear guidance 
or they will have no idea of how to determine when they have 
adequate exigencies to permit a warrantless blood draw. The 
majority’s totality of the circumstances test does not provide clear 
guidance. Thus, the majority’s totality of the circumstances test 
leaves officers with no idea how to determine when they have 
adequate exigencies to permit a warrantless blood draw. But can 
this be true? And if it is true, is there not a larger problem? If the 
totality of the circumstances test does not work for the exigencies 
of a DUI case, why should it be adequate in any other exigent 
circumstances situation?  
Chief Justice Roberts is arguably engaging in a fallacy of 
distraction—such fallacies divert the central argument from the 
issue at hand to the irrelevant, irrational, or emotional.552 In this 
case, Chief Justice Roberts is deploying a variant on the fallacy of 
terror.553 Such an argument suggests that if the course proposed 
by the opposing view is taken, disaster will ensue. Here the Chief 
Justice paints a picture of police officers lost in a sea of indecision, 
with “no idea, no idea” how to proceed.  
It could also be argued that the Chief Justice has made a hasty 
generalization. Perhaps in some circumstances an officer would 
feel he or she has “no idea” how they should proceed in a DUI case 
involving a refusal to take a breathalyzer based on the totality of 
the circumstances, but this would seem the exception. The fallacy 
                                                                                                     
 551. Id. 
 552. See ALDISERT, supra note 7, at 174 (explaining that the fallacy of 
distraction includes those that “shift attention from reasoned argument to other 
things that are always irrelevant, always irrational, and often emotional”). 
 553. See id. at 188 (explaining that the fallacy of terror “makes an appeal to 
fear of exaggerated consequences in the event an adversary's argument prevails”). 
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of a hasty generalization occurs when an advocate moves too 
quickly from a specific example to a general conclusion.554  
Contrary to the Chief Justice’s argument, there are many 
cases involving exigent circumstances and the totality of the 
circumstances test that provide clarity for officers regarding DUI 
refusal cases.555 The entire body of exigent circumstances cases 
paints a picture of when an officer can pursue a warrantless blood 
draw.556 First, the officer must have probable cause.557 Second, “the 
exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so 
compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable.”558 
Several Supreme Court cases have addressed the exigencies 
created by the danger of imminent destruction of evidence.559 
These cases seem explicit, requiring police to secure a warrant 
unless they “are truly confronted with a ‘now or never’ 
situation.”560  
                                                                                                     
 554. Id. at 195.  
 555. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948) (“We 
cannot . . . excuse the absence of a search warrant without a showing by those 
who seek exemption from the constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the 
situation made [the search] imperative.”); see also Schmerber v. California, 384 
U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (stating that the natural dissipation of alcohol could be an 
exigent circumstance when combined with other factors); Preston v. United 
States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964) (concluding the delay necessary to obtain a 
warrant, under the circumstances, threatened the destruction of evidence). 
 556. See cases cited supra note 555 (reiterating that the court must consider 
the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a delay to obtain a 
warrant would be detrimental). 
 557. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985); Schmerber v. California, 384 
U.S. 757, 768 n.12 (1966); DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 210, at 179–82.  
 558. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011).  
 559. See id. at 463 (stating warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of 
evidence is allowed); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769 (explaining an officer’s fear in 
the delay for a warrant leading to the destruction of evidence); see also McDonald, 
335 U.S. at 455 (“No reason, except inconvenience of the officers and delay in 
preparing papers and getting before a magistrate, appears for the failure to seek 
a search warrant.”); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948) (determining 
that there was no evidence under the threat of destruction). For a more complete 
discussion of the early history of the exigent circumstances exception applied to 
the destruction of evidence, see generally Barbara C. Salken, Balancing Exigency 
and Privacy in Warrantless Searches to Prevent Destruction of Evidence: The Need 
for a Rule, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 283 (1988).  
 560. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1561 (2013); see also Roaden v. 
Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 505 (1973) (“Where there are exigent circumstances in 
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The second potential logical flaw in Chief Justice Roberts’s 
dissent is that the natural metabolic process creates, in effect, 
exigent circumstances in every DUI refusal case. As the Chief 
Justice rightly points out, the exigent circumstances exception 
may apply when “there is a compelling need to prevent the 
imminent destruction of important evidence, and there is no time 
to obtain a warrant.”561 Again, placing this argument in syllogistic 
form it might be the following: Exigent circumstances exist when 
there is a compelling need to prevent the imminent destruction of 
any important evidence and no time to obtain a warrant; in all DUI 
breathalyzer refusal cases once a suspect is transported to a 
facility to draw blood there is a compelling need to prevent the 
imminent destruction of important evidence; thus there are 
exigent circumstances in every DUI breathalyzer refusal case once 
the suspect has been transported to a medical facility. This 
argument can be challenged based on its use of the term imminent. 
In cases involving exigent circumstances based on destruction 
of evidence like Ker v. California,562 or Kentucky v. King,563 there 
is a focus on the speed and ease with which evidence can be 
destroyed. In a typical drug case, the evidence of criminal activity 
is capable of being quickly and easily destroyed. The capacity to 
quickly and easily destroy evidence is not present in most DUI 
breathalyzer refusal cases.564 Individuals suspected of being 
intoxicated cannot choose to destroy the evidence immediately. 
According to the statistics the majority uses and dissenting 
opinions, the most rapid rate at which the body metabolizes alcohol 
is .025 per hour.565 The legal limit for all states is .08.566 Based on 
                                                                                                     
which police action literally must be ‘now or never’ to preserve the evidence of a 
crime, it is reasonable to permit the action withou[sic] prior judicial evaluation.”). 
 561. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1569 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 562. 374 U.S. 23 (1960). 
 563. 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011). 
 564. See id. at 466 (stating that officers are required to make split-second 
judgments and in this case, occupants were moving around in a room filled with 
evidence). 
 565. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1560; id. at 1570 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 566. Id. at 1571 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
THE RHETORIC OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 1955 
these facts, the fastest an individual arrested for a DUI could 
metabolize all of the alcohol in their system would be more than 
three hours. Under the facts in McNeely, the defendant’s BAC was 
.154 at the time of his warrantless blood draw.567 Based on 
McNeely’s BAC, the soonest the alcohol would have been out of his 
blood stream is over six hours after the blood test.  
Chief Justice Roberts addresses the argument that experts 
can present a regression analysis to a jury to explain how high a 
defendant’s BAC was at the time of arrest, as opposed to when the 
blood was drawn.568 In a footnote the Chief Justice asserts such 
“second-best evidence may prove useless . . . defense attorneys 
have objected to that evidence, courts have at times rejected it, and 
juries may be suspicious of it.”569 This is a weak counter. Defense 
attorneys regularly object to every test that would prove their 
client guilty and courts have at times rejected all sorts of tests. All 
the Justices on the Court have accepted the science surrounding 
how alcohol is metabolized and the range of rates at which it is 
metabolized.570 Why should we expect less of jurors? 
The logical premise of this second argument can be challenged 
as incorrectly categorizing all DUI breathalyzer refusal cases as 
involving the imminent destruction of evidence. The facts are 
arguably to the contrary. In the average DUI case, the evidence is 
preserved, at least for a predictable term of hours.  
2. Navarette v. California 
The second opinion in this section is Justice Thomas’s majority 
opinion in Navarette. In the opinion, Justice Thomas addressed the 
standard for permitting a traffic stop based on reasonable 
suspicion supplied by an anonymous informant.571 The focus of this 
discussion will be on Justice Thomas’s conclusion that the 
anonymous tip in the case from a motorist claiming to have been 
                                                                                                     
 567. Id. at 1557 (majority opinion). 
 568. Id. at 1572 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 569. Id. at 1572 n.1. 
 570. Id. at 1559 (majority opinion); id. at 1570–71 (Roberts, C.J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part); id. at 1575 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 571. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1686 (2014). 
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forced off the road by a particular truck provided reasonable 
suspicion to believe a crime was currently ongoing.572 Justice 
Thomas’s opinion illustrates the fallacy of composition.573 This 
fallacy is described in Joseph Gerald Brennan’s book A Handbook 
of Logic,574 as “consist[ing] of reasoning improperly from a property 
of a member of a group to a property of the group itself.”575  
In Navarette, police received a 911 call from a motorist 
claiming to have been run off the road by another vehicle.576 The 
caller gave a detailed description of the car, its license plate 
number, location, and direction.577 Approximately thirteen 
minutes after the 911 call, a police cruiser spotted a car fitting the 
description and followed the car for five minutes, ultimately 
pulling it over.578 As the officers approached the vehicle they 
smelled marijuana, and a subsequent search revealed thirty 
pounds of the drug.579 At trial, the defendants moved to suppress 
the marijuana based on an illegal stop.580 Specifically, the 
defendants argued that the anonymous caller did not provide an 
adequate basis to establish reasonable suspicion.581 The trial court 
denied the motion, as did the California Court of Appeals.582 The 
California Supreme Court refused to hear the case and the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari.583 Justice Thomas, writing for 
the majority, affirmed the lower court rulings.584  
In his majority opinion, Justice Thomas relies on a number of 
inferences to arrive at his conclusion.585 One inference in particular 
                                                                                                     
 572. Id. at 1692. 
 573. See id. at 1691 (relying on inferences related to reckless driving that the 
defendant must have been drunk). 
 574. JOSEPH GERARD BRENNAN, A HANDBOOK OF LOGIC (1957). 
 575. Id. at 190. 
 576. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1686–87. 
 577. Id. at 1687. 
 578. Id. 
 579. Id. 
 580. Id. 
 581. Id. 
 582. Id. 
 583. Id. 
 584. Id. at 1692. 
 585. See id. at 1690 (concluding that the report of the witness in this case was 
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could be challenged, both from a logical perspective and because of 
the implications it signals for reasonable suspicion standards. 
That inference is Justice Thomas’s conclusion that an allegation by 
one motorist that another motorist “ran them off the road” provides 
an adequate factual basis for a police stop based on reasonable 
suspicion of drunk driving.586 
As Justice Thomas rightly discusses, in order for an officer to 
have the authority to stop a vehicle based on a reliable tip, there 
must be “reasonable suspicion that ‘criminal activity may be 
afoot.’”587 In Navarette, the anonymous tip was that the 
defendant’s vehicle ran the reporting party off the road.588 Based 
on that information alone, Justice Thomas concluded that 
reasonable suspicion existed that the driver of the vehicle 
described by the tipster was drunk.589 Once again, to place Justice 
Thomas’s reasoning in logical form: All vehicles that run other 
vehicles off the road provide adequate articulable facts to 
reasonably suspect the driver of the vehicle is intoxicated; the 
driver in Navarette allegedly ran the tipster off the road; thus 
reasonable suspicion existed to stop the defendants.  
The difficulty with the above syllogism is that it appears to 
assume too much in the major premise. As mentioned above, the 
fallacy of composition occurs when too much is assumed about the 
whole of a group based on a characteristic of a member of the 
group.590 This could also be described as a fallacy of hasty 
generalization—where a generalization is arrived at too quickly 
based on too few specific examples. In Navarette, the group or 
whole would be all those who drive in such a way as to run another 
                                                                                                     
reliable because the reporter called 911, and because her report was allegedly 
made shortly after the incident she was reporting). But see id. at 1694 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (challenging the majority’s conclusions). 
 586. See id. at 1690 (majority opinion) (“We conclude that the behavior alleged 
by the 911 caller, ‘viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police 
officer, amount[s] to reasonable suspicion’ of drunk driving.” (citing Ornelas v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996))). 
 587. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). 
 588. Id. at 1687. 
 589. Id. at 1690–91. 
 590. See ALDISERT, supra note 7, at 221 (explaining the fallacy of composition 
as misapplying the tendency of a member of a group to the tendency of the group 
generally). 
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driver off the road. Some members of that group could be distracted 
drivers, texting or reading emails; some could be overly tired and 
falling asleep at the wheel; some could be angry drivers, purposely 
driving another person off the road due to a perceived slight; some 
could be intoxicated; and some could have just made an honest 
mistake and accidentally run another motorist off the road. Justice 
Thomas’s logical error is compounded when the other facts of 
Navarette are considered. Although briefly mentioned in the the 
majority opinion, the dissent focused on the fact that after police 
encountered the defendant’s truck, they followed the vehicle for 
five minutes.591 During the five-minute pursuit the vehicle did not 
do anything suspicious.592 These facts make the likelihood of drunk 
driving even less than one of the other possible explanations.593  
The standard of reasonable suspicion has always been difficult 
to quantify. It is something less than probable cause but more than 
“a mere ‘hunch.’”594 However, it has always required a 
connection.595 This is categorically distinct from the standard 
Justice Thomas provides in Navarette. Even if the standard was as 
low as a mere hunch, that hunch would need more than mere 
possibility: Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
describes a hunch as “a strong intuitive feeling.”596 There are no 
facts in Navarette to support even an intuitive feeling that the 
defendants in the case were drunk as opposed to any other reason 
for running another vehicle off the road.597 In fact, the code that 
was broadcast to the responding police officers was not for drunk 
                                                                                                     
 591. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1696 (2014) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 592. Id. 
 593. See id. (“Consequently, the tip’s suggestion of ongoing drunken driving 
(if it could be deemed to suggest that) not only went uncorroborated; it was 
affirmatively undermined.”). 
 594. Id. at 1687 (majority opinion) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). 
 595. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (describing the amount and 
veracity of information required to justify reasonable suspicion).  
 596. Hunch, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
1102 (1981). 
 597. See Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1695 (2014) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (stating that the anonymous caller never made an accusation of drunk 
driving, and that saying she was “[run] off the roadway” neither “assert[ed] that 
the driver was drunk nor even raise[d] the likelihood that the driver was drunk”). 
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driving, but reckless driving.598 Thus, Justice Thomas’s reasoning 
fails because the major premise he relies on is faulty. 
The standard of reasonable suspicion has been criticized as 
having steadily moved more and more in favor of law enforcement 
interests since Terry v. Ohio,599 but Justice Thomas’s formulation 
is a new leap further in that direction.600 When the facts in Terry 
that provided reasonable suspicion are compared to the facts in 
Navarette, it can hardly be said that the Navarette majority is 
applying the same test as that which the majority applied in 
Terry.601 In Terry v. Ohio, the officer observed two men repeatedly 
walk past the front of a store, look in the window, walk further 
down the street and then return, once again looking in the window 
of the same store.602 This happened approximately a dozen times 
in the course of ten to twelve minutes.603 The officer, suspicious 
that the men were reconnoitering the store for a robbery, stopped 
the men.604 In Terry, there was a clear connection between the 
                                                                                                     
 598. Joint Appendix at 20–31, Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014) 
(No. 12-9490) 2013 WL 6115701. The 911 operator in the case stated, “I 
broadcasted it to the coastal units. So I would say, Attention, costal units. BOL 
for—well, in this case it was a reckless driver, 23103. And then give the 
information, the silver, the F150 pickup, etc.” Also, the responding officer 
acknowledged receiving the message regarding reckless driving, “I remember 
hearing dispatch of a reckless driver southbound on Highway 1. I don’t recall the 
exact location. It was at the north end of the area that I was supposed to cover 
and basically coming toward Fort Bragg.” Id. at 46. 
 599. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 600. See David Cashman, Comment, Criminal Law—Terry Searches 
Predicated on Nothing More Than Reasonable Suspicion that a Suspect is Armed 
and Dangerous—United States v. House, 463 F. App’x 783 (10th Cir. 2012), 18 
SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 151, 165 (2013) (“[S]ince Terry, courts have 
allowed officers ever more leeway . . . , often at the expense of the privacy rights 
of those being investigated . . . . [S]ubsequent [court] decisions have moved the 
law on stop and frisks steadily in the government’s favor.”). 
 601. Compare Terry, 392 U.S. at 8 (determining that there was reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity where the officer personally witnessed behavior 
indicative of a “stake-out” over the course of a ten to twelve minute period), with 
Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1687 (determining that there was reasonable suspicion of 
drunk driving where the officers were responding to an anonymous tip of reckless 
driving and had not personally witnessed any behavior indicative of drunk or 
reckless driving over the course of a five minute period). 
 602. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5–6. 
 603. Id. 
 604. Id. at 6–7. 
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behavior the officer observed and the criminal activity he 
suspected was still afoot.  
In Navarette, the criminal activity that was actually suspected 
had already been completed, reckless driving.605 If the officers had 
observed behavior that made them suspect the defendants were 
continuing to engage in reckless driving, or if they observed 
additional facts that connected the alleged incident the tipster 
described to drunk driving, then reasonable suspicion would 
exist.606 Even the examples Justice Thomas provided of past cases 
where courts have found reasonable suspicion to believe drunk 
driving was occurring provide more information than that in 
Navarette, such as “crossing over the center line on the highway 
and almost causing several head-on collisions,”607 “‘driving all over 
the road’ and ‘weaving back and forth,’”608 and “driving in the 
median.”609 Compare this to the bare assertion in Navarette that 
the defendants’ car ran another car off the road. 
Justice Thomas’s formulation in Navarette can be challenged 
as including an overly broad major premise and thereby expanding 
the Terry stop exception.610 By equating factual conduct that could 
possibly be explained by criminal activity being afoot—rather than 
requiring the factual activity to create a reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity—Justice Thomas has converted the reasonable 
suspicion test into a “reasonable possibility” test. 
                                                                                                     
 605. See supra note 601 and accompanying text (explaining that the nature of 
the initial report was one of reckless driving, not drunk driving).  
 606. See Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1699 (2014) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“Had the officers witnessed the petitioners violate a single traffic law, 
they would have had cause to stop the truck . . . .”). 
 607. Id. at 1690 (majority opinion) (quoting State v. Prendergast, 83 P.3d 714, 
715–16 (Haw. 2004)).  
 608. Id. at 1690–91 (quoting State v. Golotta, 837 A.2d 359, 361 (N.J. 2003)). 
 609. Id. at 1691 (quoting State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625, 626 (Iowa 2001)). 
 610. See id. at 1696 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (positing that an anonymous tip 
was enough to “counsel observation of the truck to see if it was driven by a 
drunken driver,” but not enough to justify a Terry stop). 
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3. Arizona v. Gant 
The final opinion discussed in this section is also the shortest. 
Justice Breyer’s dissent in Arizona v. Gant is a mere few hundred 
words, yet those few words underlie a question that stands at the 
crossroad of logic and judicial philosophy. The question raised in 
Gant is whether the doctrine of stare decisis can exceed the plain 
language of the Constitution.611  
In Arizona v. Gant, the Supreme Court took up once again the 
scope of searches incident to arrest when the arrest is associated 
with a suspect in an automobile.612 The question of what impact, if 
any, the fact that an individual is in, or was moments before in, a 
vehicle has occupied several Supreme Court decisions.613 Prior to 
Gant, most courts believed that once an individual was arrested, 
the entirety of the passenger compartment of the vehicle could be 
searched.614 Some argued this rule was logically at odds with the 
precedent that gave rise to the rule and the basic requirements of 
the Fourth Amendment.615 Justice Stevens, writing for the 
majority, asserted that any conclusion that arresting the recent 
occupant of an automobile always gave police the right to search 
the vehicle without a warrant was incorrect.616 Justice Stevens 
then explained the proper application of the Court’s precedent was 
                                                                                                     
 611. Compare Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 348 (2009) (“We have never 
relied on stare decisis to justify the continuance of an 
unconstitutional . . . practice.”), with id. at 354–55 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(“Principles of stare decisis must apply, and those who wish this Court to change 
a well-established legal precedent—where, as here, there has been considerable 
reliance on the legal rule in question—bear a heavy burden.”). 
 612. Id. at 336 (majority opinion). 
 613. See generally Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004); Knowles v. 
Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986); New York v. 
Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
 614. See Gant, 556 U.S. at 342–43 (highlighting that lower court decisions 
trend toward treating the search of a vehicle incident to arrest as “a police 
entitlement rather than as an exception” to the rule (citing Thornton v. United 
States, 541 U.S. 615, 624 (2004))). 
 615. See id. at 342 n.2 (referencing United States v. Green, 324 F.3d 375 (5th 
Cir. 2003); United States v. Edwards, 242 F.3d 928 (10th Cir. 2001); and United 
States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1987) as cases challenging a broad 
interpretation of Belton).  
 616. Id. at 343. 
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“[u]nder our view, Belton and Thornton permit an officer to conduct 
a vehicle search when an arrestee is within reaching distance of 
the vehicle or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains 
evidence of the offense of arrest.”617  
Justice Breyer dissented from the majority.618 The primary 
basis for his objection was that the majority appeared to be 
breaking from the doctrine of stare decisis without an adequate 
foundation.619 Of particular significance to this discussion is 
Justice Breyer’s statement that “I . . . agree with Justice 
Stevens, . . . that the rule can produce results divorced from its 
underlying Fourth Amendment rationale.”620 Despite this 
statement, Justice Breyer asserts that because this is not a case of 
first impression, the doctrine of stare decisis should carry the 
day.621  
Justice Breyer’s short dissent is logically sound provided that 
he believes that stare decisis can trump the importance of fulfilling 
the rationale that gave birth to a line of constitutional precedent. 
Under this argument, fulfilling the objectives of clarity and 
stability could, in some circumstances, exceed a rationale that 
derives from the language of the Constitution. Thus, Justice 
Breyer’s view of constitutional interpretation would include a 
conditional major premise. That major premise could be something 
like the following: when interpreting the Constitution, the doctrine 
of stare decisis only sometimes fulfills constitutional rationales. 
However, if Justice Breyer were to reject such a major premise and 
agree that stare decisis must always fulfill and advance 
constitutional rationales, then his dissent is logically flawed.  
                                                                                                     
 617. Id. at 346. 
 618. Id. at 354–55 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 619. See id. (“I have not found [the] burden [to justify a change of 
“well-established precedent”] met. Nor do I believe that the other considerations 
ordinarily relevant when determining whether to overrule a case are satisfied.”). 
 620. Id. at 354. 
 621. See id. (“The matter . . . is not one of first impression, and that fact 
makes a substantial difference . . . . Principles of stare decisis must apply . . . .”). 
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IV. Why These Weaknesses 
Persuasion is a complex process. There are multiple methods 
of achieving it and at least as many ways to be unsuccessful. It 
would be a dramatic overstatement to claim that all of the less than 
optimally persuasive Fourth Amendment opinions from the 
Roberts Court share a common cause or cluster of common causes. 
However, several of the opinions discussed in this Article appear 
to share some connections that may partially explain their weak 
persuasive force. These connections also have a rough correlation 
to weaknesses in one of the three forms of persuasion Aristotle 
identified. Weaknesses in ethos have a common connection related 
to the doctrine of stare decisis. Weaknesses in pathos arguments 
tend to appear when Justices focus on emotions other than the 
emotive touchstones of the Fourth Amendment. In the area of 
logically weak arguments, the common cause sometimes can be 
traced to what appears to be outcome-oriented logic. In the area of 
pathos and logos, weakness appears when a particular outcome in 
the case appears to drive the emotive- and logic-based arguments. 
The appearance of outcome-based opinion writing arguably 
violates a core tenant of classical persuasion—audience 
expectation.622  
A core element of classical and modern rhetoric is that 
advocates are expected to modify their arguments for the audience 
they are attempting to persuade.623 Part of that modification turns 
on what moves a particular audience, but some of that also turns 
on what the audience expects of the speaker.624 Part of the 
                                                                                                     
 622. See ON RHETORIC, supra note 40, at 148–56 (noting that Aristotle 
discusses adapting speeches to the character of the audience); PERELMAN & 
OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 510, at 30 (explaining the need to prepare 
speeches with the intended audience in mind); Richard Long, The Role of 
Audience in Chaim Perelman's New Rhetoric, 4 J. ADVANCED COMPOSITION 107, 
107 (1983) [hereinafter Long, The Role of Audience] (“The rhetor . . . enters into 
communion with the audience, and, as a result of subsequent argumentative 
techniques, they act together.”).  
 623. See Long, The Role of Audience, supra note 622 at 107 (“The rhetor 
creates a presence by first analyzing how the audience thinks and acts and then 
stylistically re-creating the resulting information.”). 
 624. See ON RHETORIC supra note 40, at 152 (“[A]ll people receive favorably 
speeches spoken in their own character and by persons like themselves . . . .”).  
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expectation of Supreme Court Justices, or any judge for that 
matter, is that they are not partisan.625 As judges use pathos 
arguments in a heavy-handed way or logos arguments that appear 
ends-oriented, they tend to violate audience expectations. 
A. Stare Decisis and Ethos 
The Supreme Court has described the doctrine of stare decisis 
as of “fundamental importance to the rule of law.”626 Justices like 
Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer—both having dramatically 
different perspectives on constitutional interpretation—have 
expressed the need to respect the doctrine.627 Professor Laurence 
Tribe described the doctrine as “a resolution to stand by rulings, at 
least presumptively, in the face of one’s belief that one probably 
would have decided differently.”628  
Based on these descriptions, the doctrine of stare decisis is 
meant to constrain even the Supreme Court.629 In some instances, 
under the pressure from this constraint Justices have reacted in 
two ways that result in less persuasive legal opinions. First, 
                                                                                                     
 625. See 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judges § 129 (2009) (“There is a strong presumption 
that judges are impartial participants in the legal process . . . . The law presumes 
that a judge is unbiased and unprejudiced.”). 
 626. Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 494 
(1987). 
 627. See STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 
153–56 (2011) (discussing the power of stare decisis as arising from public 
reliance on precedent); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 411–12 (2012) (describing stare decisis as the 
“chief barrier against [any] . . . wrenching purge” of established constitutional 
doctrine). 
 628. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION 208 (2008).  
 629. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional 
Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 71 (1991) (predicting 
chaos if the Supreme Court were to “adopt a low level of deference to precedent”); 
Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411, 
412 (2010) (“[T]he Supreme Court has lauded stare decisis as possessing 
fundamental importance to the rule of law, promoting the evenhanded, 
predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, and contributing to 
the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” (citations omitted)); 
Adam N. Steinman, A Constitution for Judicial Law Making, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 
545, 576 (2004) (addressing the significance of stare decisis on judicial 
lawmaking). 
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Justices proceed timidly, fearful of starting a line of precedent that 
is unwise or ending a line of precedent that may be of some use 
later.630 Second, Justices misstate precedent, declaring that it 
supports their position when it does not or does so weakly.631 
Either of these reactions damage the persuasive force of a Justice’s 
opinion, and in most instances, are not necessary to carry the 
Justice’s argument. 
 The first tendency described above is for a Justice to resolve 
as little as possible in an opinion, thereby providing too little 
guidance to courts and law enforcement. The temptation to follow 
the minimalist path, especially in the area of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, can be strong. Due to the frequency of Fourth 
Amendment litigation, both criminal and civil, a poorly 
constructed Fourth Amendment opinion often makes itself known 
quickly. It took less than eight years for Georgia v. Randolph to be 
limited to the narrowest range of influence by Fernandez v. 
California,632 and Thornton v. United States633 was clarified, if not 
partially overruled, by Arizona v. Gant in even less time.634 The 
temptation to decide as little as possible in a Fourth Amendment 
opinion is further encouraged by the Court’s “totality of the 
circumstances” test for determining reasonableness.635 This sort of 
                                                                                                     
 630. See supra Part III.2 (highlighting the tendency of the Supreme Court to 
proceed timidly in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, thereby leading to a rule 
more fluid than concrete). 
 631. See infra text accompanying notes 637–639 (discussing the tendency of 
the Supreme Court to misstate precedent in order to avoid its application to the 
facts of the case).  
 632. See Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1137 (2014) (“Putting the 
exception the Court adopted in Randolph to one side, the lawful occupant of a 
house or apartment should have the right to invite police to enter the dwelling 
and conduct a search.” (citing Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006))). 
 633. 541 U.S. 615 (2004).  
 634. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 352 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“Justice Stevens acknowledges that an officer-safety rationale cannot justify all 
vehicle searches incident to arrest, but asserts that that is not the rule Belton and 
Thornton adopted (As described above, I read those cases differently).” (citing 
Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004))). 
 635. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) (establishing totality of 
circumstances as the proper probable cause test because “probable cause is a fluid 
concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual 
contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules”).  
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test lends itself naturally to a case-by-case approach to Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.636 The overly cautious approach can 
lead to a failure to commit to a particular rule in evaluation of a 
Fourth Amendment question, choosing a rule that is so narrowly 
tailored it only affects cases with virtually the same facts, or a 
refusal to end precedent that no longer has viability. The 
temptations are counterbalanced by adverse persuasive effects of 
the overly cautious approach. Opinions like Justice Kennedy’s in 
Quon and Justice Alito’s in Jones leave or would leave law 
enforcement and lower courts at a loss for determining how the 
Court intends they resolve related Fourth Amendment questions. 
Decisions like Justice Souter’s in Randolph are so narrow that if 
the facts of a future case do not match nearly exactly to the 
precedent, lower courts are still unsure how to proceed. The 
primary harm to an opinion’s persuasive force is seen in the area 
of practical wisdom.  
The second tendency is for Justices to overstate or misstate a 
line of precedent or to seek to avoid the application of the precedent 
through a factual characterization of the case. This approach 
reveals just how powerful the pull of stare decisis can be. In 
opinions like Justice Scalia’s Jones majority,637 Justice Thomas’s 
dissent in Rodriguez,638 and Justice Stevens’s majority in 
Caballes,639 the holes in the use of precedent are readily apparent 
and often commented on at length by dissenting and concurring 
opinions. These deficiencies undercut the credibility of the 
Justice’s opinion and thereby the persuasive force of the opinion’s 
ethos. In the context of a Supreme Court opinion, it can be 
forcefully argued that an opinion that lacks adequate ethos is an 
opinion of little value. 
One possible explanation for the tendency to misstate or 
overstate a line of precedent comes from a challenge inherent in 
the diversity of the Court’s judicial philosophies. Stare decisis 
                                                                                                     
 636. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968) (“No judicial opinion can 
comprehend the protean variety of the street encounter, and we can only judge 
the facts of the case before us.”).  
 637. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012). 
 638. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1617 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
 639. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005). 
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binds, to a degree, future Supreme Courts regardless of the 
modality of interpretation the Court utilizes when establishing the 
precedent.640 Thus, a committed originalist may be forced to build 
off of precedent that a committed realist established, and vice 
versa. The Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has famously 
been called “a crazy quilt.”641 The tendency to have some 
disharmony in jurisprudence must be expected, especially when 
the Justices writing the opinions do so from very different 
philosophies. 
B. Audience Expectation and Judicial Advocacy 
In addition to identifying three core components of rhetoric, 
Aristotle also advocated that any act of persuasion should be 
tailored to fit the audience to which it is being presented.642 Most 
systematic approaches to persuasion place a special emphasis on 
the role of the audience. The sophists, Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero 
all included a focus on the audience, as do modern rhetorical 
theorists.643  
In The New Rhetoric, Ch. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca 
asserted that audience awareness is central to persuasion.644 They 
                                                                                                     
 640. See Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015) 
(discussing stare decisis as “a foundation stone of . . . law;” it is ‘more important 
that the . . . law be settled than that it be settled right.’” (citing Michigan v. Bay 
Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2036 (2014); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas 
Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932))). 
 641. PHILLIP A. HUBBART, MAKING SENSE OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW: A 
FOURTH AMENDMENT HANDBOOK xix, xxii (2d ed., 2015). 
 642. See ON RHETORIC, supra note 40, at 148–56 (noting that Aristotle 
discusses adapting speeches to the character of the audience). 
 643. See id. at 148 (“In Plato’s Phaedrus . . . Socrates argues that there cannot 
be a true art of speech without a knowledge of the soul (psykh), enabling a speaker 
to fit the appropriate argument to the soul of the hearer.”); PERELMAN & 
OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 510, at 20 (discussing Aristotle’s Rhetoric, as well 
as Cicero’s proclamation to speak differently to the “coarse and ignorant” class of 
men than to “that other, enlightened and cultivated” class (quoting CICERO, 
PARTITIONES ORATORIAE § 90)); id. at 319, 495 (discussing the tendency of the 
sophists to focus on their prestige to gain the respect of the audience, as well as 
their tightly structured speeches designed to guide the audience). 
 644. PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 510, at 6–7 (“What we 
preserve of the traditional rhetoric is the idea of the audience, an idea 
1968 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1869 (2016) 
proposed that audiences can be divided into a variety of groups: 
self, interlocutor, particular, and universal.645 The audience of the 
self, as the category’s title implies, means to persuade oneself.646 
The interlocutor is a single individual a speaker would address “in 
a dialogue.”647 A particular audience is that group of individuals 
who the author is directing a particular type of persuasion 
toward.648 The universal audience is a theoretical construct.649 If 
the universal audience existed, the illusory “reasonable men” and 
“reasonable women” described throughout the various disciplines 
of U.S. law would populate it.650 The universal audience is moved 
primarily by reason.651 The particular audience is affected by other 
influences, such as personal emotion, preexisting opinions, and 
values.652 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca suggest that by 
envisioning how to persuade the universal audience and then 
                                                                                                     
immediately evoked by the mere thought of a speech. Every speech is addressed 
to an audience and it is frequently forgotten that this applies to everything 
written as well.”). 
 645. See id. at 20, 30–31 (highlighting several kinds of audience: the 
“universal audience;” the “interlocutor,” a “particular audience,” and “the subject 
himself”). 
 646. See id. at 40 (discussing the audience of self, or the “self-deliberating” 
audience). 
 647.  Id. at 30. 
 648. See id. at 31, 39–40 (discussing the interlocutor and the particular 
audience, as well as the general tendency to tailor an argument based on the 
particular audience). 
 649. See id. at 20–21 (“Every social circle or milieu is distinguishable in terms 
of its dominant opinions and unquestioned beliefs, of the premises taken for 
granted without hesitation: these views form an integral part of its culture, and 
an orator wishing to persuade a particular audience must of necessity adapt 
himself to it.”). 
 650. See id. at 32 (“Thus, maximally efficacious rhetoric, in the case of a 
universal audience, is rhetoric employing nothing but logical proof.”); Alan D. 
Miller & Ronan Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323, 325–26 
(2012) (defining the “reasonable person.”). 
 651. PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 510, at 32 (“Argumentation 
addressed to a universal audience must convince the reader that the reasons 
adduced are of a compelling character, that they are self-evident, and possess an 
absolute and timeless validity, independent of local or historical contingencies.”). 
 652. See id. at 13–17 (discussing the need for a “contact of the minds” in order 
to facilitate effective discourse). 
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adapting that argument to a particular audience, an advocate can 
create an effective argument.653  
One of the challenges the Justices of the Supreme Court face 
when writing persuasive opinions is the diversity of their audience. 
Although the “universal audience” as described in The New 
Rhetoric does not exist, the Supreme Court’s audience is perhaps 
closer to that ideal than the audiences for other political 
performative utterances. The Justices of the Court can be confident 
that their Fourth Amendment opinions will be read by their fellow 
justices, federal and state court judges, and lawyers who practice 
in the area affected by the opinion.654 Depending on the opinion, 
the Justices must be prepared to have their opinions read by 
laypeople, the media, and politicians—in short, everyone and 
anyone in the United States. In this way, Supreme Court decisions 
are not unlike some speeches made by the President or the Speaker 
of the House of Representatives. Supreme Court opinions, 
however, must persuade future audiences as well.655 The nature of 
the common law and the Court’s jurisprudence in general is that 
today’s majority opinion may be tomorrow’s dissent, and vice versa. 
Thus, the Supreme Court is called upon to address a widely diverse 
audience that is affected by the opinions and values of today, and 
the audience of tomorrow; particularly the Supreme Court justices 
of tomorrow, whose opinions and values are unknown.656  
Because the Justices of the Supreme Court are called upon to 
write persuasive opinions for today and tomorrow, they must 
balance Aristotle’s components of rhetoric with special care. This 
suggests that the Justices avoid tethering their opinions too closely 
to transitory opinions or values. Opinions should be weighted 
toward enduring judicial values because the Court’s audience 
                                                                                                     
 653. See id. at 19–47 (discussing the three audience groups and their 
relationships to one another generally in the construction of an argument). 
 654. See Eric Berger, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Absolutism, 56 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 667, 688 (2015) [hereinafter Berger, The Rhetoric] (listing “lower 
courts, governmental officials, parties, lawyers, law students, law professors . . . , 
the media, the general public, and more” as audiences). 
 655. See id. (including “future Justices” as an audience). 
 656. Id. 
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expects judicial opinions to demonstrate those values.657 Of 
particular concern is when a Justice appears outcome-oriented.  
Recently Professor Eric Berger published an article that 
examines the rise of what he calls “The Rhetoric of Constitutional 
Absolutism.”658 In the Article, Professor Berger explains that 
“constitutional absolutism” is the tendency of Justices of today’s 
Supreme Court to “pretend that answers are obvious.”659 Professor 
Berger has suggested the rise of absolutism can be connected to 
strategic goals of the Justices,660 internal Court mechanisms,661 
and psychological factors like the natural tendency for Justices to 
revert to the role of advocate.662 It is Professor Berger’s last 
suggestion that I will discuss. 
The desire to win an argument is a powerful motivator for 
human beings. Aristotle’s work on rhetoric notes that persuasion 
is an activity that humans engage in everyday in all manner of 
things.663 Attorneys have been educated in persuasion and have 
often spent much of their professional lives perfecting the art and 
science of convincing an audience. Each of the Justices on the 
Supreme Court is a skilled attorney who has risen to the heights 
of the profession.664 The publicity of the argument can accentuate 
the natural human desire to win an argument.665 The more eyes 
                                                                                                     
 657. See id. at 734 (asserting that “judges should explain their opinions with 
‘reasoned elaboration’”). 
 658. Id. at 667. 
 659. Id. at 673. 
 660. See id. at 699 (referring to the “demosprudential” aims of Justices in the 
crafting of opinions). 
 661. See id. at 709 (discussing existing judicial and political structures that 
influence the crafting of Supreme Court opinions). 
 662. See id. at 716, 725 (discussing the psychological tendency to act and write 
as an advocate). 
 663. See ON RHETORIC, supra note 40, at 30 (“Rhetoric . . . [is] within the 
knowledge of all people . . . . [A]ll people, in some way, share in [rhetoric].”). 
 664. See Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.supreme 
court.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (listing the sitting 
Supreme Court Justices and their individual legal experience) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 665. See Berger, The Rhetoric, supra note 654, at 723 (“[T]he writing process 
sometimes subconsciously leads a writer towards rhetorical absolutism as she 
tries to defend an outcome as persuasively as possible.”). 
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watching, the more an individual’s ego is a factor. Because the 
legal academic community, lower court judges, and the media 
dissect and discuss every opinion Supreme Court Justices issue, 
the personal stakes can be high.666  
The desire to “win” may influence a Justice to use a 
pathos-based argument that resonated with them personally, but 
in doing so, the Justice excites emotions disconnected with the 
Fourth Amendment. Justice Kennedy’s use of an emotive 
argument in Maryland v. King illustrates this point.667 The 
emotions Justice Kennedy evokes are empathy for the victim and 
outrage toward the defendant, but those emotions are fairly beside 
the Fourth Amendment point.  
The desire to win can also impact a Justice’s logic-based 
arguments. It has long been recognized that correct facts are not 
necessary for a logical syllogism to be formally correct.668 Professor 
David Zaresky has offered the following example: all heavenly 
bodies are made of cheese, the moon is a heavenly body, and thus 
the moon is made of cheese.669 From a strict form perspective the 
above syllogism is correct.670 So, a syllogism can be used to give any 
argument the appearance of validity.671 Further, how an advocate 
crafts the major premise of the syllogism is often determinative of 
the syllogism’s outcome. The selection of such a major premise, 
which demands a particular outcome, appears less a tool of valid 
logical analysis than a tool of advocacy.  
As Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca all 
acknowledge, persuasion ought to be tailored to a particular 
audience.672 In the context of the Supreme Court, most of the 
                                                                                                     
 666. This does not include the weight that history must also place on a Justice 
when writing an opinion. Justices like Marshall, Holmes, Story, Frankfurter, 
Brandeis, and Cardozo are well known and nearly revered.  
 667. See supra notes 401–404 and accompanying text (detailing the use of 
pathos in Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Maryland v. King). 
 668. See Audio tape: DAVID ZAREFSKY, ARGUMENTATION: THE STUDY OF 
EFFECTIVE REASONING lecture 3 (2d ed., Teaching Company 2005) (illustrating 
how categorical syllogisms, which contain statements that relate different 
categories to one another, need only consist of two premises and a conclusion). 
 669. Id. 
 670. Id. 
 671. Id. 
 672. See supra notes 642–643 and accompanying text (discussing the need to 
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audience has a general expectation of how Justices should present 
their opinions. These expectations have been created and 
developed over the life of the United States. They are manifest in 
our symbols of judicial power and authority and the art that adorns 
the Supreme Court itself. Judges are expected to be balanced, 
without personal agenda, and demonstrate “reasoned 
elaboration”673 in their written opinions.674 This is not to say 
Justices should not advocate a position—rather it is to emphasize 
that they must advocate in a particular way or risk violating the 
expectations of their audience. 
V. Conclusion 
The Fourth Amendment opinions of the Justices of the Roberts 
Court are, at their core, advocacy pieces. Through their opinions, 
Justices are called upon to convince their audience that they have 
done justice to the parties involved in a dispute, established a wise 
rule for future application, and extolled the virtues of the Fourth 
Amendment while condemning the vices that threaten it. These 
demands are high and quite arguably unrealistic. The only way 
that Justices can achieve this goal is through effective use of all 
the components of persuasion: appeals to credibility, emotion, and 
logic. These appeals must be tempered by the cultural expectations 
of judicial opinions issued by the Supreme Court. Those cultural 
expectations become part of the expectations of the Court’s 
audience. Thus, persuasive Supreme Court decisions not only use 
appeals to emotion, logic, and credibility, but they do so in an 
apparently balanced, judicious fashion.  
                                                                                                     
tailor rhetoric to the intended audience). 
 673. Berger, The Rhetoric, supra note 654, at 736. 
 674. See supra note 625 and accompanying text (describing the role of judges 
as nonbiased third-party arbiters). 
